Violence and displacement. Evidence from the Spanish civil war (1936-1939)

Laia Balcells[1]

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between violence and displacement during civil war focusing on two different forms of population movements (i.e. incoming and outgoing), and two different forms of violence (i.e. direct and indirect). The paper explores the relationship between displacement and violence at the local level in the context of a civil war fought conventionally using fine-grained data from 1,062 municipalities of the region of Catalonia during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). First, the paper suggests that exogenous and endogenous to the war factors combine to generate patterns of resettlement. Second, the evidence indicates that, in a civil war context, refugee flows and violence are interrelated in multiple ways: the arrival of internal refugees in a locality promotes the perpetration of direct violence against civilians; this, in turn, triggers the departure of people from the locality when the other group approaches. Third, indirect violence (i.e. bombings) shows to be the most significant factor accounting for external displacement at the local level, suggesting that bombing can serve as a strong signal for civilians of the type of armed group they are facing. Finally, the Spanish case suggests that the demographic changes provoked by displacement, combined with the lethality of the conflict, are likely to have long-term political consequences.

Keywords: civil war, violence, displacement, Spain

[1] Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. Email: laia.balcells@iae.csic.es. The author is grateful for comments to Theodore McLauchlin, Luis de la Calle, and conference participants at the ECPR General Conference 2011, APSA Annual Meeting 2011, and Barcelona HiCN Workshop 2011. She gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Recercaixa and from the Spanish Government through project ECO2011-25293.

Introduction: Violence and Displacement during Civil War

How does violence interact with forced and voluntary displacement at the local level during civil war? Displacement is a form of violence that can be used either a substitute or a complement of lethal violence (Kalyvas, 2006; Esteban, Morelli & Rohner, 2010). At the same time, displacement is a crucial variable to be taken into account when analyzing the determinants of violence in conflict, as well as its consequences: violence engenders displacement, and different forms of violence result from displacement (Hovil, 2008). Cycles of violence and displacement are difficult to bring to an end, and they are at the core of the humanitarian catastrophes in some of the most severe civil wars in recent times (e.g. Great Lakes; former Yugoslavia; Colombia). Despite cycles of violence and displacement are not new phenomena, and they have characterized civil wars for decades now, they are understudied in the literature. 'Despite conspicuous awareness of instances in which relocation processes have a clear role in the dynamics of violence, there has been no systematic research on the way such interaction unfolds' (Serrano, 2010).

In this paper, I explore empirically the relationship between displacement and violence in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), and 'old' civil war, which was fought conventionally, and possibly the first contemporary civil war observing mass displacement. It is estimated that over 440,000 people left Spain during the conflict and right after its end. The phenomenon of mass displacement in this conflict called the attention of international powers, and it directly affected countries such as France, which received the vast majority of refugees in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in its Southern territories. It has been argued that armed groups fighting this conflict deliberately promoted displacement in order to cleanse the territory (Prada, 2010).

I study two different aspects of displacement in the Spanish Civil War: i) Incoming refugee flows. There were a lot of internally displaced in this conflict, and several localities in rearguard territories (such as the region of Catalonia) hosted refugees coming from other parts of Spain. I ask the question of where did these internal refugees go; that is, why did they go to some localities, and not to others? ii) Outgoing refugee flows. During and after the conflict, many

people left their localities to go to other localities in Spain, to France or to other countries. I explore variation in these outgoing flows: why people fled from some localities, and not others? The first question has to do with 'pulling' type of factors (what did attract people into a locality?), while the second has to do with 'pushing' type of factors (what did push people out from a locality?). I will analyze local level data on incoming and outgoing flows during and immediately after this civil war, and I will explore their connections with a number of political and military variables. In particular, I will explore the relationship between displacement and two different forms of violence featured in conventional civil wars: direct and indirect. I will consider as 'direct' violence perpetrated with light weaponry (e.g. guns, knives, shotguns, machetes) in a face-to-face type of interaction (e.g. individual or mass executions); and as 'indirect' violence that is perpetrated with heavy weaponry (e.g. tanks, fighter planes) and that does not require a face-to-face interaction with the victims (Balcells, 2010a). These types of violence should be differently connected to demographic movements and resettlement patterns during conflict.

In this paper, I will take advantage of a fine-grained novel dataset of 1,062 localities in the territory of Catalonia, which is an extension of the Balcells (2011a) dataset. This dataset contains information at the municipal level on direct violence (i.e. executions), indirect violence (i.e. bombings), incoming people in localities (during the civil war: between 1936 and 1939), and outgoing people from localities, during and after the end of the war.[2] In addition, it also includes information on a number of demographic, geographic, and political covariates. The dataset allows me to inductively explore different hypotheses on the ways violence and displacement are intertwined.

The Spanish Civil War in Catalonia

The Spanish Civil War (hereafter, also SCW) began as a military coup against a legally constituted democratic government. It lasted for almost three years (18 July 1936-1 April 1939)

[2] The unit of analysis will be the municipality, which is a significant administrative unit in Spain; the local level is the one where the most important interactions and dynamics take place during internal conflict (Kalyvas, 2006; Fuji, 2009).

and generated around 800,000 deaths.[3] The civil war took place between two main political blocs: 1) the army of the Republican government or Loyalists, which also included militias of political parties, trade unions, and the International Brigades; I include all of them under the label of the 'left', even though there were important differences between them, including intense rivalries that eventually led to violent clashes; 2) the army of the rebels (Francoists or Nationalists), which also included factions of the regular army and various militias; I include them all under the label of the 'right'. The right won the war, and Spain became a military dictatorship led by General Francisco Franco that lasted until 1975, when Franco died and there was a transition to democracy.

The SCW has an extensive bibliography: it was a key event of the 'interwar period', and it had many consequences for the international system (i.e. it was the place where the Nazis and the Italian fascists tested their aerial military equipment and got ready for WWII). In this paper, I deal only with internal aspects of the war: I refer mainly to dynamics of lethal violence and displacement during the conflict. Thus, I leave other aspects of it (such as its international dimension) aside.

In Spain, violence was perpetrated by both blocs, both in the battlefield and outside of it:

i) *Leftist violence* has been labeled as 'Red Terror', and it consisted on 'organized mass executions in most parts of the Republican zone (…)' (Payne, 2004:117), as well as non-mass executions. This violence has been considered by some historians as very 'rational' (Ledesma, 2003: 253) because it was very often selective and intended to 'clean the society' from counterrevolutionary people: religious people, capitalists, landowners, etc. Other authors have argued, in contrast, that this violence was mostly a consequence of the collapse of the state, which allowed a lot of uncontrolled civilian militias to take weapons and perpetrate the crimes

[3] Data on total deaths during the civil war is still incomplete, and historians are involved in debates about estimations (Salas, 1977; Martín Rubio, 1997; Preston, 1986; Torres, 2002; Juliá, 2004; Prada, 2010). Hence, we should take this as an orientation number.

(Preston, 1986; Vilar, 1986).[4] Leftist violence had approximately 50,000 victims.[5] Members of the clergy constituted a big share of these victims: a total of 6,832 members of the clergy were assassinated (Rodrigo, 2008: 99). In addition, there was violence within the Republican Army (e.g. against deserters), as well as violence between leftist parties (e.g. during the 'events of May' of May 1937 in Barcelona, between CNT and POUM and the Communist Party).[6] The Republican army also perpetrated indirect violence in Nationalist territories, mainly in frontlines areas but also on rearguard territories inhabited by civilians.

ii) *Rightist violence*, also called 'blue terror' (Salomón & Ledesma, 2006), took the form of indirect and direct violence. On the one hand, many historians consider it more terrorizing than the 'red terror' precisely because the machinery that promoted it was very well organized (Preston, 1986); a strong discipline and rank-and-file control within the Francoist army implied that opportunistic behavior could hardly take place (Prada, 2010). In those villages that the Right took control of, executions affected selectively people that were suspected to be leftist, leftist militants, liberals, and even Catalan/Basque nationalists. On the other hand, the Francoist army was also responsible of mass killings in conquered places (i.e. Badajoz), and aerial bombings against civilians.[7]Francoist violence lasted several years after the end of the war; postwar repression was extremely severe: in Catalonia, with a population of around 3 million habitants, there were 110,000 judiciary trials, and around 180,000 people were processed during the whole Francoist period (Solé i Sabaté, 2000). The 'state of war' lasted at least until 1948.

Violence in Catalonia

Catalonia is located in the Northeast of the Iberian Peninsula. It is delimitated by the Mediterranean Sea in the East, by France and Andorra in the North, and by the Spanish region of

[4]Ledesma argues against this perspective saying that most of the perpetrators (militia members, civilians) were associated with antifascist organizations and local committees or 'column' committees and that they cannot be considered 'uncontrolled'. Recent systematic empirical evidence also challenges this claim (Balcells,2011a).
[5] Only in the territory of Catalonia, it implied the assassination of 8,352 people (Solé I Sabaté & Villarroya, 1989:450).
[6] Nevertheless, this intra-leftist violence was not substantially as important as one would think judging from some historical accounts (e.g. Orwell, 1938) –in Catalonia, for example, it only represented 2.85% of the total executions (Solé I Sabaté & Villarroya, 1989).
[7] The latter were supported by the armed forces of Italy and Germany, allies of Franco in the war.

Aragon in the West. The Pyrenees are the natural boundary between Catalonia and France. During the SCW, one of the most stable frontlines was the one created along the Ebro River, which divided Aragon into two sides (i.e. Nationalist and Republican). As the Nationalist army advanced in 1938, it conquered Lleida and some parts of the Western counties, which constituted 'combat zone' for a while. One of the most affected counties was *Terra Alta* (in the Southwest of the region), which was witness to the largest battle of the war (the 'battle of the Ebro', July-December 1938), and the counties of the Midwest (*Pallars Jussà, Segrià, Noguera, Alta Ribagorça*), which were affected by the so-called 'battle of the Segre' (April-December 1938). Catalonia was under Republican control during most of the war, and it was conquered by the Nationalist army in an offensive that started right after the Nationalist victory in the battle of the Ebro (Reverte, 2003; Sole i Sabaté & Villarroya, 1987).The use of aerial attacks combined with well-organized land forces made it a ferocious occupation, leading to the surrender of this territory on 13 February 1939.

Direct violence took place in Catalonia in two stages: first (from July 1936 to 1938/39) violence was perpetrated by leftist militias and the Republican army; later (during and after its occupation of the territories) violence was perpetrated by the Nationalist army and right-wing militias. Indirect violence took place in the form of aerial bombings by the Nationalists until they occupied the region. The peak of leftist violence in Catalonia was August 1936; after November 1936, it decreased quite abruptly, only slightly increasing again in 1938 and in the first two months of 1939, right before the occupation of the region by the Francoist army, illustrating the death throes of Republican control of the area. The highest levels of rightist repression took place in those months that preceded and immediately followed the end of the war (1 April 1939), and it decreased thereafter. Bombings by the Nationalists (and their allies) took place during the whole 1936-1939 period, although they increased in intensity as the war advanced (Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya, 1986).

Displacement in Catalonia

As we said, the SCW was the first contemporary civil war experiencing large numbers of internally and externally displaced. Despite the relevance of the phenomenon, data on displaced

is still very fragmentary; most studies on refugees are limited to one county or to one municipality. Partly as a consequence of datascarcity, no systematic study of the determinants of displacement has been made to date.

Incoming people

During the civil war, Catalonia received a large amount of refugees coming from other regions of Spain, which had already been conquered by the Nationalists (i.e. Andalusia, Basque Country). The number of internally displaced (thereafter, also IDPs) increased as the war advanced, and this implied a lot of challenges for the already scarce Catalan war economy (Borràs, 2000; Maymí Rich, et al., 2006; Serrallonga, 2004). According to Serrallonga (2004), the total number of IDPs in Catalonia was 300,000 by the end of 1936, 700,000 by 1937, and more than a million by the end of 1938. Most of these IDPs left the country between the end of 1938 and the beginning of 1939 –prior to Franco's victory- and thus became externally displaced. Only a small share of them stayed in their host towns and villages. Figures 1-3 display the distribution of IDPs, in % of the population of the host localities, for years 1936, 1937, and 1938. The figures depict that IDPs moved towards northern areas as the Nationalists were advancing; the figures also show that while some areas had IDPs all three years, others did not have IDPs any time during the entire conflict; this variation is interesting and shall be explored.

Figures 1 to 3 about here

Outgoing people

In Catalonia, there were two main phases of people leaving their localities during the civil war:

1) Between 1936 and 1939, Catalonia experienced an outflow of people that left the region mostly to go to foreign countries, fleeing from repression by anarchist and communist militias. Also, another (smaller) share of people departed to get into other Spanish regions that were under rightist control –sometimes to join the Nationalist army. This is the so called *1936 Exile*, which

affected people identified with right-wing political parties, landlords and members of the bourgeoisie, members of the clergy, and even people identified with left-wing moderate political parties who were threatened by the anarchists and/or communists. In this period, the democratic government of the Second Republic was involved with the organization of infrastructures that would allow people to flee (Dòll-Petit, 2003). This exile has been very well studied from the point of view of the political elites that experienced it, and it also has been studied from the perspective of the destinations (i.e. Genoa, which was the main destination of this first wave of refugees). Whereas some data has been gathered from the perspective of the localities from which these people were leaving, this is not very systematic.

2) The so-called *1939 Exile*, which affected people that were identified as members of leftist political parties, trade unions, Catalan nationalist political parties, and IDPs having arrived to Catalonia during the war. This exile has been quite studied by local historians,[8] but fine-grained data has only been collected for a few of them.[9] Much of the research on the 1939 exile is done with a focus on the impact of the refugees in their destination countries (France, Mexico, US, Cuba, etc.), on the compilation of global numbers of refugees, or on the detailed account of the biographies of important people that went through it, especially political leaders (e.g. Lluís Companys, Josep Irla) and intellectuals (e.g. Antonio Machado, Pere Quart). The lion's share of the displaced between 1938 and 1939 in Catalonia became external refugees; the preemptive flight from the conquest of Catalonia by the Nationalists implied that thousands of hundreds of people crossed the Spain-France border by all possible means of transportation. A large number of these refugees died on their way to France either because of bad weather, fatigue, famine, or because of the bombs that the rightist army threw on them (Sole i Sabaté &Villarroya, 1986, 2003b). There is still not accurate data on the rates of return to Spain, but there is quite a lot of evidence that a lot of these external refugees could not return until the late 40s/early 50s –due to Franco's political repression - and that many of them never did it because they stayed in their host countries, they died in French refugee camps, they died during WWII (fighting with the Allies), or they were killed in Nazi camps (Roig,1977; Bermejo & Checa, 2006).

[8]For example, Pijiula (2000), Gaitx (2007), Planes (1989).
[9] For instance, Gaitx (2007) presents reliable data on exiled people for a total of 48 municipalities.

Empirical Analysis

In this paper, the study of Catalonia will be focused on two different dependent variables at the local level: 1) incoming people (i.e. internally displaced people coming into Catalan localities); 2) outgoing people (i.e. people leaving from Catalan localities). On the one hand, I will explore the determinants of the localization of the IDPs: why they went to some locations and not others. In Republican Spain, the government took charge (through the *Junta Nacional de Refugiados*) of the settlement of IDPs arriving from other Republican areas, and of the provision of services for these people in the localities where they were going (Serrallonga, 2004). Yet, the government could not fully control these population movements, and people very often ended up choosing their own destinations; this was especially the case in late stages of the conflict (i.e. 1938). We can think that some localities were more receptive to IDPs than others, and that individuals made their choices according to this degree of receptivity. We can hence ask what made some localities more receptive to IDPs than others.

The variables that I will explore are: a) Political variables, related to the prewar period (e.g. support for the left in the 1936 elections; political competition), and thus exogenous to the war. Following Steele (2009), we could think that leftist supporters having departed from Nationalist areas would be more interested in going to places with a greater proportion of leftist militants and/or supporters, so that they could become more invisible if facing a threat by the Nationalist army. Following Balcells (2011a), we could think that local prewar competition -a good predictor for executions- would be a deterrent for IDPs, who would be reluctant to settle in potentially violent locations. b) Endogenous to the war variables, or security variables (e.g. executions, bombings). These variables will be considered lagged; we could think that past violence in a locality would be a deterrent for IDPs.

After analyzing the determinants of the location of the IPDs, I will explore the implications of their presence in the localities. Did they have any impact on the perpetration of violence? In a context where armed groups are targeting civilians with the intention to cleanse rearguard areas of strong enemies (Balcells, 2010a, 2011a), we would think that the group will have an interest in eliminating strong supporters of the enemy regardless of their place of origin. Areas hosting

internally displaced people that are associated with the rival group, B (e.g. civilians who are fleeing from areas that are occupied by A), could be more targeted by A because of this. Indeed, Steele (2008) has observed, in the civil war in Colombia (1998-2006), that massacres by the paramilitary were more likely in locations with a greater density of internally displaced having fled from paramilitary control zones. From an empirical perspective, in Catalonia it is less plausible to observe patterns of prosecution of IDPs by means of direct violence (e.g. massacres) because, as explained above, most of these IDPs left their host towns when the Francoist army was approaching the territory (Pujol, 2006). Yet, IDPs could also have had an impact on direct violence: it could be that these leftists coming from other areas of Spain, fleeing from the Nationalists, were prone to promote violence against right-wingers in the hosting localities. In Extremadura, for example, Espinosa argues that people victimized by fascist repression in the western zone (i.e. *Almendralejo*, *Fuente de Maestre*, *Mérida*, *Badajoz*) were those that led the repression in the eastern part; the refugees that went to the Republican zones of Extremadura (fleeing from the Nationalists) 'wanted to kill rightist detainees' (Espinosa, 2003: 253). Thus, one implication of the presence of IDPs in Catalan localities could be a greater number of executions by the left during the 1936-1939 period, as compared to localities not hosting IDPs. In Spain, some historians have pointed out that places with larger numbers of IDPs were more intensively affected by bombings of the right (e.g. Guernica, as argued by Vidal 1997). Yet, there is no systematic evidence in support of this hypothesis (Balcells, 2011b).

On the other hand, I will study outgoing population movements, namely people that left Catalan localities during and after the end of the war. Again, in the case of Catalonia, due to the proximity with the sea and with France, a vast majority of people that left their homes ended up being an external refugee. While I have been able to collect some data at the local level on the 1936 exile, I will use an estimate of local level displacement of 1939 (see below) to study variation across localities. In the empirical analysis, I will focus on the so-called 1939 exile, which was numerically more important than the 1936 exile (Dòll-Petit, 2003). I will again consider both prewar political variables and wartime factors (such as executions and bombings), in order to account for this variation. This will allow me to test whether the threat of prosecution (leading to displacement) is related to prewar political identities, as argued by Steele (2011), to wartime behavior of individuals, or to both. Again, the predominant hypothesis in the literature is

that higher levels of violence yield more displacement, but the mechanisms by which these two are interrelated are not clear (Steele 2009). In a recent research, Arjona (2010) argues that displacement is motivated mostly by the signal that armed groups send to civilians on their willingness to govern or otherwise cleanse them, once controlling the locality. Previous violence by the group in a locality could be a proxy for this type of signal.

In the following subsection, I describe the data that will be used in the analyses. I will then present the results of the multivariate regression analyses.

Data

Dependent Variables

IDPs: For all 1,062 localities of Catalonia, I collected available data on the total number of internally displaced people that were living in a locality during different stages of the civil war, in particular in December 1936, in April 1937, and in August 1938.[10]

1939 Displacement: I will focus on the displacement that took place at the end of the war, which was the most relevant from a numerical perspective.As explained, it is almost impossible to get large-n data on displacement at the local level. Getting perfectly accurate data implies making an assessment of every single individual who left a locality, and that is why historians have focused on a few counties and municipalities.[11] Here I take a novel approach and I calculate a 1939 displacement estimate by using a series of indicators for which I have collected informationat the local level (from primary and secondary historical sources). While this index is not optimal, it is

[10] Source: Serrallonga (2004). This historian has triangulated data from different national, regional and local archives. The total number of cases for which he collected data on refugees are 559 (December 1936), 642 (April 1937), and 678 (August 1938); the remaining localities had no IDPs.These months/year are three out of the five for which Serrallonga (2004) provides systematic data; he also collected data for December 1937 and December 1938. I choose to use the data for the three points of time for which he argues that his data is most reliable. These correspond to very different moments of the civil war in Catalonia, and I believe that can capture different dynamics regarding IDPs.

[11] In total, I have been able to collect fine-grained data from historians for only 48 municipalities. This is a very small number (it represents 0.04% of the total of Catalonia). While I do not neglect these data, and I will use it for robustness checks, I am interested in obtaining another estimate of displacement that can allow me to work with a larger number of observations.

the best possible estimate of displacement that can be calculated for a large number of cases. Unfortunately, the index cannot be calculated for all localities of Catalonia due to missing data in one or more of the indicators, which are the following:

a) Official Census of the locality in 1936.[12]
b) Official Census of the locality in 1940.[13]
c) Number of people of the locality assassinated by the left between 1936 and 1939.[14]
d) Number of people of the locality assassinated by the right between 1938 and 1942. This includes people that were assassinated after the celebration of judicial trials (most of which were in prison since 1939),[15] and people that were assassinated without previous trials –at the moment of conquest of the locality by the rightist army.[16]
e) Number of people from the locality that were in prison in 1940, and that did not get executed (that is, not included in d).[17]
f) People from the locality that were killed in bombings between 1936 and 1939.[18]
g) Combatants from the village that were killed in the battlefield.[19]
h) People from the village that were killed as a consequence of war related accidents.[20]
i) People from the locality that left during the 1936-38 period (that is, 1936 exile). [21]

I assume that population growth in the localities was null between 1936 and 1940, and that all changes in population were basically a consequence of war-related factors.[22] Then, if we subtract all the war-related causes from the figures of demographic change in a locality between 1936 and

[12] Source: Servei General d'Estadística (SGE).
[13] Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).
[14] Sources: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1989)
[15] Even if a lot of these assassinations took place after 1940, all the victims had already been imprisoned before that year, so they were not included in the censuses of their localities.
[16] Sources: Solé i Sabaté (2000), Gimeno (1989), Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1987).
[17] Sources: Sabaté (2002), Clara (1991), Ventura i Solé (1993).
[18] Sources: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1986), Gimeno (1989). These include mostly bombings by the Nationalists, but also deaths in Republican bombings that took place in areas close to the battlefield.
[19] Sources: Pijiula (1993), Arnabat & Sabanés (2006), Oliva (1992, 1994, 1999), Blanch (1994), Bonjorn et al. (1991, 1995), Noguera (1989), Gimeno (1989), Garriga et al. (2007), Castillo (1991), Sabaté (2002).
[20] Sources: Same sources listed in footnote 17.
[21] Sources: Dòll-Petit (2003), Gaitx (2007). This data is very scarce, though.
[22] This assumption is coherent with figures showing that there was a total demographic stagnation in Spain during this period (INE). Also, natural demographic growth is usually null during civil war.

1940, the result we get is the demographic change of a locality caused by the exodus of people that took place in 1938-1939.[23]

Hence, the variable **1939 Displacement Estimated** is generated with the following formula:

> [(Census1940- Census1936)*-1] – [Killed by Left + Killed by the Right +Imprisoned in 1940+ Killed By Bombs+ Combatants killed+ War accidents deaths + 1936 Displacement]

I normalize the variable to the population of a locality in 1936: % 1939 Displacement is (Displacement Estimated/Population1936)*100.

From the resulting index, I have taken out all the estimates that look suspicious;[24] I preferred to be conservative and not use data that could not possibly be relied. Nonetheless, I use different variations of the index, and the results are overall consistent.[25] In the results of the analyses displayed here, I use data for only 363 cases in my database (34% of Catalan municipalities of 1936).[26]

Independent and Control Variables

The different covariates included in the regressions, as explanatory or control variables, are the following:

---

[23] Even if exile also took place in 1936, we can assume that most of the people would have come back in 1940, once the right was in power. In any case, for the small number of cases for which we have data on exile of 1936, we have included it in the equation, in order not to count refugees from 1936 as refugees from 1939.

[24] For example, negative or excessively high numbers (over 90%).

[25] In some cases, we obtain a negative estimate for exile; I have taken out these cases of the sample. In an alternative coding (available upon request) I have given these cases the value of 0.

[26] Since I am concerned with the missing data and the representativity of the sample, I regress data availability in this variable on a large number of covariates (see Table A1 of the Appendix; the dependent variable of the logistic regression takes value 1 if the data on displacement is missing and 0 otherwise), and I observe that the only significantly robust variable explaining missing data in 1939 Displacement is % of Single Men in the locality in 1930. (This might be capturing missing data on one of the components of the index: Combatants killed. In this war there were more combatants in places with a greater share of young men as there was compulsory conscription on both sides.) Overall, even if the sample is small and obviously not fully representative of all the localities of Catalonia, there does not seem to be any systematic factor accounting for inclusion in the sample. In this sense, while the results have to be observed with caution, they can still be providing meaningful results.

% Support left 1936: Percent support for the Popular Front in the 1936 general elections.[27]

CNT Affiliation: % inhabitants affiliated to the CNT in a locality.[28]

UGT Affiliation: % inhabitants affiliated to the UGT in a locality.[29]

Latitude: Degrees (UTM, fus 31, datum ED50).[30]

Longitude: Degrees (UTM, fus 31, datum ED50).[31]

Altitude: Altitude of the municipality, in meters. [32]

Population: Inhabitants of the municipality in 1936.[33]

% Single Men: Percent of the total inhabitants of the municipality who were single men in 1930. It indicates if the locality with populated with young men, who were more likely to be combatants and participate in violence (Muchembled, 2010).[34]

% Literate: Percent of the total inhabitants of the municipality who were literate in 1930. This is a proxy for level of economic development of the locality.[35]

Catholic Center: Dummy variable, 1 if the municipality had an archbishopric in 1936; 0 otherwise.[36]

---

[27] Source: Vilanova (2005).
[28] Source: CNT (1936), Cucó i Giner (1970).
[29] Source: UGT (1931).
[30] Source: Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya (ICC).
[31] Source: Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya (ICC).
[32] Source: Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya (ICC).
[33] Source: Serrallonga (2004)
[34] Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 1930 census. Given that this variable correlates with missing values in 1939 Displacement Estimated, it will not be included in the estimations for this dependent variable.
[35] Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).
[36] Source: Conferencia Episcopal Española (CEE).

Competition: Index from 0 (minimum parity) to 1 (maximum parity). Using quadratic formula: 1-[(%Vote Left36 - %Vote Right/100)]^2

Volatility: It proxies the depth of the political cleavages; if patterns of support for the political blocs are stable, and therefore volatility is low, we can think that cleavages are deeper than if patterns of support for the blocs are unstable, and therefore volatility is high.[37]

Executed by Left: Total number of people executed by the left in a locality in the 1936-39 period.[38]

Killed Priest: 1 if the priest was killed in the locality in the 1936-39 period, 0 if not.[39]

Bombings: I use different measures of strikes in a locality: bombings in a particular years (e.g. 1937, 1938, 1939), or bombings during the totality of the civil war.[40]

Some of these variables will be included altogether in the models; others will be included separately, in order to test alternative hypotheses. Obviously, the variables will be testing different hypotheses depending on the dependent variable considered (i.e. IDPs or 1939 Displacement). I will develop thesehypotheses in the following subsection.

[37] I measure this with electoral returns of both 1933 and 1936: 0 if % Support Left 1936-% Support Left 1933 <=10%; 1 if %Support Left 1936-%Support Left 1933> 10%. Source: Vilanova (2005).
[38] Source: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1989).
[39] Source: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1989).
[40] Source: Solé i Sabaté & Villarroya (1986).

Results

Determinants of IDPs presence

In this subsection, I explore the dependent variable *IDPs*, for three different years. The dependent variable in the analyses is a dummy with value 1 if the locality had IDPs in a particular month/year (December 1936, May 1937, August 1938) and 0 if not.[41]

In Table I, we can see the results of a series of logit regressions on IDPs presence in December 1936. In M1, the main independent variable is Support Left 1936; this allows us to test the hypotheses that IDPs settle in locations with a greater presence of leftist sympathizers; M2 includes another prewar political variable in the covariates, Competition, which allows us to test for the hypothesis that prewar competition diminished the attractiveness in the locality as a refugee location. In M3, a measure of prewar volatility is added to the model with the competition variable; like before, if places with deeper cleavages are more risky in terms of safety of those arriving, people will be less attracted to go to these places. M4 and M5 incorporate variables endogenous to the war: M4 includes executed by the left in the locality,[42] and, M5 includes a more specific measure of repression, a dummy variable with value 1 if the locality had the priest executed during the war, and 0 otherwise. For 1938, I will incorporate a sixth model with the independent variable Bombings in 1937, in order to check if bombings during the previous year had a deterrent effect on IDP presence in a locality.[43]

Table I about here

Table I shows that leftist locations were more likely to receive IDPs in 1936. This is coherent with Steele's (2009) finding that people move to places with a greater density of people with

[41] I use a dummy because it makes more sense to distinguish localities that had refugees from those that did not have refugees, than to look into total number of refugees in a locality, and variation in these numbers, as this will be more determined by the size of the locality. Regressions with total number of IDPs and with IDPs as % population of the locality are available upon request.

[42] Note that this is data on executions during the whole period. I could not collect these data disaggregated by year.

[43] I do not include data on previous bombings for 1936 and 1937, because there were no bombings in Catalonia in 1935 and 1936.

their political identity in order to become more invisible in front of the enemy's threat. At the same time, the political variable Competition is significant and it takes a negative sign, indicating that places with greater balance of power between the left and the right were less likely to receive IDPs; these places turned out to be the most violent (Balcells, 2011a), and people might have been less reluctant to move there –anticipating this violence. It could also be that these divided communities had a particularly unfriendly climate, not cooperative enough to host refugees; or that refugees did not want to move there because they would not be as invisible to the enemy as in overwhelmingly leftist localities. Endogenous to the war variables are statistically insignificant; this makes sense as, by December 1936, people could still not have information on wartime events, and thus their decisions regarding where to move could not possibly be affected by them. In all models, latitude has a significant negative sign, indicating that southern locations were more likely to receive refugees: this seems to be due to geographical proximity as most of the refugees were entering Catalonia from the southwest. Altitude takes a positive sign, and this probably captures the fact that more mountainous localities where also safer destinations. Interestingly, % of Single Men in the locality has a negative impact on IDPs presence; this can be also capturing the higher risk of violence in these locations. % Literate in the locality has a positive impact, indicating that more developed locations were also more attractive to IDPs.

In 1937 (Table II), we no longer find that leftist locations are more likely to receive IDPs; Competition is still negative and significant, though. At the same time, southern, western, and bigger (i.e. more populated) locations are significantly more likely to host IDPs this year. % Single Men and % Literate take the same signs and significance levels as before. Interestingly, in this table, we observe that there is a significant effect of a variable that is endogenous to the war: Priest Killed. Having had the priest killed reduces the likelihood of a locality to receive IDPs. This variable was not significant in Table I (this makes sense, as the first wave of refugees was contemporary to the killings of priests, and thus could not be affected by them). In short, in this second year of the war, both prewar and wartime variables seem to be accounting for patterns of IDPs location.

Table II about here

Table III shows the results for IDP presence in 1938, which are overall consistent with Table II, but which display some interesting changes. On the one hand, while latitude is again negative, longitude takes a positive sign indicating that eastern locations were more likely to receive IDPs. That is probably as a consequence of the threat of a movement in the frontline due to the Battle of Ebro, which started in July 1938. On the other hand, prewar political variables lose significance in this table, but endogenous to the war variables become significant. Not only priest killed is very significant and negative (as it was in Table II), but also Executed by the Left is so. This confirms the deterrent effect of previous violent events in a locality on IDPs presence. Consistent with this, Bombings in a locality in 1937 also have a negative effect on IDPs presence in 1938.[44]

Table III about here

I now briefly explore the consequences of IDPs presence on local dynamics of violence. The presence of leftist supporters having escaped rightist repression could have enhanced the perpetration of direct violence by armed groups. While the collaboration of the refugees might not have been as crucial as that of local civilians for the perpetration of violence (these were *outsiders*, after all),[45] these IDPs could have brought information on what was happening on the other side of the frontline, and in this way increased the degree of polarization and made local civilians more prone to help leftist militias and promote violence. At the same time, people from hosting localities could just be shocked about the situation of the incoming refugees (Serrallonga, 2004: 175), and in this way developed increased hatred against their political enemies. Refugees were sometimes given voice in local newspapers, where they could explain what they had gone through with the Nationalists; this was a form of propaganda that enhanced collaboration with the refugees, but that could also increase local polarization. Finally, the presence of IDPs was

[44] In M6, I include Support Left36 as well, because this is variable that has been found to be explanatory of bombings (Balcells, 2011b), and not including it would imply an omitted variable bias.

[45] In Catalonia, refugees where mainly Spanish or Basque speaking, while the local population was Catalan speaking. So there was a clear division between local and outsiders.

stressing for communities undergoing the scarcity associated to the civil war; this could have generated private hatreds, and potentially violence driven by these hatreds (Kalyvas, 2006).

Table IV in here

Table IV replicates the Negative Binomial models in Balcells (2011a), to which I add the 1936 IDPs presence variable.[46] The results indicate that IDPs presence in 1936 has a positive impact on leftist executions, confirming the hypotheses that leftist refugees incoming to Catalan localities could have altered the local dynamics, and in this way enhanced the perpetration of direct violence.[47]

Determinants of 1939 Displacement

In this subsection, I explore the dependent variable % Displacement Estimated, which is a continuous variable (with minimum value 0.12%, maximum value 61.53%, and median 7%). I run OLS regressions with the same correlates above, although they have a different theoretical justification and interpretation here. In M1, I include Support Left 1936 as the main independent variable in order to test the hypothesis that the amount of displacement was determined by the extent to which supporters of the enemy populated the locality. Steele (2011) has found this to be the case in Apartadó, Colombia. Trade union (CNT and UGT) affiliation and Catholic Center are also measuring the presence of leftist and rightist supporters, respectively. In the Spanish case, the people that left in 1938-1939 were fleeing from the Nationalist army, and we can thus hypothesize that they were mostly left-wingers. As above, Competition is included in a second model in order to check for the alternative hypothesis that the local balance of power had an impact on displacement. Competition is a very robust variable explaining direct violence in civil war, and it could be that it was underlying displacement if this was to be used as a complementary strategy to cleanse localities from strong supporters of the enemy and change the

[46] It only includes 1936 IDPs as an independent variable because the bulk of the executions took place between August and November 1936, and it would not make sense to include 1937 and 1938 IPDs as correlates of executions having take place earlier.

[47] I do not include % Single Men and % Literate in these models because these variables were not included in Balcells (2011). In any case, I have run the models with these variables and the results do not change.

local state of affairs. Volatility is added in M3 in order to check for the explanatory effect of the depth of the cleavages on displacement. Bulutgil (2011) explains that the depth of the cleavages is a key factor accounting for ethnic cleansing; it could be that this was also key in the explanation of what can be called ideological cleansing (Steele, 2011). M4 includes executed left in order to test for the impact of direct violence on displacement. A lot of people left out of fear of retaliation, and thus we can think that more people would flee from places where the leftist militias had killed more civilians, where they would anticipate the right to be severe in this next period. Finally, M6 include bombings during the totality of the war, in order to check for the impact of this form of indirect violence on the outflow of people from localities; bombing can be a signal of toughness of the armed group entering the territory, and thus can incentivize flight.

Table V in here

Table V displays the results of the OLS regressions. We can observe that Support Left 1936 has a positive impact on 1939 displacement, quite intuitively: insofar as displacement in 1939 was generated by a threat of rightist conquest of the territory, this should be greater in places with greater leftist support.[48] Nonetheless, trade union affiliation has no significant impact on rates of displacement. The geographical variables are very significant in all models: displacement was greater in northern locations and in western locations. The former was probably due to the proximity with the French border, and the latter was probably due to the proximity with the Ebro frontline. Altitude is negative, indicating that displacement was greater in lower locations. Interestingly, Catholic Center takes a very significant negative effect, indicating that places with a greater share of religious population, were significantly less affected by displacement. In M2 and M3 we find no effect of Competition and Volatility. In M4, we find Executions by the Left to be statistically significant; thus, direct violence by the left (against rightists) provoked threat of retaliation and consequent flight.[49] Priest Killed has no significant effect on displacement, and total number of Bombings in a locality has a positive impact on it. The mechanism in this case is

[48] This contradicts the historical account provided by Gaitx (2006: 35), as he says that, for the 48 cases he studies, displacement is greater in places with lesser leftist support.

[49] This has an interesting implication: by killing supporters of the other group, the left could be changing the balance of power in the short-term (Balcells, 2010a), but this provoked the later displacement of its own supporters and it generated a *de facto* loss of political power for the group.

also fear and threat of the group that is throwing bombs.[50] If we run robustness checks with county fixed effects, the only two variables that remain significant are Support Left 1936 and Bombings.[51]

To summarize the empirical results, the analyses on the arrival of refugees into Catalan localities indicate that political variables are quite explanatory of the presence of IDPs in early stages of the war, i.e. in 1936, places with a greater support for the left, and places with a greater presence of the anarchist trade union (CNT) were more likely to host IDPs. Endogenous to the war variables are explanatory of the location of these refugees in 1937 (i.e. locations having had the priest killed were less likely to receive refugees); and geographical variables (added to the previous variables) explain the location of refugees in later stages, i.e. in 1938. At the same time, the results indicate that presence of IPDs in a locality had a positive effect on leftist executions; hence, this suggests that localities were not impermeable to the newcomers, who had an incidence not only on cohabitation within the community (Serrallonga, 2004), but also on the dynamics of violence affecting them. This is important as it suggests that cycles of displacement and violence have their seeds at the level of the community. Regarding outgoing population movements that affected all Catalan localities in 1939, the results indicate that endogenous to the war variables are the most powerful factors accounting for displacement. In particular, executions by the left in a locality had a positive impact on displacement; this is probably due to the fact that this previous violence generated a threat of retaliation at the local level, and pushed people to flee. At the same time, bombings by the right is the statistically and substantively most significant explanatory factor in these regressions, indicating that people would leave more if inhabiting places that were targeted by bombs. It could be that bombings were signaling local populations that the incoming armed group had cleansing intentions and was not willing to rule the existing population (Arjona, 2010: 138), therefore incentivizing flight.

[50] In the Appendix, I present the results of M6 with different versions of bombings (i.e. bombings disaggregated by year, total number of bombings, and total number of deaths in bombings). The significant variables are 1937 bombings, and total bombings. Thus, the bombings at the early stages of the conflict were more determinant of displacement than late stage bombings.

[51] Results are available upon request.

Conclusions

Displacement and violence are highly intertwined during civil war. Armed groups can use displacement in order to shape territories demographically (Bulutgil, 2009; Steele, 2011). Violence can generate displacement, displacement can generate violence (Hovil, 2008), and violence and displacement can simply be used as complementary forms of victimization (Kalyvas, 2006; Esteban, Morelli & Rohner, 2010).[52] This paper has made an effort to untangle the relationship between violence and displacement during civil war using micro-level data from the Spanish civil war. Micro-level studies, which have been only recently used for the study of displacement (Engel & Ibañez, 2007; Steele, 2009, 2010), should be very useful to understand the relationship between these two phenomena. If we limit ourselves to the macro-level, we might be overlooking key aspects of these processes, and achieving flawed conclusions.[53]

In the Spanish case, there has not been any theorizing over the displacement associated to the civil conflict which torn the country in the 1930s. The research has been limited to descriptive accounts of the refugee movements, or to the production of refugees' life histories. The analysis of micro-level dynamics of displacement is extremely scarce.[54] This paper constitutes a first attempt to analyze systematically patterns of arrival and departure of people from localities of a relatively large portion of the country. While some of the data has measurement issues, and there are limitations regarding the number of cases for which we have fine-grained data on all the relevant variables, I would argue that the effort is worth it. The paper displays some relevant findings, which connect with other pieces of research on displacement, and which leave room for further theorizing and research on the topic. In a similar way, there has not been theorizing regarding the determinants of the hosting of internally displaced population during the Spanish civil war. In this paper, I have taken advantage of data on IDPs presence in the Catalan rearguard

[52] For example, in a newspaper interview, a testimony of the Spanish civil war from Palencia explains: 'They expelled (my mother and me) of the village, after executing my father. (…) He was killed for being a leftist' (El Pais, 17 August 2011). He exemplifies how violence and displacement were used as complementary forms of victimization.

[53] As Steele (2009) explains, one of the most important flawed finding in large-n analyses of displacement is that higher levels of violence yield more displacement.

[54] Only a few historians have made some attempts to these (using small-n fine-grained data on localities), e.g. Pujol (2006), Gaitx (2006, 2007).

territory in order to evaluate different possible explanations for this. We have observed that a combination of political, geographical and wartime factors account for variation in IDPs presence across localities. While political variables are more salient in the first year of the war, the others gain relevance as the war goes by and the frontline advances –when the Nationalist threat becomes more visible and physically closer to rearguard localities.

One of the findings in the paper is that that direct violence in t_1 (in this case, by the left) is explanatory of local level displacement in t_2. This is particularly relevant because it indicates that violence perpetrated against one's enemies may have the counterproductive effect of promoting cleansing against one's own supporters if /when the control of the territory changes hands. This seems to be what happened in the Krajina region, in Croatia, where Serbs were expulsed largely as a reprisal on previous violence against Croats in the area. The implications of these findings are relevant to understand the motivations underlying victimization during conflict. In the case of Catalonia, the fact that exile affected more intensively localities that were more victimized by the left in the first stage of the war, and that they were later proportionally more victimized by the right, is likely to have generated important changes in their local state of affairs in favor of the right. We cannot test this conjecture because of the lack of electoral data from the immediate postwar period, due to the establishment of a dictatorship that lasted until 1977. Yet, the analysis of electoral continuity in municipalities of Catalonia (from 1936 to 1977) indicates that they did indeed experience a switch to the right (Balcells, 2010a). A tentative conclusion of this paper is thus that both violence and displacement are likely to be having political consequences in war-ravaged countries, and that is why armed groups used them strategically, in order to clean the territories politically.

References

Arjona, Ana 2010. *Social Order in Civil War.* PhD Dissertation, Yale University.

Arnabat, Ramon & Anna Sabanés (2006) Víctimes de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939) al Penedès [Victims of the Civil War (1936-1939) at Penedes]. Vilafranca del Penedès, Andana.

Balcells, Laia (2011a) Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(3): 327-339.

—(2011b) Death is in the Air. Bombings in Catalonia 1936-1939 *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*136 (Octubre-Diciembre): 25-48.

— (2010a) *Behind the Frontlines: Identity, Competition, and Violence in Civil Wars.* PhD Dissertation, Yale University.

— (2010b) Rivalry and Revenge. Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars, *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2): 291-313.

Bermejo, Benito & Sandra Checa (2006) *Libro Memorial. Españoles deportados a los campos nazis (1940-1945)* [Memorial book. Spaniards deported to Nazi camps (1940-1945)]. Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura.

Blanch, Josepa (1994) Mort, on és la teva victòria? Aproximació al cost humà de la Guerra Civil a la Terra Alta [Death, where is your victory? Approximation to the human cost of the Civil War at Terra Alta]. *Butlletí del Centre d'Estudis de la Terra Alta* 20(segon semestre).

Bonjorn, Robert, Glòria Comas, &Jaume Torres (1991) Soldats de l'Urgell morts a la Guerra Civil (1936-1939) i civils morts per material de Guerra abandonat [Soldiers from Urgell who died in the Civil War (1936-1939) and civilian deaths from abandoned war material]. Urtx 3.

Bonjorn, Robert, Josep Pla, Joan Civit, & Delfí Soler (1995) Combatents de la Noguera morts al front i civils victims d'accidents derivats de la guerra [Soldiers from Noguera who died in the battlefield and civilian deaths from war related accidents]. Urtx 7.

Borràs i Dòlera, Mercè (2000) *Refugiats/des (1936-39)* [Refugees (1936-39)] Quaderns de la Revista de Girona. Girona: Diputació de Girona.

Bulutgil, Zeynep (2011) War, Collaboration, & Endogenous Ethnic Polarization: The Path to Ethnic Cleansing. In E. Chenoweth & A. Lawrence, *Rethinking Violence.States and Non-State Actors in Conflict.* Boston: MIT Press.

— (2009) Territorial Conflict and Ethnic Cleansing. PhD thesis, University of Chicago.

Castillo, Sonia (1991) El cost humà de la guerra civil: Ripollesos morts al front [The human costs of the civil war: Citizens of Ripoll who died in the battlefield]. *Annals 1989-1990*. Ripoll, Centre d'Estudis Comarcals del Ripollès**:** 115-125.

Clara, Josep (1991) La repressió de postguerra al Ripollès: els empresonats del 1940 [The postwar repression at the Ripollès: the imprisoned of 1940]. *Annals 1989-1990*. Ripoll, Centre d'Estudis Comarcals del Ripollès**:** 127-139.

CNT. *El Congreso Confederal de Zaragoza*. [General Confederal Congress of Zaragoza].Mayo 1936.

Conferencia Episcopal Española (CEE) [Spanish Episcopal Conference]: (http://www.conferenciaepiscopal.es)

Cucó Giner, Antonio (1970) Contribución a un estudio cuantitativo de la C.N.T. [Contribution to a quantitative study of the CNT]. *Saitabi*: 181–202.

Dòll-Petit, Rubèn (2003) *Els "Catalans de Gènova" historia de l'èxode i l'adhesió d'una classe dirigent en temps de guerra* [The Catalans of Genoa. History of the exodus and adhesion of a leadership class during wartime]. Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat.

Engel, Stefanie, & Ana Maria Ibañez (2007) Displacement due to Violence in Colombia: A Household-Level Analysis. *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 55(2): 335-365.

Esteban, Joan, Massimo Morelli, & Dominic Rohner (2010) Strategic Mass Killings.*Barcelona Economics Working Paper Series*. Barcelona, BGSE: 1-47.

Fujii, Lee Ann (2009) *Killing Neighbors. Webs of Violence in Rwanda*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gabarda Cebellán, Vicente (1994) El Camp de Morverdre, 1936-1942. Las muertes violentas en la retaguardia bélica y la inmediata postguerra [El Camp de Morverdre, 1936-1942. The violent deaths in the war rearguard and the inmediate postwar]. *Braçal* 9: 31-52.

GaitxMotlló, Jordi (2006) Orígens socials i polítics de l'exili català de 1939. [Social and political origins of the Catalan exile of 1939]. In: E. Pujol (ed.) *L'exili català del 1936-39. Noves aportacions*. Girona: Cercle d'Estudis Històrics i Socials, 21-39.

Gaitx Motlló, Jordi (2007) *L'exili del Baix Empordà al 1939* [The exile of Baix Empordà in 1939]. La Bisbal d'Empordà: Ajuntament de la Bisbal d'Empordà.

Garriga, Joan, Montserrat Salvador, & Francesc Sánchez (2007) El cost humà [The human cost]. *El 9 nou.* Granollers**:** 3-20.

Gimeno, Manuel (1989). *Revolució, guerra i repressió al Pallars (1936-1939)* [Revolution, war and repression at Pallars]. Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat.

Global Ganzeeter Version 2.1: (http://www.fallingrain.com/world).

Hovil, Lucy (2008) The Inter-Relationship between Violence, Displacement and the Transition to Stability in the Great Lakes Region. Concept Paper, Violence and Transition Project Roundtable, Johannesburg.

Infraestructura de Datos Espaciales de España (IDEE) [Infrastructure of Spatial Data of Spain]: (www.idee.es).

Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) [Spanish National Statistics Institute]: (www.ine.es).

Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya (ICC) [Cartographic Institute of Catalonia]: (http://www.icc.cat).

Juliá, Santos (2004) *Víctimas de la guerra civil* [Victims of the Civil War]. Madrid: Temas de Hoy.

Kalyvas, Stathis N (2006) *The Logic of Violence in Civil War,* New York & London: Cambridge University Press.

Kalyvas, Stathis, & Laia Balcells (2010) International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict. *American Political Science Review* 104(3): 415-429.

Kocher, Matthew; Thomas Pepinsky, & Stathis Kalyvas (2011) Bombing as an Instrument of Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War. *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 201-218.

Lyall, Jason (2009) Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (3): 331-362.

Maldonado, José María (2006) La guerra desde el aire. Los bombardeos y sus efectos [The war from the air. Bombings and their effects]. In A. Cenarro& V. Pardo. Zaragoza (eds.) *Guerra Civil en Aragón 70 años después*: Departamento de Educación, Cultura y Deporte.

Maymí Rich, Josep; Josep Ros Nicolau, & Turró Ventura (2006) *Els refugiats de la Guerra Civil a les comarques del Gironès i el Pla de l'Estany (1936-1939)* [The refugees of the civil war in the counties of Gironès and Pla de l'Estany (1936-1939]. Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat.

Muchembled, Robert (2010) *Una historia de la violencia. Del final de la Edad Media a la actualidad*. Barcelona: Paidós.

Noguera, Josep(1989) Els morts del Berguedà al front durant la guerra civil de 1936-1939 [Deaths of Berguedà in the battlefield]. *L'Erol* 28: 24-39.

Sabaté, Jaume (2002) *Víctimes d'una guerra al Priorat (1936-19..)* [Victims of a war at Priorat*(1936-19..)*]. Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau.

Serrallonga i Urquidi, Joan (2004) *Refugiats i desplaçats dins la Catalunya en guerra 1936-1939* [Refugees and displaced in wartime Catalonia].Barcelona: Base.

Oliva, Jordi(1992) Els soldats de la Segarra morts a la Guerra Civil (1936-1939) i els civils victims d'accidents de la guerra [The soldiers of Segarra who died in the Civil War (1936-1939) and civilian victims of war related accidents]. *Miscel.lània cerverina* 8.

— (1994) El cost humà de la Guerra Civil de 1936-1939 [The human cost of the civil war]. *Recerques: història, economia, cultura* 30: 87-102.

— (1999) *El cost humà de la Guerra Civil a les comarques gironines: combatents morts i víctimes del material bèl.lic abandonat.*[The human cost of the civil war at the counties of Girona: death combatants and victims of abandoned war material]. Girona: El Punt.

Orwell, George (1938) *Homage to Catalonia.* London: Secker and Warburg.

Pijiula, Jordi(1993) *Els morts per la Guerra Civil a la Garrotxa (1936-1945)* [The victims of the Civil War at Garrotxa].Olot: Llibres de Batet.

— (2000) L'exili olotí del 1939. In *Temps de Postguerra. Estudis sobre les comarques gironines (1939-1955).*Edited by Sonia Castillo. Girona, Cercle d'Estudis Històrics i Socials**:** 117-136.

Planes, Jordi (1989) Exili republicà i exili berguedà, cinquanta anys després [Republican exile, and exile from the Berguedà, 50 years later]. *L'Erol* 28: 59-63.

Pujol, Enric (ed) (2006) *L'exili català del 1936-39. Noves aportacions* [The Catalan exile of 1936-39. New contributions]. Girona: Cercle d'Estudis Històrics i Socials.

Prada, Julio (2010) *La España masacrada.* [The massacred Spain]. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Preston, Paul (1986) *Història de la Guerra Civil Espanyola* [History of the Spanish Civil War]. Barcelona: Base.

Reverte, Jorge M (2006) *La batalla del Ebro* [The battle of the Ebro]. Madrid: Crítica.

Rodrigo, Javier (2008) *Hasta la raíz. Violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la dictadura Franquista* [To the roots. Violence during the civil war and the Francoist dictatorship]. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Roig, Montserrat (1977) *Els Catalans als camps Nazis* [Catalans in the Nazi camps]. Barcelona: Edicions 62.

Salomón, Mª Pilar, & José Luis Ledesma Vera (eds.) (2006) *La guerra civil en Aragon. Terror 'azul' y violencia 'roja'* [The civil war in Aragon. Blue terror and red violence]. Zaragoza & Barcelona: Ciro Ediciones y Prensa Diaria Aragonesa.

Serrano, Inmaculada (2010) Return after violence.Rationality and emotions in the aftermath of violent conflict. Paper presented at the IV Graduate Conference of the Center for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Instituto Juan March, Madrid, 17-18 June.

Servei General d'Estadística (SGE). Generalitat de Catalunya. *Població de Catalunya. 1936.*

Solé i Sabaté, Josep M (2000) *La repressió franquista a Catalunya. 1938-1953* [The Francoist repression in Catalonia. 1938-1953]. Barcelona: Edicions 62.

Solé i Sabaté, Josep Maria, & Joan Villarroya (1986) *Catalunya sota les bombes* [Catalonia under the bombs]. Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat.

— (1987) *L'ocupació militar de Catalunya. Març 1938- Febrer 1939* [The military occupation of Catalonia. March 1938-February 1939]. Barcelona: L'Avenç.

— (1989) *La Repressió a la Reraguarda de Catalunya (1936-1939)* [The Repression in the Rearguard of Catalonia (1936-1939)]. Puigcerdà, Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat.

— (2003) *España en llamas* [Spain on fire]. Madrid: Temas de Hoy.

Steele, Abbey (2011) Electing Displacement: Political Cleansing in Apartadó, Colombia. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(3): 423-445.

— (2010) *Unsettling: Displacement during Civil Wars*. PhD Dissertation, Yale University.

— (2009) Seeking Safety: Avoiding Displacement and Choosing Destinations in Civil Wars. *Journal of Peace Research* 46(3): 419-429.

UGT. *Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores de España* [Bulletin of Workers's General Union of Spain]. Noviembre 1931. Año III. Num. 35.

UGT. *Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores de España* [Bulletin of Workers's General Union of Spain]. Diciembre 1931. Año III. Num. 36.

Valentino, Benjamin A, Paul Huth, & Dylan Balch-Lindsay (2004) Draining the Sea: Mass Killing, Genocide, and Guerrilla Warfare. *International Organization* 58(2): 375-407.

Ventura i Solé, Joan (1993). *La postguerra a Valls* [Postwar in Valls]. *1939-1940.*Valls: Consell Comarcal de l'Alt Camp.

Vilanova, Mercè (2005) Atles Electoral de la Segona República a Catalunya [Electoral Atlas of the Second Republic in Catalonia].Barcelona: Enciclopèdia Catalana.

Vilar, Pierre (1986) *La Guerra Civil Española* [The Spanish Civil War]. Barcelona: Crítica.

Tables and Figures



Figure 1. IDPs in 1936



Figure 2. IDPs in 1937



Figure 3. IDPs in 1938

Table I. Logit on IDPs Presence (1936)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
CNT Affiliation	0.063	0.068*	0.068*	0.064	0.061
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
UGT Affiliation	0.0076	0.012	0.012	0.0077	0.0074
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.074)
Latitude	-0.020***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.018***
	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0029)
Longitude	-0.00074	-0.0016	-0.0016	-0.0014	-0.0013
	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)
Altitude (*1000)	0.79**	0.59*	0.59*	0.64*	0.69*
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.36)
Population (*1000)	0.021	0.036	0.036	0.022	0.028
	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.077)	(0.053)
Catholic Center	0.22	0.045	0.045	-0.20	-0.030
	(1.31)	(1.38)	(1.38)	(1.60)	(1.31)
% Single Men	-0.044*	-0.063**	-0.063**	-0.056**	-0.056**
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
% Literate	0.033***	0.036***	0.036***	0.033***	0.034***
	(0.0100)	(0.0099)	(0.0099)	(0.0098)	(0.0098)
Support Left 36	0.014***				
	(0.0051)				
Competition		-1.14**	-1.14**		
		(0.56)	(0.57)		
Volatility			0.00080		
			(0.17)		
Executed by the Left				0.0027	
				(0.0086)	
Priest Killed					0.16
					(0.16)
Constant	91.0***	86.3***	86.3***	84.5***	84.9***
	(13.0)	(12.9)	(12.9)	(12.8)	(12.9)
Observations	832	832	832	833	833
Pseudo R^2	0.156	0.153	0.153	0.148	0.149

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Table II. Logit on IDPs presence (1937)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
CNT Affiliation	0.037	0.041	0.041	0.038	0.049
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)
UGT Affiliation	-0.093	-0.090	-0.089	-0.092	-0.085
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Latitude	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***
	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0032)	(0.0032)
Longitude	-0.0052***	-0.0057***	-0.0057***	-0.0054***	-0.0058***
	(0.0019)	(0.0019)	(0.0019)	(0.0019)	(0.0018)
Altitude (*1000)	0.047	0.055	0.054	0.064	0.082*
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Population (*1000)	1.54***	1.45***	1.46***	1.50***	1.37***
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Catholic Center	-0.28	-0.31	-0.32	-0.21	-0.29
	(1.24)	(1.29)	(1.29)	(1.40)	(1.41)
% Single Men	-0.085***	-0.097***	-0.097***	-0.089***	-0.090***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
% Literate	0.036***	0.039***	0.039***	0.036***	0.036***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Support Left 36	0.0050				
	(0.0050)				
Competition		-1.40**	-1.39**		
		(0.57)	(0.57)		
Volatility			-0.062		
			(0.18)		
Executed by the Left				-0.0022	
				(0.0063)	
Priest Killed					-0.58***
					(0.18)
Constant	104.1***	104.4***	104.6***	101.9***	103.1***
	(14.8)	(14.8)	(14.8)	(14.6)	(14.5)
Observations	832	832	832	833	833
Pseudo R^2	0.219	0.224	0.225	0.218	0.227

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Table III. Logit on IDPs presence (1938)

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
CNT Affiliation	0.033	0.036	0.036	0.042	0.051	0.0040
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.0051)
UGT Affiliation	-0.077	-0.075	-0.075	-0.069	-0.068	0.034
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.032)
Latitude	-0.025***	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.025***	-0.025***	-0.070
	(0.0028)	(0.0027)	(0.0027)	(0.0028)	(0.0027)	(0.083)
Longitude	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	-0.025***
	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)	(0.0028)
Altitude (*1000)	0.0030	0.0031	0.0031	0.056*	0.0035	0.012***
	(0.0031)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)	(0.031)	(0.0033)	(0.0017)
Population (*1000)	1.99***	1.93***	1.93***	1.97***	1.81***	0.013**
	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.0056)
Catholic Center	-1.26	-1.26	-1.25	-0.31	-1.07	1.95***
	(1.45)	(1.46)	(1.46)	(1.39)	(1.51)	(0.38)
% Single Men	-0.059**	-0.066**	-0.066**	-0.063**	-0.063**	-1.18
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(1.53)
% Literate	0.059***	0.060***	0.061***	0.060***	0.059***	-0.058**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.029)
Support Left 36	0.0031					0.060***
	(0.0051)					(0.011)
Competition		-0.74	-0.75			
		(0.62)	(0.62)			
Volatility			0.018			
			(0.18)			
Executed by the Left				-0.015*		
				(0.0086)		
Priest Killed					-0.57***	
					(0.18)	
Bombings 1937						-0.26*
						(0.13)
Constant	107.3***	107.1***	107.1***	107.0***	107.6***	107.1***
	(12.2)	(12.1)	(12.1)	(12.2)	(12.1)	(12.2)
Observations	832	832	832	833	833	832
Pseudo R^2	0.150	0.151	0.151	0.151	0.159	0.153

Standard errors in parentheses
* p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01

Table IV. Impact of IDPs Presence on Direct Violence. Negative Binomial on Leftist Executions

Variable	M1
Competition	1.296***
	(0.33)
Frontline	0.290*
	(0.15)
Population (*1000)	0.075
	(0.12)
CNT Affiliation	0.112*
	(0.06)
UGT Affiliation	0.089
	(0.09)
Border	-0.355**
	(0.16)
Sea	-0.405***
	(0.14)
Altitude	-0.001***
	(0.00)
Catholic center	2.169***
	(0.84)
IDP 1936	0.404***
	(0.12)
Constant	0.261
	(0.42)
LnAlpha	0.628***
Constant	0.09
Observations	870
Chi2	330.649

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Table V. OLS on 1939 Displacement in Catalonia

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Support Left 36	0.047**					0.035
	(0.024)					(0.022)
CNT Affiliation	-0.034	-0.025	-0.026	-0.038	-0.0093	-0.043
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
UGT Affiliation	-0.031	-0.029	-0.028	-0.045	-0.0088	-0.055
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.26)
Latitude	0.047***	0.050***	0.050***	0.050***	0.052***	0.045***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Longitude	-0.032***	-0.033***	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.034***	-0.033***
	(0.0097)	(0.0098)	(0.010)	(0.0099)	(0.0097)	(0.0099)
Population (*1000)	-0.19**	-0.16**	-0.16*	-0.42**	-0.12	-0.30**
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.18)	(0.080)	(0.14)
Altitude (*1000)	0.54	-0.22	-0.20	-0.31	-0.42	1.04
	(2.03)	(2.02)	(2.01)	(2.03)	(2.08)	(1.87)
Catholic Center	-4.83***	-5.61***	-5.62***	-6.67***	-5.19***	-4.50***
	(1.19)	(1.23)	(1.25)	(1.51)	(1.17)	(1.17)
% Literate	0.069	0.065	0.064	0.058	0.061	0.057
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Competition		-0.42	-0.41			
		(2.76)	(2.76)			
Volatility			-0.059			
			(0.80)			
Executed by the Left				0.056*		
				(0.031)		
Priest Killed					-1.42	
					(0.97)	
Bombings Total						0.80*
						(0.42)
Constant	-202.8***	-215.2***	-214.5***	-215.0***	-222.1***	-190.4***
	(70.3)	(72.4)	(72.5)	(73.3)	(72.5)	(65.8)
N	315	315	315	315	315	315
pseudoR^2						

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p< 0.10$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$

Appendix

Table A1. Correlates of Missing Data in the 1939 Displacement Estimate

	M1Ψ	M2Ψ	M3Ψ	M4 Ψ	M5Ψ	M6Ψ
Support Left 36	-0.0068					-0.0066
	(0.0060)					(0.0060)
CNT Affiliation	-0.013	-0.019	-0.018	-0.021	-0.00040	-0.019
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.048)
UGT Affiliation	-0.033	-0.048	-0.049	-0.049	-0.030	-0.055
	(0.074)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.073)	(0.086)
Latitude	0.0024	0.0028	0.0028	0.0019	0.0000053	0.0023
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Longitude	0.016	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.0092	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Population (*1000)	0.045	0.0095	0.0096	0.020	0.047	0.0080
	(0.098)	(0.0082)	(0.0087)	(0.080)	(0.042)	(0.019)
Altitude (*1000)	0.58	0.90	0.88	0.88	0.29	0.84
	(0.69)	(0.69)	(0.69)	(0.69)	(0.73)	(0.68)
Catholic Center	-2.14*	-1.39	-1.37	-1.36	-0.96	-1.51
	(1.22)	(1.98)	(1.95)	(1.65)	(1.59)	(2.01)
%Single Men	0.068**	0.084**	0.083**	0.086**	0.090**	0.083**
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)
% Literate	-0.020					
	(0.014)					
Idps 1936	-0.00050					
	(0.0016)					
Idps 1937	0.0020*					
	(0.0010)					
Idps 1938	-0.0018**					
	(0.00076)					
Volatility			0.076			
			(0.20)			
Executed by the Left				-0.0028		
				(0.022)		
Priest Killed					-1.56***	
					(0.21)	
Bombings Total						0.0069
						(0.041)
Constant	-34.5	-35.7	-35.9	-32.6	-23.5	-33.6
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Observations	635	635	635	636	636	635
Pseudo R^2	0.162	0.150	0.150	0.149	0.224	0.150

ΨRegressions include county fixed effects
Standard errors in parentheses
* $p< 0.10$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$

Table A2. Determinants of 1939 Displacement. Bombings disaggregated

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Support Left 36	0.036	0.043*	0.040*	0.035	0.044*
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)
CNT Affiliation	-0.018	-0.041	-0.055	-0.043	-0.042
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
UGT Affiliation	-0.011	-0.026	-0.17	-0.055	-0.099
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.24)
Latitude	0.043***	0.047***	0.045***	0.045***	0.046***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Longitude	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.034***	-0.033***	-0.032***
	(0.0095)	(0.0099)	(0.0099)	(0.0099)	(0.0100)
Population (*1000)	-0.27***	-0.23**	-0.24**	-0.30**	-0.20**
	(0.093)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.083)
% Literate	0.061	0.064	0.062	0.057	0.068
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Altitude (*1000)	1.17	0.69	0.58	1.04	0.47
	(1.95)	(1.96)	(1.95)	(1.87)	(2.04)
Catholic Center	-4.68***	-4.72***	-4.47***	-4.50***	-4.87***
	(1.16)	(1.18)	(1.17)	(1.17)	(1.18)
Bombings 1937	1.83***				
	(0.25)				
Bombings 1938		0.57			
		(0.64)			
Bombings 1939			2.87		
			(2.77)		
Bombings Total				0.80*	
				(0.42)	
Deaths in Bombings					0.15
(Per Thousand)					(0.20)
Constant	-184.8***	-201.6***	-192.7***	-190.4***	-199.1***
	(67.0)	(69.3)	(67.0)	(65.8)	(69.3)
Observations	315	315	315	315	315
R^2	0.135	0.091	0.123	0.127	0.087

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p< 0.10$, ** $p< 0.05$, *** $p< 0.01$