

# On the Different Forms of Individual and Group Strategic Behavior, and Their Impact on Efficiency

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Chapter

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## Abstract

We survey a number of results regarding incentives and efficiency that have been recently added to the social choice literature, and we establish parallels and differences with the concepts and results obtained so far by co-utility theory. Our main purpose is to facilitate the convergence between researchers who end up dealing with similar issues in response to rather different motivations and backgrounds.

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