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Professor of Economics

Ph.D, CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1988


Dept. d'Economia and CODE
Edifici B
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
08193 Bellaterra
Tel.: +93 581 21 92
Fax: +93 581 24 61

Research Fellow of  MOVE

On-Going Research

Iceberg transport technologies in spatial competition. Hotelling reborn (joint with J.M. Usategui)
Transport costs in address models of differentiation are usually modeled as separable of the consumption commodity and with a parametric price. However, there are many sectors in an economy where such modeling is not satisfactory either because transportation is supplied under oligopolistic conditions or because there is a difference (loss) between the amount delivered at the point of production and the amount received at the point of consumption. This paper is a first attempt to tackle these issues proposing to study competition in spatial models using an iceberg-like transport cost technology allowing for concave and convex melting functions.

Partnerships in pre-competitive agreements (joint with R. Nicolini)
In this paper we aim at studying the effects entailed by a pre-competitive agreement in the case of a Bertrand duopoly. Our distinguishing ferature is to introduce a time dimension for such an agreement. Despite of the common issues in the current literature, such an agreement yields pecuniary advantages each firm may enjoy once the agreement comes to end. In this dynamic framework, the magnitude of those adavantages turns out to be associated with firms' technology and, as a novelty, to the lenght of the agreement. The set of possible admissible solutions coincides with a Cantor set.
Technological adoption in health care (joint with P.P. Barros)
This paper addresses the impact of payment systems on the rate of technology adoption.
We present a model where technological shift is driven by demand uncertainty, increased patients' benefit, financial variables, and the reimbursement system to providers.  Two payment systems are studied: cost reimbursement and (two variants of) DRG. According to the system considered, adoption occurs either when patients' benefits are large enough or when the differential reimbursement across technologies offsets the cost of adoption. Cost  reimbursement leads to higher adoption of the new technology if the rate of reimbursement is high relative to the margin of new vs. old technology reimbursement under DRG. Having larger patient benefits favors more adoption under the cost reimbursement payment system, provided that adoption occurs initially under both payment systems.
Pricing proprietary research projects in large scientific facilities (joint with David Pérez-Castrillo)
Large scientific facilities in all domains of science, are looking at cooperation between science and the industry to alleviate their increasing financial constraints, as proprietary research proposals are charged a price for the time-use of the facility. We argue that present practices to determine those prices are completely ad hoc and thus, not based in any economic rationality. This paper presents several alternative pricing mechanisms based on three economic concepts: willingness to pay, social benefits, and opportunity cost. These mechanisms satisfy some desirable properties like publicity, simplicity, and based in well-accepted economic principles.

Working Papers
Curriculum Vitae (spanish)   (english)

Teaching Notes   Llibre d'Organització
          Industrial       Health Economics: An Industrial Organization

My Library

Last update February 2012.