1

Referències Bibliogràfiques que s’han de treballar.

    1. Alcantud, Jose Carlos R. and Annick Laruelle: “Dissapproval voting: a characterization”. Social Choice and Welfare, 2014.
    2. Apesteguia, José and Miguel Ángel Ballester: “A Measure of Rationality and Welfare”. Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
    3. Balinski, Michel and Rida Laraki: “Judge: Don't Vote!” Operations Research 62(3), 483-511, 2014.
    4. Ballester, Miguel Ángel and Guillaume Haeringer: “A Characterization of the Single-Peaked domain”. Social Choice and Welfare 36, 305-322, 2011.
    5. Barberà, Salvador and Anke Gerber: “Sequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation". WP SSRN-id2483329 and WP782 Barcelona GSE, 2014.
    6. Barberà, Salvador and Bernardo Moreno: "Top Monotonicity: a Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result". Games and Economic Behavior 73, 345–359, 2011.
    7. Barberà, Salvador and Danilo Coelho: "On the Rule of k Names". Games and Economic Behavior 70(1), 44–61, 2010. Special issue in honor of Ehud Kalai.
    8. Barberà, Salvador and Matthew O. Jackson: "Choosing How to Choose: Self–Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions". The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3), 1011–1048, 2004.
    9. Barberà, Salvador and Matthew O. Jackson: "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union"Journal of Political Economy 114(2), 317–339, 2006.
    10. Barberà, Salvador: "An Introduction to Strategy–proof Social Choice Functions"Social Choice and Welfare 18(4), 619–653, 2001.
    11. Barberà, Salvador: "Strategy–proof Social Choice", in K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds.) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Volume 2. Netherlands: North–Holland, chapter 25, 731—831, 2010.
    12. Barberà, Salvador; Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno: "Individual versus group strategy–proofness: when do they coincide?" Journal of Economic Theory 145(5), 1648–1674, 2010.
    13. Barberà, Salvador; Hugo Sonnenschein and Lin Zhou: "Voting by Committees"Econometrica 59(3), 595–609, 1991.
    14. Barberà, Salvador; Michael Maschler and Jonathan Shalev: "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution"Games and Economic Behavior 37(1), 40–78, 2001.
    15. Bossert, Walter and Yves Sprumont: “Strategy-proof Preference Aggregation”. Cahiers de recherche 2012-10, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, 2012.
    16. Brams, Steven J. and Peter C. Fishburn: “Voting Procedures”, in K. Arrow; A. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds.) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1.  Netherlands: North-Holland, chapter 4, 173-227, 2002.
    17. Cassella, Alessandra: “Storable Votes”. Games and Economic Behavior 51, 391-419, 2005.
    18. Dasgupta, Partha and Eric Masking: “On the Robustness of majority rule”. Journal of the European Economic Association 6(5), 949-973, 2008.
    19. Dokow, Elad and Ron Holzman: “Aggregation of binary evaluations”. Journal of Economic Theory 145, 495-511, 2010.
    20. Gerardi, Dino: “Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity”. American Political Science Review 94, 395-406, 2000.
    21. Gibbard, Allan: “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result”. Econometrica 41, 587–601, 1973. Reprinted in Charles K. Rowley (ed.) Social Choice Theory. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1993.
    22. Holzman, Ron and Hervé Moulin: "Impartial Nominations for a Prize," Econometrica 81(1), 173-196, 2013.
    23. List, Christian and Clemens Puppe: “Judgment aggregation: A survey”, in Paul Anand, Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Clemens Puppe (eds.) Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press 2009.
    24. List, Christian: “Judgment aggregation: a short introduction”, in: Mäki, Uskali (ed.) Philosophy of Economics. Handbook of the philosophy of science (13). Elsevier, 799-822, 2012. ISBN 9780444516763.
    25. Man, Priscilla and Shino Takayama: “A unifying impossibility theorem”. Economic Theory 54(2), 249-271, 2013. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0750-6.
    26. Saporiti, Andrea: “Strategy-proofness and Single Crossing”. Theoretical Economics 4, 127-163, 2009.
    27. Young, Peyton: “Condorcet’s Theory of Voting”. American Political Science Review 82(4), 1231-1244, 1988.