



## Corrigendum

# Corrigendum to “Strategy-proof social choice correspondences” [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374–394] <sup>☆</sup>

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We are grateful to Remzi Sanver for pointing out an error in our paper. The error occurs on page 390, where the specified preference profiles are not in  $\mathcal{D}_E$ , despite our claims to the contrary.

The correct specification of preference profiles should be:

(i)  $\{a_k\}P_j\{a_k, a_l\}P_j\{a_l\}P_j\{a_j, a_k\}P_j\{a_j, a_k, a_l\}P_j\{a_j, a_l\}P_j\{a_j\}P_jX$  for all other  $X$ ,

(ii)  $\{a_l\}P_j\{a_k, a_l\}P_j\{a_k\}P_j\{a_j, a_l\}P_j\{a_j, a_k, a_l\}P_j\{a_j, a_k\}P_j\{a_j\}P_jX$  for all other  $X$ .

Then,  $f(R_{-ijk}, R_i, R_j, R_k)$  is either  $\{a_j, a_l\}$ ,  $\{a_j, a_k\}$  or  $\{a_j, a_k, a_l\}$ . (Only the first two possibilities are mentioned on page 390).

In Case A, also consider the possibility that  $f(R_{-ijk}, R_i, R_j, R_k) = \{a_j, a_k, a_l\}$ . Choose  $R'_k \in \mathcal{D}_E$  such that  $\{a_l\}P'_k\{a_j, a_l\}P'_k\{a_j\}P'_k\{a_k, a_l, a_l\}P'_kX$  for any other set  $X$ . The proof that  $k$  will manipulate at  $(R_{-ijk}, R_i, \bar{R}_j, R'_k)$  via  $R_k$  is virtually the same as before.

Case B remains as in the paper.

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