Voting by Committees with Exit*

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January 2002

*We thank Salvador Barberà, Carmen Beviá, Anna Bogomolnaia, Renan Goetz, Matthew Jackson, Howard Petith, Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, James Schummer, and Tayfun Sönmez for their helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to an associate editor and a referee of this journal for valuable suggestions that helped to improve the paper. The work of D. Berga is partially supported by Research Grants 9100075 and 9101100 from Universitat de Girona. The work of A. Neme is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from Universidad Nacional de San Luis. The work of G. Bergantiños and J. Massó is partially supported by Research Grants PB98-0613-C02-01 and PB98-0870 from the Spanish Ministry of Education, respectively. The work of J. Massó is also partially supported by Research Grant 2000SGR-54 from the Generalitat de Catalunya. The work of G. Bergantiños is also partially supported by Research Grant PGIDT00PXI30001PN from the Xunta de Galicia. The paper was partially written while J. Massó was visiting the IMASL at the Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina) under a sabbatical fellowship from the Spanish Ministry of Education.

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ABSTRACT: We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

JEL Classification Number: D71

RUNNING TITLE: Voting by committees with exit

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1 Introduction

Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) considered the problem where a finite set of agents who originally make up a society has to decide which candidates, to be chosen from a given set, will become new members of the society. They analyzed this problem without considering the possibility that current members of the society may want to leave it as a result of its change in composition. In particular, they characterized *voting by committees* as the class of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions whenever founders' preferences over subsets of candidates are either separable or additively representable and founders *cannot* leave the society.

In this paper we are interested in studying the consequences of considering explicitly the possibility that founders have the option to leave the group in case they do not like the resulting composition of the society. In our context, a social choice function is a rule that associates with each founders' preference profile a newly composed society consisting of both candidates and founders. This set up is sufficiently general to include as social choice functions mechanisms which select, given each founders' preference profile, the new composition of the society in a potentially complex procedure. For instance, mechanisms where the subset of admitted candidates is first selected (using a pre-specified voting rule) and then, founders decide sequentially to stay or to leave the society after being informed about the chosen candidates.

Notice that our framework is not a particular case of Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991)'s model. One of the main consequences of the fact that a founder might leave the society is that each founder's preferences have to be defined on subsets where he is excluded. We will assume that founders are indifferent between any pair of societies to which they do not belong to.

Moreover, for all societies *containing* a given founder, we will assume, as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991), that this founder has separable preferences. A founder has *separable* preferences if the division between good and bad agents guides the ordering of subsets of agents, in the sense that adding a good agent leads to a better set, while adding a bad agent leads to a worse set. However, when considered as binary relations on the set of all possible societies our separability condition is not the same as Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991)'s.[1]

We are specially interested in *strategy-proof* social choice functions because this property guarantees that no founder ever has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences in order to obtain personal advantages.[2] In order to capture the main feature of our problem, we will concentrate on social choice functions that are *stable* in the sense that no founder that remains in the final society wants to leave it (internal stability) and no founder that left the society wants to rejoin it (external stability). Finally, we require that social choice functions satisfy the property of *voters' sovereignty on the set of candidates*. It implies that a function must be sensible to founders' preferences in two ways: all commonly agreed good candidates have to be elected, and no commonly agreed bad candidates can be elected.

Our main result demonstrates that the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty on the set of candidates is the one such that, for each profile of separable preferences, the final chosen society consists of *all* initial founders and the *unanimously* good candidates. In other words, founders do not leave the society, but the existence of such a

[1] At the end of Section 3, and after presenting Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991)'s model, we compare the two preference domains.

[2] See Sprumont (1995), Barberà (1996), and Barberà (2001) for three excellent surveys on strategy-proofness.

possibility reduces substantially the number of ways candidates are elected. Stability requires the use of the most qualified majority to get candidates in. But again, this extremely qualified majority makes exit unnecessary since each founder has veto power for all candidates and the original society was originally acceptable for all founders. We also show that not only stability, strategy-proofness, and voter's sovereignty on the set of candidates are independent properties but also that once we relax one of the two stability criteria new social choice functions appear where some founders leave the society at some preference profiles.

However, our model is not limited to the interpretation given so far; i.e., the choice of the composition of the final society. It also permits to analyze the problem where a society has to define its formal and public positions on a set of issues. One can think of political parties or religious communities deciding on different issues like abortion, death penalty, health reform, and so on. After approving a particular subset of issues, the original members of the society may decide to leave it if they do not want to be members of that society any more or because other members have already left for this reason.

Before finishing this Introduction, we want to comment on two lines of research existing in the literature. The first one is composed of two recent and related papers. Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) consider a society that, during a fixed and commonly known number of periods, may admit in each period a subset of new members. Within this dynamic setup, an interesting issue arises: voters, at earlier stages, vote not only according to whether or not they like a candidate but also according to their tastes concerning future candidates. They study the particular case where agents have dichotomous preferences (candidates are either friends or enemies) and the voting rule used by the society is quota one (it is sufficient to receive one vote to be elected). They identify and study (subgame perfect and trembling-hand perfect) *equilibria* where agents exhibit, due to the dynamics of the game, complex strategic voting behavior.

Granot, Maschler, and Shalev (2000) study a similar model with expulsion; current members of the society have to decide each period whether to admit new members into the society *and* whether to expel current members of the society for good. They study equilibria for different protocols which depend on whether the expulsion decision has to be taken each period either simultaneously with, before, or after the admission decision.

In contrast to the works cited above, our framework is static. In particular, candidates in our model do not count: they do not have preferences over societies. We are implicitly assuming that they want to become new members of the society regardless of its final composition, and this is restrictive. But this hypothesis allows us to include the interpretation offered earlier where the society has to decide a subset of binary issues which cannot have preferences. Moreover, our paper also differs from the mentioned ones because of the following three features. First, our focus is on *voluntary exit* rather than expulsion; it seems to us that voluntary exit is a relevant and common problem societies face (members often leave a society just by not renewing their annual membership rather than being expelled). Second, we do not restrict ourselves to specific protocols or specific voting rules. Our setup is general and corresponds to the standard framework used in social choice theory: social choice functions mapping agents' preferences into the set of social alternatives. Third, our main interest is in identifying strategy-proof social choice functions instead of analyzing different types of equilibria.

The second line of research started with a work by Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001) on candidate stability by considering only single-valued voting rules, and continued with the work of Ehlers and Weymark (2001), Eraslan and McLennan (2001), and Rodríguez-Álvarez (2001) on multi-valued voting rules. In these papers, a set of voters and a set of candidates (which may overlap) must select a representative candidate (or a subset of them). The key issue this literature addresses is the incentives of candidates, given a particular voting rule (how voters choose a candidate or a subset of candidates), to enter or exit the election in order to strategically affect the outcome of the rule. By imposing some independence conditions and an "internal stability" condition (the not chosen candidates must not have an incentive to drop out of the election) they prove that the class of voting rules immune to this strategic manipulation is only composed of dictatorial rules. In contrast to our paper, these articles consider the stability condition to be "strategic" in the sense that, if considering exiting, an agent anticipates the new choice with the smaller set of candidates.

The paper is organized as follows. We introduce preliminary notation and basic definitions in Section 2. Section 3 contains the description and characterization of voting by committees due to Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) and compares both models (with and without exit). In Section 4 we state and prove our main result. Section 5 contains some final remarks while Section 6 presents all omitted proofs of Section 5.

2 Preliminary Notation and Definitions

Let $N = \{1, ..., n\}$ be the set of *founders* of a society and $K = \{n+1, ..., k\}$ be the set of *candidates* who may become new members of the society. We assume that n and k are finite, $n \geq 2$, and $k \geq 3$. Founders have *preferences* over $2^{N \cup K}$, the set of all possible final societies. We identify the empty set with the situation where the society has no members.[3]

Founder i's *preferences* over $2^{N\cup K}$, denoted by R_i, is a complete and transitive binary relation. As usual, let P_i and I_i denote the strict and indifference preference relations induced by R_i, respectively. We suppose that founders' preferences satisfy the following conditions:

(C1) STRICTNESS: For all $S, S' \subset N \cup K$, $S \neq S'$ such that $i \in N \cap S \cap S'$, either SP_iS' or $S'P_iS$.

(C2) INDIFFERENCE: For all S such that $i \notin S$, $SI_i\emptyset$.

(C3) LONELINESS: (a) $\{i\}R_i\emptyset$. (b) If $SI_i\emptyset$ and $i \in S$ then $S = \{i\}$.

(C4) NON-INITIAL EXIT: For all $i \in N$, $NP_iN\setminus\{i\}$.

STRICTNESS means that founder i's preferences over sets containing himself are strict. INDIFFERENCE means that founder i is indifferent between not belonging to the society and the situation where the society has no members. Part (a) of LONELINESS means that either founder i founds specific benefits to being the only member of the society (in which case $\{i\}P_i\emptyset$) or else, founder i could provide them without being a member of the society (in which case $\{i\}I_i\emptyset$), while part (b) says that the only society containing i that may be indifferent to not being in the society is the society formed by i alone. Finally, the NON-INITIAL EXIT condition says that no founder wants to exit the initial society.[4]

We denote by $\mathcal{R}_i$ the set of all such preferences for founder i, by $\mathcal{R}$ the

[3]Remember that, as we already argued in the Introduction, we could interpret the set K as the set of issues that the society has to decide upon. In this case the interpretation of a final society is the subset of approved issues and the subset of members that remain in the society.

[4]In Section 5 we will argue that we need condition (C4) for the existence of "stable" social choice functions.

Cartesian product $\mathcal{R}_1 \times ... \times \mathcal{R}_n$, and by $\widehat{\mathcal{R}}_i$ and $\widehat{\mathcal{R}}$ generic subsets of $\mathcal{R}_i$ and $\mathcal{R}$, respectively. Notice that conditions (C1), (C2), (C3), and (C4) are founder specific and therefore $\mathcal{R}_i \neq \mathcal{R}_j$ for different founders i and j. Given $R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$, denote by $\tau(R_i)$ the best element of $2^{N \cup K}$ according to R_i. As a consequence of conditions (C1) and (C4) this element is unique.

A *preference profile* $R = (R_1, ..., R_n) \in \mathcal{R}$ is a n-tuple of preferences. It will be represented by (R_i, R_{-i}) to emphasize the role of founder i's preference.

A *social choice function* f is a function $f : \widehat{\mathcal{R}} \longrightarrow 2^{N \cup K}$. Given a social choice function f, we will denote by f_N and f_K the functions that specify the subsets of N and K, respectively. Namely, $f_N(R) = f(R) \cap N$ and $f_K(R) = f(R) \cap K$ for all $R \in \widehat{\mathcal{R}}$.

Now we define two basic properties that social choice functions may satisfy. The first one is *strategy-proofness.* It says that no founder can gain by lying when reporting his preferences.

Definition 1 *A social choice function $f : \widehat{\mathcal{R}} \rightarrow 2^{N \cup K}$ is* strategy-proof *if for all $R = (R_1, ..., R_n) \in \widehat{\mathcal{R}}$, $i \in N$, and $R_i' \in \widehat{\mathcal{R}}_i$,*

$$f(R)\, R_i f(R_i', R_{-i}).$$

If $f(R_i', R_{-i})\, P_i f(R)$, we say that *founder i manipulates f at profile R via R_i'.*

We are specially interested in social choice functions satisfying the property of *stability* in a double sense: *internal stability* (no founder that remains in the final society wants to leave it) and *external stability* (no founder that left the society wants to rejoin it). Formally,

Definition 2 *A social choice function* $f : \widehat{\mathcal{R}} \to 2^{N \cup K}$ *satisfies* internal stability *if for all* $R \in \widehat{\mathcal{R}}$*,*

$$i \in f(R) \cap N \Longrightarrow f(R) R_i \left(f(R) \backslash \{i\}\right).$$

A social choice function $f : \widehat{\mathcal{R}} \to 2^{N \cup K}$ *satisfies* external stability *if for all* $R \in \widehat{\mathcal{R}}$*,*

$$i \in N \text{ and } i \notin f(R) \Longrightarrow f(R) R_i \left(f(R) \cup \{i\}\right).$$

A social choice function f *is* stable *if* f *satisfies internal and external stability.*

As in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) we will restrict ourselves to preferences that order subsets of agents (containing agent i) according to two basic characteristics of their elements. Consider a preference $R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$ and an agent $j \in K \cup N \backslash \{i\}$. We say that *$j$ is good for i according to R_i* whenever $\{j, i\} P_i \{i\}$; otherwise, we say that *j is bad for i according to R_i*. Denote by $G(R_i)$ and $B(R_i)$ the set of good and bad agents for i according to R_i, respectively. To simplify notation, let $G_K(R_i) = G(R_i) \cap K$, $B_K(R_i) = B(R_i) \cap K$, and $G_N(R_i) = G(R_i) \cap N$. Now, we are ready to formally define separable preferences.

Definition 3 *A preference* $R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$ *is* separable *if for all* $j \in K \cup N \backslash \{i\}$ *and* $S \subset N \cup K \backslash \{j\}$ *such that* $i \in S$*,*

$$\left[\{j\} \cup S\right] P_i S \text{ if and only if } j \in G(R_i).$$

Let $\mathcal{S}_i \subset \mathcal{R}_i$ denote the set of separable preferences for founder i and let $\mathcal{S}$ denote the Cartesian product $\mathcal{S}_1 \times ... \times \mathcal{S}_n$.

It is well known that by restricting the domain of preferences the set of strategy-proof social choice functions may become larger. However, a careful examination of all preferences used in all proofs below shows that the statements of our results still hold if we consider social choice functions defined on the subdomain of additive preferences, where a preference $R_i \in \mathcal{R}_i$ is said to be *additive* if there exists a function $u_i : N \cup K \cup \{\emptyset\} \to I\!R$ such that for all S and S' with $i \in S \cap S'$,

$$SP_iS' \text{ if and only if } \sum_{x\in S} u_i(x) > \sum_{y\in S'} u_i(y)$$

and

$$SP_i\emptyset \text{ if and only if } \sum_{x\in S} u_i(x) > u_i(\emptyset).$$

Remark that additivity implies separability but the converse is false for $k > 3$, since a separable ordering R_1 could simultaneously have $\{1,3\}P_1\{1,4\}$ and $\{1,2,4\}P_1\{1,2,3\}$. However, if R_1 were additive, $\{1,3\}P_1\{1,4\}$ would imply $\{1,2,3\}P_1\{1,2,4\}$, but this would seem too restrictive, though, to capture some degree of complementarity among agents, which can be very natural in our setting.

We are also interested in social choice functions satisfying the property of *voters' sovereignty on* K in a double sense. Namely, candidates that are good for all founders have to be admitted to the society. On the contrary, candidates that are bad for all founders can not be admitted. Formally,

Definition 4 *A social choice function* $f : \widehat{\mathcal{R}} \to 2^{N\cup K}$ *satisfies* voters' sovereignty on K *if for all* $R \in \widehat{\mathcal{R}}$,

$$\bigcap_{i\in N} G_K(R_i) \subseteq f_K(R) \subseteq \bigcup_{i\in N} G_K(R_i).$$

Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) characterized the class of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions without exit (see Proposition 1 in Section 3). They used the phrase *voters' sovereignty* to indicate the onto condition (for all $K' \subseteq K$, there exists $R \in \widehat{\mathcal{R}}$ such that $f_K(R) = K'$). Our voters' sovereignty (on K) condition is stronger. However, our condition is reasonable because, in addition to ontoness, it only requires the natural coherence between the preference profile and its corresponding subset of elected candidates.

3 Voting by Committees

In this Section we first present the main ingredients of the Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991)'s model in order to state their characterization of voting by committees, in which part of our proof is built upon. We finish the Section with a discussion of the differences between the two models.

Since in the problem considered by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) founders can not leave the society, the social alternatives are subsets of candidates. Therefore, founder i's preferences, denoted by $\succsim_i$, is a complete and transitive binary relation over 2^K. As usual, let $\succ_i$ denote the strict preference relation induced by $\succsim_i$. Let $\tau(\succsim_i)$ denote the best element of 2^K according to $\succsim_i$ and let $\succsim = (\succsim_1, ..., \succsim_n)$ be a preference profile.

Definition 5 *A preference* $\succsim_i$ *is BSZ-*separable *if for all* $S \subseteq K$ *and all* $x \notin S$,

$$S \cup \{x\} \succ_i S \text{ if and only if } \{x\} \succ_i \emptyset.$$

Let $\mathcal{S}_i^{BSZ}$ be the set of all BSZ-separable preferences on 2^K (note that this set is the same for all founders) and let $\mathcal{S}^{BSZ} = \mathcal{S}_1^{BSZ} \times ... \times \mathcal{S}_n^{BSZ}$.

A *voting scheme* g is a function from $\mathcal{S}^{BSZ}$ to 2^K. A voting scheme g is *strategy-proof* if it satisfies the natural translation of Definition 1 to this setup.

We now turn to define voting by committees. Rules in this class are defined by a collection of families of winning coalitions (committees), one for each candidate; founders vote for sets of candidates; to be elected, a candidate must get the vote of all members of some coalition among those that are winning for that candidate. Formally,

Definition 6 *A* committee $\mathcal{W}$ *is a nonempty family of nonempty coalitions of* N*, which satisfies coalition monotonicity in the sense that if* $I \in \mathcal{W}$ *and* $I' \supseteq I$ *then,* $I' \in \mathcal{W}$.

Coalition $I \in \mathcal{W}$ is a *minimal winning coalition* if, for all $I' \subsetneq I$, $I' \notin \mathcal{W}$. Given a committee $\mathcal{W}$ we denote by $\mathcal{W}^m$ the set of minimal winning coalitions and call it the *minimal committee.*

Definition 7 *A voting scheme* $g : \mathcal{S}^{BSZ} \to 2^K$ *is* voting by committees *if for each* $x \in K$*, there exists a committee* $\mathcal{W}_x$ *such that for all* $\succsim \in \mathcal{S}^{BSZ}$

$$x \in g(\succsim) \textit{ if and only if } \{i \in N \mid x \in \tau(\succsim_i)\} \in \mathcal{W}_x.$$

Proposition 1 *(Theorem 1 in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991) A voting scheme* $g : \mathcal{S}^{BSZ} \to 2^K$ *is strategy-proof and onto if and only if* g *is voting by committees.*

We could now extend voting by committees to our context by saying that a social choice function $f : \mathcal{S} \to 2^{N \cup K}$ is *voting by committees* if for each agent x (founder and candidate) there exists a committee $\mathcal{W}_x$ such that for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$,

$$x \in f(R) \text{ if and only if } \{i \in N \mid x \in \tau(R_i)\} \in \mathcal{W}_x.$$

We now argue that the two models are different due to fundamental differences of the two preference domains. The following three are crucial.

First, to deal with voluntary exit and voluntary membership we allow a founder's preference of joining a society to depend on the other members in the society; that is, founder i may prefer joining a society S to not joining it, i.e., $S \cup \{i\} P_i S$ and *at the same time*, prefer not joining another society S' to joining it, i.e., $S' P_i S' \cup \{i\}$ (so BSZ-separability is violated). Second, each founder is indifferent to any two societies to which he does not belong to. Third, each founder belongs to his best society; that is, $i \in \tau(R_i)$ for all $R_i \in \mathcal{S}_i$ and $i \in N$, since $\tau(R_i) R_i N$ and $N P_i \emptyset$ by (C4). We think that these three aspects are meaningful and necessary to deal with the social choice problem we want to study here. We want to emphasize that, due to these domain differences, the Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991)'s model cannot be applied directly here, although we will use their main result after showing that no founder never wants to leave the society.

Furthermore, and as a consequence of the fact that each i belongs to $\tau(R_i)$ (each founder always votes for himself) we have now an insubstantial multiplicity of voting by committees inducing the same social choice function. To see that, consider the following two possibilities. On the one hand, consider any pair of committees $\mathcal{W}$ and $\mathcal{W}'$ such that $\mathcal{W}_x = \mathcal{W}'_x$ for all $x \in K$ and for any founder i, $\mathcal{W}'_i = \{\{S \cup \{i\}\}_{S \in \mathcal{W}_i}\}$. Since $i \in \tau(R_i)$ for all $i \in N$ and all $R_i \in \mathcal{S}_i$, we conclude that both voting by committees ($\mathcal{W}$ and $\mathcal{W}'$) induce the same social choice function. On the other hand, if $\mathcal{W}$ and $\mathcal{W}'$ are such that $\{i\} \in \mathcal{W}_i$ and $\{i\} \in \mathcal{W}'_i$ for all $i \in N$, and $\mathcal{W}_x = \mathcal{W}'_x$ for all $x \in K$, then both voting by committees induce the same social choice function. Therefore, because of these two situations, from now on and in order to state our results more compactly, we will assume that a committee for founder i is a nonempty family of subsets containing i. Formally,

Definition 8 *A social choice function $f : \mathcal{S} \to 2^{N \cup K}$ is voting by committees if for each $x \in N \cup K$ there exists a committee $\mathcal{W}_x$ such that for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$,*

$$x \in f(R) \text{ if and only if } \{i \in N \mid x \in \tau(R_i)\} \in \mathcal{W}_x,$$

where for all $i \in N$ and $I \in \mathcal{W}_i$, $i \in I$.

4 The Characterization Result

Theorem 1 below characterizes the class of strategy-proof and stable social choice functions satisfying voters' sovereignty on K as the voting by committees satisfying the properties that the minimal committee of each founder is himself and the minimal committee for each candidate is the set of all founders. That is, it is the single rule which chooses, for each preference profile, the final society consisting of *all initial founders and all unanimously good candidates*. Formally,

Theorem 1 *Let $f : \mathcal{S} \longrightarrow 2^{N \cup K}$ be a social choice function. Then, f is strategy-proof, stable, and satisfies voters' sovereignty on K if and only if f is voting by committees with the following two properties:*
(Founders) For all $i \in N$, $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i\}\}$.
(Candidates) For all $x \in K$, $\mathcal{W}_x^m = \{N\}$.

Remark 1 *Theorem 1 can be expressed in a different way: Let $f : \mathcal{S} \longrightarrow 2^{N \cup K}$ be a social choice function. Then, f is strategy-proof, stable, and satisfies voters' sovereignty on K if and only if for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$,*

$$f(R) = N \cup (\bigcap_{i \in N} G_K(R_i)).$$

Proof of Theorem 1 To prove sufficiency, assume that for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$, $f(R) = N \cup (\bigcap_{i \in N} G_K(R_i))$. Clearly, f satisfies external stability and voters' sovereignty on K. Since $f_N(R) = N$, $f_K(R) \subset G_K(R_i)$ for all $i \in N$, and preferences are separable and satisfy (C2) and (C4), we have that $f(R) R_i N P_i N \backslash \{i\} I_i (f(R) \backslash \{i\})$ for all $i \in N$ which shows that f satisfies internal stability.

To show that f is strategy-proof, let $i \in N$, $R \in \mathcal{S}$, and $R_i' \in \mathcal{S}_i$ be arbitrary and suppose that $f(R) \neq f(R_i', R_{-i})$ (otherwise, the proof is trivial). Since $f_N(R) = f_N(R_i', R_{-i}) = N$, there must exist $x \in K$ such that either $x \in f_K(R)$ and $x \notin f_K(R_i', R_{-i})$ or else $x \notin f_K(R)$ and $x \in f_K(R_i', R_{-i})$. Note that for both cases, $f_K(R) = \bigcap_{j\in N} G_K(R_j)$ and $f_K(R_i', R_{-i}) = G' \cup B'$ where $G' \subset G_K(R_i)$, $B' \subset B_K(R_i)$, and $G' \subset \bigcap_{j\in N} G_K(R_j)$. Then, since R_i is a separable preference we obtain $(N \cup \bigcap_{j\in N} G_K(R_j)) P_i (N \cup G' \cup B')$; that is, $f(R) R_i f(R_i', R_{-i})$ which shows that f is strategy-proof.

To prove necessity, let f be a strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty on K. First note that the following claim holds.

Claim 1 *If $R \in S$ is such that $G_K(R_i) = A$ for all $i \in N$, then $f(R) = N \cup A$.*

Proof of Claim 1 Let $R \in \mathcal{S}$ be such that $G_K(R_i) = A$ for all $i \in N$. By voter's sovereignty on K, $f_K(R) = A$. To prove that $f_N(R) = N$ we use an induction argument. First observe that $f_N(R) \neq N\backslash\{i\}$ for all $i \in N$; otherwise, if $f_N(R) = N\backslash\{i\}$ for some $i \in N$, f would not be externally stable since, by separability of R_i, $(N \cup f_K(R_i)) R_i N$, by (C4), $N P_i N\backslash\{i\}$, by (C2), $N\backslash\{i\} I_i (N \cup f_K(R))\backslash\{i\}$, and by transitivity, $(N \cup f_K(R)) P_i (N \cup f_K(R)) \backslash \{i\}$.

Induction hypothesis: Suppose that for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $G_K(R_i) = A$ for all $i \in N$ and for all $S \subset N$ such that $1 \leq \#S \leq s < n$,[5] $f_N(R) \neq N \setminus S$. We will show that for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $G_K(R_i) = A$ for all $i \in N$ and for all $T \subset N$ with $\#T = s+1$, $f_N(R) \neq N\backslash T$. Suppose there exists $R \in \mathcal{S}$ and $T \subset N$ with $\#T = s+1$ such that $f_N(R) = N \setminus T$.

[5] The symbol # stands for the cardinality of a set.

Consider $i_1 \in T$ and $R'_{i_1} \in \mathcal{S}_{i_1}$ such that $G(R'_{i_1}) = (N \setminus \{i_1\}) \cup A$ and $\{i_1\} P'_{i_1} \emptyset$. We define $R^{(1)} = (R'_{i_1}, R_{-i_1})$. By voters' sovereignty on K, $f_K(R^{(1)}) = A$. Note that $f(R^{(1)}) \subset G(R'_{i_1}) \cup \{i_1\}$. Then, by separability $\left(f(R^{(1)}) \cup \{i_1\}\right) P'_{i_1} \emptyset$ and by external stability, $i_1 \in f_N(R^{(1)})$. This fact joint with the induction hypothesis implies that we can write $f_N(R^{(1)}) = N \backslash T^{(1)}$ for some $T^{(1)}$ such that $\#T^{(1)} \in [s+1, n-1]$ or $\#T^{(1)} = 0$. If $\#T^{(1)} = 0$, that is, $f_N(R^{(1)}) = N$, we have that $f(R^{(1)}) = (N \cup A)\, P_{i_1} \emptyset I_{i_1} f(R)$, which means that i_1 manipulates f at R via R'_{i_1} contradicting strategy-proofness of f. Thus, $\#T^{(1)} \in [s+1, n-1]$.

Consider $i_2 \in T^{(1)}$ and $R'_{i_2} \in \mathcal{S}_{i_2}$ such that $G(R'_{i_2}) = (N \setminus \{i_2\}) \cup A$ and $\{i_2\} P'_{i_2} \emptyset$. Define $R^{(2)} = (R'_{i_2}, R^{(1)}_{-i_2})$. Using similar arguments to those used above for i_1 we can conclude that $\{i_1, i_2\} \subset f_N(R^{(2)}) = N \setminus T^{(2)}$ where $\#T^{(2)} \geq s+1$. Repeating this process we obtain that there exists $V \subset N$ such that $V \subset f_N(R^{(n-s)}) = N \setminus T^{(n-s)}$ where $\#T^{(n-s)} \geq s+1$ and $\#V = n-s$, which is a contradiction. ■

We decompose the necessity part of the proof into two Lemmas.

Lemma 1 *For all $i \in N$, $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i\}\}$.*

Proof of Lemma 1 We use an induction argument over all good candidates. Let $R \in \mathcal{S}$ be arbitrary and define $m = \sum_{i \in N} \#G_K(R_i)$. If $m = 0$, we get that $f_N(R) = N$ by Claim 1.

Induction hypothesis: Suppose that $f_N(R) = N$ holds for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $m \leq l$.

To prove that $i \in f(R)$ for all $i \in N$ and all $R \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $m = l+1$, we distinguish the following two cases:

- $G_K(R_i) \neq \emptyset$.

  Consider any $R_i' \in \mathcal{S}_i$ with the properties that $G(R_i') = G_N(R_i)$ and

  $$\text{if } SR_i'\emptyset \text{ then } SR_i\emptyset. \tag{1}$$

  By the induction hypothesis, $f_N(R_i', R_{-i}) = N$. By strategy-proofness, $f(R)\, R_i f(R_i', R_{-i})$, and by internal stability, $f(R_i', R_{-i})\, R_i'\emptyset$. By condition (1) in the construction of R_i', $f(R_i', R_{-i})\, R_i\emptyset$. Since $N \subseteq f(R_i', R_{-i})$ and part (b) of the loneliness condition (C3), $f(R_i', R_{-i})\, P_i\emptyset$. Therefore, by transitivity of R_i, $f(R)\, P_i\emptyset$ holds. Moreover, by the indifference condition (C2), $i \in f(R)$.

- $G_K(R_i) = \emptyset$.

  Suppose that $i \notin f(R)$. Since $m \geq 1$, there exists $j \in N$ such that $G_K(R_j) \neq \emptyset$. By the previous case, $j \in f(R)$. Consider any $R_j' \in \mathcal{S}_j$ with the property that $G_K\left(R_j'\right) = \emptyset$ and $SP_j'S'$ for all S, S' such that $i \in S' \backslash S$ and $j \in S \cap S'$. By the induction hypothesis, $f_N\left(R_j', R_{-j}\right) = N$. Since $i \in f\left(R_j', R_{-j}\right)$ and $i \notin f(R)$, by definition of R_j', $f(R)P_j'f\left(R_j', R_{-j}\right)$, which contradicts strategy-proofness.

Hence, for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$, $f_N(R) = N$. Therefore, for each $i \in N$, $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i\}\}$, which ends the proof of Lemma 1. ■

Lemma 2 *For all $x \in K$, $\mathcal{W}_x^m = \{N\}$.*

Proof of Lemma 2 We will now use the result of Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) stated in Proposition 1 above. In order to do so, we will identify our $f_K : \mathcal{S} \to 2^K$ with a Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou voting scheme $g : \mathcal{S}^{BSZ} \to 2^K$ as follows: Given $\succsim_i \in \mathcal{S}_i^{BSZ}$ choose any $R_i \in \mathcal{S}_i$ such that $N \cup SP_iN \cup S'$ if and only if $S \succ_i S'$ for all distinct $S, S' \in 2^K$. Therefore, we have defined a mapping $p : \mathcal{S}^{BSZ} \to \mathcal{S}$; notice that there are many p's. Define $g : \mathcal{S}^{BSZ} \to 2^K$ as follows: $g(\succsim) := f_K(p(\succsim))$ for all $\succsim \in \mathcal{S}^{BSZ}$. We want to show that g is well-defined, strategy-proof, and onto.

- g is well-defined.

  It is sufficient to show that, for all $\succsim \in \mathcal{S}^{BSZ}$, $f_K(p^1(\succsim)) = f_K(p^2(\succsim))$ for any pair of functions p^1 and p^2. Assume otherwise; that is, there exist $\succsim \in \mathcal{S}^{BSZ}$, p^1 and p^2 such that $f_K(p^1(\succsim)) = S^1 \neq S^2 = f_K(p^2(\succsim))$. Hence, $p^1(\succsim) \neq p^2(\succsim)$. Let $p^1(\succsim) = (R_1^1, ..., R_n^1)$ and $p^2(\succsim) = (R_1^2, ..., R_n^2)$ be the two different preference profiles. By Lemma 1 there exist $S \subseteq N$ and $i \in S$ such that $f(R_S^1, R_{-S}^2) = N \cup S^1$ and $f(R_{S\setminus\{i\}}^1, R_{-(S\setminus\{i\})}^2) = N \cup T$ with $T \neq S^1$ (eventually, T could be equal to S^2). By the strictness condition (C1) either $(N \cup T)\, P_i^1\, (N \cup S^1)$ or $(N \cup S^1)\, P_i^1\, (N \cup T)$. If $(N \cup T)\, P_i^1\, (N \cup S^1)$ then i manipulates f at profile (R_S^1, R_{-S}^2) with R_i^2. If $(N \cup S^1)\, P_i^1\, (N \cup T)$, and hence $(N \cup S^1)\, P_i^2\, (N \cup T)$, then i manipulates f at profile $(R_{S\setminus\{i\}}^1, R_{-(S\setminus\{i\})}^2)$ with R_i^1.

- g is strategy-proof.

  Assume otherwise; that is, there exist $\succsim \in \mathcal{S}^{BSZ}$, $i \in N$, and $\succsim_i' \in \mathcal{S}_i^{BSZ}$ such that $g(\succsim_i', \succsim_{-i}) \succ_i g(\succsim)$. Since g is well-defined, we can find $R \in \mathcal{S}$, $R_i' \in \mathcal{S}_i$, and p such that $p(\succsim) = R$ and $p(\succsim_i', \succsim_{-i}) = (R_i', R_{-i})$. Therefore, by Lemma 1 and the definition of g and p, $f(R_i', R_{-i}) = (N \cup g(\succsim_i', \succsim_{-i}))\, P_i\, (N \cup g(\succsim)) = f(R)$, which implies that f is not strategy-proof.

- g is onto 2^K.

  This is an immediate consequence of Claim 1, using definitions of g and p.

Then by Proposition 1, g is voting by committees. Let $\{\mathcal{W}_x\}_{x \in K}$ be its associated family of committees. We next show that f is voting by committees. Given $R \in \mathcal{S}$ let p and $\succsim \in \mathcal{S}^{BSZ}$ be such that $p(\succsim) = R$ (the strictness condition (C1) guarantees the existence of a unique preference profile $\succsim$). Notice that, for all $i \in N$, $G_K(R_i) = \tau^{BSZ}(\succsim_i)$. Therefore, for each $x \in K$,

$$\begin{aligned} x \in f_K(R) &\iff x \in g(\succsim) \\ &\iff \{i \in N \mid x \in \tau^{BSZ}(\succsim_i)\} \in \mathcal{W}_x \\ &\iff \{i \in N \mid x \in G_K(R_i)\} \in \mathcal{W}_x \\ &\iff \{i \in N \mid x \in \tau(R_i)\} \in \mathcal{W}_x. \end{aligned}$$

To show that all committees are unanimous, assume that there exist $x \in K$ and $S \subsetneq N$ such that $S \in \mathcal{W}_x^m$. Take $i \in N \backslash S$ and $R \in \mathcal{S}$ where for all $j \in S$, $x \in G_K(R_j)$, and

$$\emptyset P_i T \text{ whenever } x \in T. \tag{2}$$

Then, $x \in f(R)$. By Lemma 1, $i \in f(R)$. But this and condition (2) contradict internal stability of f. This ends the proof of Lemma 2. ■

5 Final Remarks

Before finishing this paper we would like to show the following two things: (1) all properties used in the characterization of Theorem 1 are independent and (2) the non-initial exit condition (C4) is indispensable for the existence of stable social choice functions.

First, the constant function $f(R) = N$ for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$ is strategy-proof and stable but it does not satisfy voters' sovereignty on K.

Second, there exist social choice functions satisfying voters' sovereignty on K and stability but not strategy-proofness. For any $R \in \mathcal{S}$ define

$$T(R) = \{S \subset \bigcup_{j \in N} G_K(R_j) \mid (N \cup S) R_i (N \cup (\bigcap_{j \in N} G_K(R_j)) \text{ for all } i \in N\}.$$

Consider now the social choice function $f : \mathcal{S} \to 2^{N \cup K}$ such that $f(R) = N \cup B$ where $B \in T(R)$ and $(N \cup B) P_1 (N \cup S)$ for any $S \in T(R) \backslash \{B\}$. Of course f satisfies voters' sovereignty on K and stability. Assume that $N = \{1, 2\}$ and $K = \{3, 4, 5\}$. We take R_1 such that $G(R_1) = \{2, 3, 4\}$, $(N \cup \{4, 5\}) P_1 N$, and $S P_1 \emptyset$ if $1 \in S$. Moreover we take R_2 such that $G(R_2) = \{1, 5\}$, $(N \cup \{4, 5\}) P_2 (N \cup K) P_2 N$, and $S P_2 \emptyset$ if $2 \in S$. Then $f(R) = N \cup K$. Now we consider R_2' such that $G(R_2') = \{1, 5\}$, $(N \cup \{4, 5\}) P_2' N$, $\emptyset P_2' S$ if $3 \in S$ and $2 \in S$, and $S P_2' \emptyset$ if $2 \in S$ and $3 \notin S$. Then,

$$f(R_1, R_2') = (N \cup \{4, 5\}) P_2 (N \cup K) = f(R),$$

which means that f is not strategy-proof.

Third, there exist strategy-proof social choice functions satisfying voters' sovereignty on K that, although they are not stable, satisfy either internal or external stability. Propositions 2 and 3 below identify, among the class of voting by committees, those that are internal and external stable, respectively.

To state Proposition 2 we need the following definitions. We say that a committee $\mathcal{W}_i$ is *unanimous* if $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{N\}$; *decisive* if $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i\}\}$; and *bipersonal* if $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i, j\}_{j \in N \backslash \{i\}}\}$. When $n = 3$ we say that the committees $\mathcal{W}_i$, $\mathcal{W}_j$, and $\mathcal{W}_l$ are *cyclical* if $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i, j\}\}$, $\mathcal{W}_j^m = \{\{j, l\}\}$, and $\mathcal{W}_l^m = \{\{l, i\}\}$.

Proposition 2 *Assume $f : \mathcal{S} \longrightarrow 2^{N \cup K}$ is voting by committees. Then, f satisfies internal stability if and only if:*

(Candidates) $\mathcal{W}_x^m = \{N\}$ *for all* $x \in K$*.*

(Founders) When $n \geq 4$ *committees are either all unanimous or some decisive and some bipersonal. When* $n = 3$ *committees are either all unanimous, or cyclical, or some decisive and some bipersonal.*

Proof See the Appendix.

We now characterize the set of voting by committees satisfying external stability.

Proposition 3 *Assume* $f : \mathcal{S} \longrightarrow 2^{N \cup K}$ *is voting by committees. Then,* f *satisfies external stability if and only if for all* $i \in N$, $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i\}\}$.

Proof See the Appendix.

Fourth, all voting by committees satisfy strategy-proofness and voter's sovereignty on K. But there are more rules satisfying both properties. For instance, those where a subset of founders N_1 is *always* in the society and another subset N_2 is *never* in the society. These can be expressed as *generalized* voting by committees by allowing that the committees of all founders in N_2 be empty (that is, without any winning coalition) and the committees of all founders in N_1 have the empty set as minimal winning coalition.

Finally, we want to argue that the non-initial exit condition (C4) is indispensable for the existence of stable social choice functions; that is, there might not exist social choice functions satisfying stability if (C4) fails. Example 1 below illustrates this fact.

Example 1 Assume that $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ (K could be any set of candidates). Let R be the additive preference profile induced by the following utility functions:

	u_1	u_2	u_3
1	1	10	-5
2	-5	1	2
3	10	-5	1
$x \in K$	$\pm\varepsilon_x$	$\pm\varepsilon_x$	$\pm\varepsilon_x$
$\emptyset$	0	0	0

where the absolute value of all ε_x's are sufficiently small.

Notice that (C4) fails since $N \setminus \{3\} I_3 \emptyset P_3 N$. We now check that there is no social choice function satisfying stability. Let X denote any arbitrary subset of K.

- If $f(R) = X$ then f does not satisfy external stability because $1 \notin f(R)$ and $(X \cup \{1\}) P_1 X$.
- If $f(R) = \{1\} \cup X$ then f does not satisfy external stability because $2 \notin f(R)$ and $(f(R) \cup \{2\}) P_2 f(R)$.
- If $f(R) = \{2\} \cup X$ then f does not satisfy external stability because $3 \notin f(R)$ and $(f(R) \cup \{3\}) P_3 f(R)$.
- If $f(R) = \{3\} \cup X$ then f does not satisfy external stability because $1 \notin f(R)$ and $(f(R) \cup \{1\}) P_1 f(R)$.
- If $f(R) = \{1, 2\} \cup X$ then f does not satisfy internal stability because $1 \in f(R)$ and $(f(R) \setminus \{1\}) P_1 f(R)$.
- If $f(R) = \{1, 3\} \cup X$ then f does not satisfy internal stability because $3 \in f(R)$ and $(f(R) \setminus \{3\}) P_3 f(R)$.

- If $f(R) = \{2,3\} \cup X$ then f does not satisfy internal stability because $2 \in f(R)$ and $(f(R) \setminus \{2\}) P_2 f(R)$.
- If $f(R) = N \cup X$ then f does not satisfy internal stability because $3 \in f(R)$ and $(f(R) \setminus \{3\}) P_3 f(R)$.

6 Appendix

Proof of Proposition 2 First, we define the set of *vetoers* of $\mathcal{W}_i$ as the set $V_i = \{j \in N \backslash \{i\} \mid j \in S \text{ for all } S \in \mathcal{W}_i\}$. We will use the following result.

Lemma 3 *(a) Suppose that $n \geq 3$ and there exist $i, j \in N$ such that $i \neq j$ and $\{i, j\} \notin \mathcal{W}_j$. Then, for all $l \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$, $i \in V_l$.*
(b) Suppose that $n \geq 3$ and there exist $i, j \in N$ such that $i \neq j$ and $i \in V_j$. Then for all $l \in N \setminus \{i, j\}$, $l \in V_q$ for all $q \in N \setminus \{l, j\}$.
(c) Suppose that $n \geq 4$ and there exist $i, j \in N$ such that $i \neq j$ and $i \in V_j$. Then for all $l \in N$, $l \in V_q$ for all $q \in N \setminus \{l\}$.

Proof (a) We prove it by contradiction. Assume that there exists $l \in N \backslash \{i, j\}$ such that $i \notin V_l$. Let R be a preference profile satisfying:

- $\tau(R_i) = (N \setminus \{l\}) \cup K$. Given $S \subset N \cup K$ such that $i \in S$, then $\emptyset P_i S$ if $j \notin S$ and $l \in S$.
- $\tau(R_j) = N \cup K$.
- $\tau(R_r) = (N \setminus \{j\}) \cup K$ for all $r \in N \setminus \{i, j\}$.

Since $\{i, j\} \notin \mathcal{W}_j$ we conclude that $j \notin f(R)$. Moreover, $l \in f(R)$ because $i \notin V_l$. Agents of $(N \backslash \{j, l\}) \cup K$ belong to $f(R)$ because they are unanimously good. But this contradicts internal stability since $i \in f(R) = (N \setminus \{j\}) \cup K$ and $\emptyset P_i f(R)$.

(b) We prove it by contradiction. Assume that there exist $l \in N \setminus \{i, j\}$ and $q \in N \setminus \{l, j\}$ such that $l \notin V_q$. Let R be a preference profile satisfying:

- $\tau(R_i) = (N \setminus \{j\}) \cup K$.
- $\tau(R_l) = (N \setminus \{q\}) \cup K$. Given $S \subset N \cup K$ such that $l \in S$, then $\emptyset P_l S$ if $j \notin S$ and $q \in S$.
- $\tau(R_r) = (N \setminus \{j\}) \cup K$ for all $r \in N \setminus \{i, l\}$.

Since $i \in V_j$ we conclude that $j \notin f(R)$. Moreover, $q \in f(R)$ because $l \notin V_q$. Agents of $(N \setminus \{j, q\}) \cup K$ belong to $f(R)$ because they are unanimously good. But this contradicts internal stability since $l \in f(R) = (N \setminus \{j\}) \cup K$ and $\emptyset P_l f(R)$.

(c) Without loss of generality assume that $2 \in V_1$. By part (b) we conclude that for all $i \geq 3$, $i \in V_q$ for all $q \in N \setminus \{1, i\}$. Since $3 \in V_4$, by part (b), $2 \in V_i$ for all $i \in N \setminus \{2, 4\}$. Since $4 \in V_3$, by part (b), $2 \in V_i$ for all $i \in N \setminus \{2, 3\}$. Then, $2 \in V_i$ for all $i \in N \setminus \{2\}$. Using arguments similar to those used in the case of agent 2 we can conclude that $1 \in V_i$ for all $i \in N \setminus \{1\}$. Since $1 \in V_2$, by part (b), $3 \in V_i$ for all $i \in N \setminus \{2, 3\}$. Then, $3 \in V_i$ for all $i \in N \setminus \{3\}$. Using arguments similar to those used in the case of agent 3 we can conclude that for all $i \geq 4$, $i \in V_j$ for all $j \in N \setminus \{i\}$. ■

It is straightforward to prove that voting by committees defined as in the statement of Proposition 2 satisfy internal stability.

We now prove the reciprocal. To show that all committees for the candidates are unanimous, assume that there exist $x \in K$ and $S \subsetneq N$ such that

$S \in \mathcal{W}_x^m$. Take $i \in N \backslash S$ and $R \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $x \in G_K(R_j)$ for all $j \in S$, $i \in G_N(R_j)$ for all $j \in N$, and

$$\emptyset P_i T \text{ whenever } x \in T. \tag{3}$$

Then, $x \in f(R)$ and $i \in f(R)$. But this and condition (3) contradict internal stability of f.

We now prove the statement for founders distinguishing two cases: (1) $n \geq 4$ and (2) $n \geq 3$. No restriction has to be imposed on committees for $n = 2$, since for this case we can check that any committee structure defines voting by committees satisfying internal stability.

1. $n \geq 4$. Again, we consider two cases:

   (a) There exist $i, j \in N$, $i \neq j$, such that $\{i, j\} \notin \mathcal{W}_j$.

   By parts (a) and (c) of Lemma 3, we conclude that for all $l \in N$, $l \in V_q$ for all $q \in N \setminus \{l\}$. Now it is easy to conclude that all committees are unanimous.

   (b) For all $i, j \in N$, $i \neq j$, $\{i, j\} \in \mathcal{W}_j$.

   Let $\{N_1, N_2\}$ be the partition of N where $N_1 = \{i \in N \mid \{\{i\}\} = \mathcal{W}_i^m\}$ and $N_2 = \{i \in N \mid \{\{i\}\} \neq \mathcal{W}_i^m\}$. Now it is immediate to conclude that all committees for founders in N_1 are decisive and all committees for founders in N_2 are bipersonal.

2. $n = 3$. We now distinguish several cases.

   (a) There exist $i, j, l \in N$, $j \in N \setminus \{i\}$, and $l \in N \setminus \{i, j\}$, such that $\{i, j\} \notin \mathcal{W}_i$ and $\{i, l\} \notin \mathcal{W}_i$.

   Then $\mathcal{W}_i^m = N$, which means that $j \in V_i$ and $l \in V_i$. Since $j \in V_i$ $(l \in V_i)$, by part (b) of Lemma 3, $l \in V_j$ $(j \in V_l)$. Applying again part (b) of Lemma 3 we conclude that $i \in V_l$ $(i \in V_j)$.

Hence, for all $q \in N$, $q \in V_r$ for all $r \in N \setminus \{q\}$. Now it is easy to conclude that all committees are unanimous.

(b) There exist $i, j, l \in N$, $j \in N \setminus \{i\}$, and $l \in N \setminus \{i, j\}$, such that $\{i, j\} \notin \mathcal{W}_i$ but $\{i, l\} \in \mathcal{W}_i$.

Then $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i, l\}\}$ and thus $l \in V_i$. Applying several times part (b) of Lemma 3 we conclude that $j \in V_l$ and $i \in V_j$. For $n = 3$ this implies that $\mathcal{W}_l^m = \{\{l, j\}\}$ and $\mathcal{W}_j^m = \{\{j, i\}\}$. That is, the committees $\mathcal{W}_i$, $\mathcal{W}_j$, and $\mathcal{W}_l$ are cyclical.

(c) For all $i, j \in N$, $i \neq j$, $\{i, j\} \in \mathcal{W}_i$.

Arguing as in Case 1(b) we obtain that some committees are decisive and some are bipersonal. ■

Proof of Proposition 3 Since $i \in \tau(R_i)$ for all $i \in N$ and all preference profile $R_i \in \mathcal{S}_i$, we conclude that

$$[\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i\}\}, \text{ for all } i \in N] \Longleftrightarrow [N \subset f(R), \text{ for all } R \in \mathcal{S}].$$

Suppose that f is voting by committees and for all $i \in N$, $\mathcal{W}_i^m = \{\{i\}\}$. Then f satisfies external stability because $N \subset f(R)$ for all $R \in \mathcal{S}$.

We now prove the reciprocal by contradiction. Let $R \in \mathcal{S}$ and $i \in N$ be such that $i \notin f(R)$. Consider $R_i' \in \mathcal{S}_i$ such that $\tau(R_i) = \tau(R_i')$ and $SP_i'\emptyset$ when $i \in S$. Since f is voting by committees we conclude that $f(R) = f(R_i', R_{-i})$. But this contradicts external stability because $i \notin f(R_i', R_{-i})$ and $(f(R_i', R_{-i}) \cup \{i\}) P_i'\emptyset$. ■

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