A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities” (2018) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10, 272-314. With Yinghua He, Marek Pycia and Jianye Yan.

Ex-ante Efficiency in Assignments with Seniority Rights” (2017) Review of Economic Design 21, 33-48.

Welfare-Maximizing Assignment of Agents to Hierarchical Positions” (2015) Journal of Mathematical Economics 61, 253-270. With Isa Hafalir.

Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers” (2012) Journal of Economic Theory 147, 179-206.

 “Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry” (2010) Economic Theory 42, 523-538.

“Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs” (2008) Mathematical Social Sciences 56, 448-455.

 “Choosing between service fees and budget funding to pay for local services: Empirical evidence from Spain” (2010), Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 28, 54-71. With Germà Bel.

“A duration model analysis of privatization of municipal water services in Spain” (2009) Revista de Economía Aplicada 50, 47-75.

“The link between service privatization and price distribution among consumer types: municipal water services in the Spanish region of Catalonia” (2008) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 26, 159-172.

“Factors influencing privatization of urban solid waste collection in Spain” (2003) Urban Studies 40, 1323-1334. With Germà Bel.



Large vs. Continuum Assignment Economies”, with Marek Pycia (Revise and Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior.) With appendix.

Prices and Efficient Assignments without Transfers”, with Marek Pycia (Revise and Resubmit at the Journal of Economic Theory.)

Catchment Areas and Access to Better Schools”, with Caterina Calsamiglia.

School Choice Mechanisms, Peer Effects and Sorting”, with Caterina Calsamiglia and Francisco Martínez-Mora.

Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes in Two-Sided Matching”, with Yinghua He and Jianye Yan.

 Pseudomarkets with priorities in large random assignment economies

 School choice: the case for the Boston Mechanism