One Team, One Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa*

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ABSTRACT

Do collective experiences that prime sentiments of national unity reduce inter-ethnic tensions and conflict? We examine this question by looking at the impact of national football teams' victories in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on over 70 official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days following a victory of their country's national team are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, national victories do not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence. Indeed, using exogenous variation from close qualifications to the Africa Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the six months following the qualification than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, patriotic shocks can reduce inter-ethnic mistrust and have a tangible impact on conflict.

Keywords: Conflict, Ethnic divisions, Ethnic identity, Trust, Football, Africa
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"Men and women of Ivory Coast, from the north, south, center and west:
we proved today that all Ivorians can coexist and play together
with a shared aim: to qualify for the World Cup.
We promised that the celebration would unite the people.
Today, we beg you, on our knees... Forgive. Forgive. Forgive.
The one country in Africa with so many riches must not descend into war.
Please lay down your weapons. Hold elections. Everything will be better."

Didier Drogba after Ivory Coast's historical qualification to 2006 FIFA World Cup

1. INTRODUCTION

The detrimental effect of ethnic fractionalization on various aspects of socio-economic development has been documented by a vast literature. In particular, ethnically diverse communities tend to experience more corruption and conflict, and less social cohesion, public good provision, and growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005).[1] The consequences of ethnic divisions are especially severe in Africa where the arbitrary drawing of borders by European powers forced different ethnicities to cohabitate (Cederman et al., 2013; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, forthcoming), and where ethnic cleavages were used by colonizers to divide and rule over the indigenous population (Mamdani, 2014; Herbst, 2014).

One question that remains largely unexplored is where inter-ethnic tensions originate from, and whether anything can be done to mitigate them. On the one hand, previous evidence suggests that inter-ethnic mistrust has deep historical roots, and can be traced back to experiences, such as the slave trade, occurred several centuries ago (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). On the other hand, other studies show that ethnic sentiments are surprisingly malleable, and can be primed by factors such as political competition (Eifert et al., 2010) and mass media (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). Indeed, the desire to promote inter-ethnic cooperation by reinforcing national identity has motivated many "nation-building" policies adopted

[1] Two (non-mutually exclusive) sets of theories have attempted to rationalize the negative association between ethnic fractionalization and public good provision. According to some, lower public good provision in more ethnically diverse communities could be attributed to differences across ethnic groups in preferences over different types of public goods (Alesina et al., 1997), aversion for "mixing" with other ethnic groups (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), and/or preferences for public goods that benefit one's own ethnic group(Vigdor, 2002). Other theories have instead emphasized the importance of social sanctions and community pressure in sustaining collective action; because social interactions are less frequent between members of different ethnic groups, social sanctions that discourage free-riding are much harder to enforce in more than in less ethnically homogeneous communities.

in various African governments after independence (Miguel, 2004).[2] Yet, what collective experiences can contribute to appease ethnic tensions, and how long-lasting their impact may be remains largely unknown.

This paper examines this question by looking at the impact of one phenomenon that, like few others, spur nationalistic fervor: football. Specifically, focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa, we test whether the victories of national football teams make people identify less with their own ethnic group and more with the country as a whole, and can ultimately contribute to reduce inter-ethnic tensions and conflict. Indeed, sport in general, and football in particular, has traditionally played a key role in nation-building in Africa. As argued by Darby (2002), football has greatly contributed to "construct a sense of national identity and to create a feeling of bonded patriotism cutting across tribal and ethnic allegiances". An eminent example of the unifying power of football is represented by the historical qualification of Ivory Coast to the 2006 FIFA World Cup under the charismatic leadership of Didier Drogba which, many argue, paved the way to a peaceful solution of the civil war that had ravaged the country for over five years (Stormer, 2006; Mehler, 2008).[3]

We want to examine how the success of national football teams in important international competitions influence the strength of ethnic identification, attitudes towards people of other ethnicities, and actual inter-ethnic violence. To do so, we combine different empirical approaches and uses data from a variety of sources. First, to study the impact of the national teams' victories on individual attitudes, we combine survey data from four waves of the Afrobarometer with information on over 70 official games by African teams held between 2000 and 2015. In this case, our identification strategy exploits arguably exogenous differences in the timing of respondents' interviews relative to the timing of matches. In particular, we compare self-reported attitudes between individuals interviewed in the days immediately before a victorious match of their national team and individuals interviewed in the days immediately after. Since our regressions control for country-year, language group (a proxy for ethnicity), and match fixed effects, we identify the effect from comparing individuals with similar ethnic background, interviewed in the same country the same period, but respectively before and after a given match, two groups which, we show, are comparable along most socio-economic characteristics. Applying this approach to over 35,000 respon-

[2] Examples of such policies include changing the country's name (Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso), changing the capital city (Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria), changing the national currency (Ghana, Angola), introducing military conscription, promoting national services (Zambia, Nigeria), imposing religious and linguistic homogenization (Sudan, Mauritania, Tanzania), introducing non-ethnic censuses (Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania), and land nationalizing (Ghana, Tanzania, Sudan). For a comprehensive survey of these policies and a discussion of their mixed results see Bandyopadhyay and Green (2013).

[3] Another notable example is represented by the unexpected success of South African national rugby team - the Springboks - in the 1995 World Cup, which president Nelson Mandela masterfully used in his effort to build a common identity and bridge racial divisions in the immediate post-apartheid period.

dents in 24 countries, we find that individuals interviewed after a national team's victory are 4% less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity than those interviewed just before the match. This effect is sizable, corresponding to a 20% decrease in the average probability of ethnic self-identification. Furthermore, it does not appear to be short-lived; in fact, it is very persistent within the limited time window for which data are available (i.e., up to 30 days after the match), and becomes even larger several days after the match. Additional results further support the view that it is the victory of the national team - perceived as a successful collective venture - that galvanizes national supporters and tilts the balance between ethnic and national identity in favor of the latter. First only a victory, and not the mere occurrence of an important match, affects ethnic sentiments. Second, the effect is driven only by victories in high-stake official games (i.e., World Cup or CAN qualifiers and finals), while friendly matches are inconsequential. Third, the effect is substantially larger for unexpected victories than for predictable ones. Finally, we find no significant difference between victories in home vs. away games, which suggests that the effect is driven by a shared collective experience and not by respondents' direct participation in the event.

These results are further corroborated by the fact that post-match respondents are also significantly more likely to trust other people, particularly members of other ethnicities. Crucially, respondents' lower emphasis on ethnic identity and higher trust in others do not merely reflect a generalized positive mood due to post-victory euphoria. In fact, we find no effect of national team's victories on either trust in the ruling party or approval for the incumbent, a result which suggests that politicians' effort to use national teams' achievements to boost their own popularity may not pay off. [4] Furthermore, we find that optimism regarding the economic condition of the country as well as the one of the respondent, does not systematically change after a victory.

We then explore whether, in addition to people's attitudes, national team's success has a tangible impact on social tensions and violence. To do so we combine the football data with data on the occurrence and severity of political violence events available from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) for the period 1995-2014. To investigate the impact of national team's success on violent conflict and understand how persistent this effect may be, we resort to a different empirical strategy that allows us to analyze the evolution of conflict over a much longer time span. Our approach exploits the

[4] Referring to the image of then Ghanaian president J. A. Mills celebrating the performance of the national team in the 2010 FIFA World Cup below the slogan "*Let us rally around the flag and support the Black Stars*", Darby (2013a) comments: "those words were explicitly aimed at invoking a sense of unified national pride and identity". In the same passage, Darby also reports the words of A. K. Kennedy, then Director of Communications for the New Patriotic Party (NPP), who following Ghana's first appearance at the FIFA World Cup finals in 2006 said that the team's performance "*gave us a glimpse of what we could be – all of us, regardless of faith or ethnic origin, united in common purpose of building a great nation*".

quasi-randomness of the qualification to the final tournament of the CAN for teams that, prior to the last game of the group stage, could still qualify. In other words, for each two teams in the same group that, prior to the very last game, could still both qualify, we attribute the one that actually qualified to the treatment group and the one that barely failed to do so to the control group. We then compare the evolution of conflict in the six months before and after the last match for countries in the treatment and in the control group which, we show, are *ex ante* comparable along most dimensions. Our results indicate that countries whose teams (barely) qualified to the CAN tournament experience significantly less conflict events in the six months following the qualification than countries whose teams (barely) did not. This effect is sizable and significant, and robust to controlling for country/qualifier and week fixed effects, as well as for intensity of conflict in the weeks prior to qualification. Also, the reduction in conflict intensity that follows a successful qualification campaign appears to be surprisingly persistent, up to several months after the shock.

Taken together our findings indicate that successful collective experiences - such as important sport victories - can be very effective at priming sentiments of national pride and unity and attenuate even deeply-rooted ethnic mistrusts, with tangible effects on violence. Though the effect of these events is likely to be transient, our results suggest that it may last long enough to open a precious window of opportunity for political dialogue, negotiations and reforms capable of producing long-lasting improvements.

Our work contributes to the political economy literature in several ways. In particular, it advances the literature that tries to understand ethnic identification. While previous work has provided suggestive evidence that the strength of ethnic identification may be malleable by factors such as electoral competition or economic modernization (Eifert et al., 2010; Robinson, 2014), data limitations and econometric designs made it difficult to go beyond robust statistical associations, and thus draw causal conclusions. We then contribute to this literature by providing robust causal evidence on how a particular event can impact ethnic identification.

Our research also speaks to an economic literature on the determinants of interpersonal trust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Durante, 2011). Notably, this literature argues that the culture of trust has deep historical roots. Our contribution shows however that there may be also a sizable short-run component of interpersonal trust that may be shaped by particular circumstances. Especially relevant to our work is Robinson (forthcoming) who shows that manipulating the salience of national identification in a "lab-in-the-field" experiment affects behavioral measures of trust, particularly inter-ethnic trust. Unlike Robinson (forthcoming) who focuses in a specific region of the Malawian-Zambian border, our empirical examination is conducted in multiple Sub-Saharan African countries. Given that our sample of countries

exhibits a high degree of heterogeneity along several relevant dimensions, such as ethnic diversity or conflict prevalence, and expands for a long period of time, it arguably mitigates the usual concerns regarding the potential lack of external validity of the empirical results. Our paper tangentially relates to Miguel (2004) who argues that nation-building policies can positively impact inter-ethnic cooperation.

Finally, our work goes beyond documenting how ethnic identification and inter-ethnic trust react to national pride shocks and examines whether those shocks can also translates in a tangible reduction of violence. Therefore, we also contributes to a large literature on the determinants of civil conflict and organized violence. In this sense, our work is the the first one presenting causal evidence on how priming national pride and unity can impact aggregate measures of conflict.

2. Data

2.1. Football Data

We collect information on all official matches played by men national teams of various sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1990-2014; these data are available from the FIFA statistical office.[5] In particular, we focus on the matches played for both the qualification phase and the tournament phase of the two most important international football competitions for African teams: the African Cup of Nations (CAN) and the FIFA World Cup (WC).[6] For each match we have information on the exact date of the match, the location of the match, the opponent, the competition, the phase, and the final score. As explained below, we combine the information on the matches with both individual-level survey data. Specifically, based on the date of each game, we identify the respondents interviewed in the days just before and after the game.

Overall we use information from nearly 70 official matches played between 2002 and 2013, for the main individual-level analysis.[7] For the analysis of the relationship between national teams' success and conflict, we also collect information on teams' standings in nine CAN qualification phases held between 1997 and 2013, again available from the FIFA statistical office. In particular, we record all teams' standings before and after the final match of the group stage in order to identify all teams that, prior to the last game, could technically still qualify to the tournament phase, and, among these, those teams that eventually qualified

[5] Countries from the Maghreb region are excluded from our analysis because, in these countries, Afrobarometer surveys do not include any question on ethnic identity.

[6] In a robustness check we examine the importance of friendly games.

[7] In a placebo exercise we also exploit information from nearly 60 friendly matches played between 2002 and 2013.

and those that did not.[8]

2.2. Survey Data from Afrobarometer

In the first part of our analysis we use individual survey data from four waves of the Afrobarometer conducted between 2002 and 2013. The Afrobarometer is a collection of comparative series of nationally representative surveys covering several African countries. Overall, we use data from 47 survey rounds conducted in 24 sub-Saharan African countries.

The Afrobarometer relies on personal interviews conducted in local languages; questions are standardized so responses can be compared across countries (Afrobarometer, 2007). Questions are designed to assess respondents' attitudes on a range of issues, including attitudes towards democracy, political actors, markets, and civil society. For our analysis we focus on the questions regarding how strongly individuals identify with their own ethnic group (relative to the nation as a whole), and how much they trust their fellow countrymen, from neighbors and relatives to politicians and people from other ethnic groups. In addition, we also use information on a range of respondents' personal characteristics, including gender, age, occupational status, education, rural location, and, crucially, the main language spoken at home, which we use as a proxy for ethnic background.[9] The following are the main outcome variables we use in our analysis. *Ethnic Identification* is a measure of the strength of an individual's ethnic identity relative to national identity. The variable is based on responses to the following question: *"Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [National] and being a [respondent's ethnic group]. Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?"*. While in round #2 of the Afrobarometer respondents could only chose the options "national identity", "group identity", or "don't know", in rounds #3, #4, and #5 they could chose any of the following five options: 0 ("I feel only [National]"), 1 ("I feel more [National] than [Ethnic group]), 2 ("I feel equally [National] and [Ethnic group])", 3 ("I feel more[Ethnic group] than [National]"), and 4 ("I feel only [Ethnic group]"). To be able to compare respondents' answers across rounds, we construct a binary measure of ethnic identity that takes value 1 for all respondents in rounds 3# to #5 that reported feeling "only ethnic", or "more ethnic that national", and for all respondents in round #2 that chose the option "group identity".

In Figure 1 we plot the share of respondents that reported stronger ethnic than na-

[8] Unlike previous tournaments, the final qualification process for the 2013 CAN was not based on a final groups stages. Teams entering the tournament were drawn from 14 two-legged home-and-away knock-out ties.

[9] We use language as a proxy for ethnic background because, unfortunately, Afrobarometer questionnaires did not systematically include questions about respondents' ethnicity. A small share of respondents reported speaking a non-indigenous language at home (in most cases a European language). Because of the difficulty to identify these individuals' ethnicity, we decide to exclude them from our sample.

tional identity, separately for different countries in different rounds of the Afrobarometer. The figure is based only on the responses of those individuals interviewed in the proximity of one or more national team's official games, which represents our sample of interest. An interesting pattern that emerges from Figure 1 is that the relative strength of ethnic identity varies considerably not only across countries, but even in the same country over time, possibly also due to the sort of impact of major sport events we investigate. One suggestive example in this regard is given by Mali, where more than 30 percent of the individuals interviewed in 2002 emphasized ethnic over national identity, but where less than 10% did so in 2013, when the Malian national football team achieved the third place in the Africa Cup of Nations, its best performance in the history of the competition.[10] The strength of ethnic identity appears to be more stable in other countries: for example in Tanzania, a country known for its effective nation-building policies (Miguel, 2004), less than 10% of respondents in any round emphasize ethnic over national identity.

To explore the impact of national team's victories on respondents' level of trust in others, we use four additional variables. First, we construct a measure of *Generalized Trust* computed as the average score in four separate questions regarding trust in relatives, trust in other acquaintances, trust in fellow countrymen, and trust in neighbors. The exact wording of the question is *"How much do you trust each of the following",* followed by the list of specific target groups, with possible answers ranging from 0 ("not at all") to 3 ("a lot"). Second, exploiting the presence of questions specifically aimed at eliciting respondents' trust in people within and outside their ethnic group, we construct measures of *Inter-ethnic* and *Intra-ethnic Trust*, defined over the same 4-point scale described above.[11] We also construct a measure of *Pro-inter-ethnic trust*, given by the difference between *Inter-ethnic* and *Intra-ethnic Trust*, and hence defined over the interval (-3, 3).[12] Additionally, to examine the effect of national team's victories on trust and support for the incumbent, we code two additional variables, *Trust in the Ruling Party*, and *President's Approval* based respectively on answers to the question "*How much do you trust the ruling party?",* and *"Do you approve or disapprove of the way the president has performed over the past twelve months?"*, with possible answers ranging from 1 ("strongly disapprove") to 4 ("strongly approve"). Finally, to further examine whether victories somehow affect overall mood of the respondents, we code

[10] Similarly, the typically high share of Zambians who report a strong sense of ethnic identification was greatly reduced in 2013, a year after the country's historical and unexpected victory in the 2012 CAN. Incidentally, the final took place in Libreville near the place where, twenty years earlier, most of the Zambian national football team died in an air crash, a circumstance which further strengthened the emotional valence of the victory.

[11] The exact wording of the two questions is respectively: *"How much do you trust people from other ethnic groups",* and *"How much do you trust in people from your own ethnic group*".

[12] Because this question on *inter-ethnic* trust is only available for round #3 of the Afrobarometer, the analysis on this aspect will rely on a substantially smaller sample.

FIGURE 1: ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION OVER TIME AND ACROSS COUNTRIES



four variables regarding individuals' assessment about the (present and future) economic conditions of the country as well as their own living conditions. Respondents rate present conditions based on a 5-point scale: very bad (1), fairly bad (2), neither good nor bad (3), fairly good (4), and very good (5) whereas they also rate future conditions based on a 5-point scale: much worse (1), worse (2), same (3), better (4), and much better (5). We thus construct 4 indicators taking value 1 if a respondent rates conditions either as (4) or (5), 0 otherwise.

2.3. Country-Level Conflict Data

To study the impact of football-driven positive priming of pride and unity on actual violence, in the last part of our analysis we use country-level data on conflict from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).

ACLED's data is available for the period 1997-2013 and include information on the date, location of any instance of political violence - including battles, killings, or riots - that involve either rebel groups, governments, militias, or civilians. Information on the severity of the events, measured by the number of associated fatalities, is also available.

3. Individual-Level Analysis: Empirical Strategy

To estimate the impact of patriotic shocks on ethnic identity (relative to national identity) and several measures of interpersonal trust, we estimate different specifications of the following equation:

$$Outcome_{i,e,c,m,t} = \alpha + \beta Victory_{c,m,t} + \gamma' X_i + \Gamma_{c,t} + \Delta_e + \Theta_{c,m} + \varepsilon_{e,t} \quad (1)$$

where i, e, c, m, and t denote individual, ethnicity, country, match, and year, respectively. We focus on several attitudinal *outcome* variables at the individual level from different waves of Afrobarometer as described in previous section: *Ethnic Identification, Generalized Trust, Pro-inter-ethnic Trust, Trust in Ruling Party, President's Approval, and economic assessment*.

Victory is our main treatment variable of interest and takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory of his/her national team in an official match, 0 otherwise. The variable X_i is a vector of individual characteristics; including education, gender, age, age squared, unemployment status and a rural indicator. The variables Γ, Δ, and Θ are country-year, language group, and country-match fixed effects, respectively. Finally, $\varepsilon_{e,t}$ is an heteroscedasticity-corrected error term which, unless specified, is allowed to be correlated within an ethnicity. We proxy ethnicity by the indigenous language spoken at

home. [13]

Our main empirical strategy exploits a sample of individuals interviewed within 15 days before and after an official game of their national football team. We basically focus on two samples. In our initial analysis we only take into account for the treatment group those individuals who were treated exclusively by one game. This leaves us with nearly 30,000 individuals in both the treatment and control groups. In a second step we allow the treatment to be defined by multiple games (i.e. an individual could have had more than one game within 15 days before the interview), which leaves us with more than 35,000 individuals. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the first sample. Half of the individuals had a game within 15 days before the Afrobarometer interview. Almost 18 percent of them were affected by the victory treatment whereas 22 percent and 10 percent potentially saw their national team losing and drawing, respectively. [14]

TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Played	30,306	0.493	0.500
Victory	30,306	0.175	0.380
Defeat	30,306	0.221	0.415
Draw	30,306	0.096	0.294

Sample includes respondents interviewed within 15 days before and after an official game. Played takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a game (regardless of the result), 0 otherwise. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory. Defeat takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a loss, 0 otherwise.

Our identification strategy relies on the quasi-random nature of the date and the final result of a game with respect to the timing and the sampling of the Afrobarometer interview. That is, our assumption is that national team games did not alter the implementation of the Afrobaromter household surveys.[15] This would provide a credible setting to isolate the causal effect of the exposure to a football-driven shock on ethnic identification and interpersonal trust. We thus assess the credibility of our identification assumption by conducting a balance test for several characteristics for both the respondent and the interviewer. In other

[13] The same strategy is followed in Eifert et al. (2010)

[14] In a robustness check exercise we increase the length of the time window up to 30 days around a game. In that case the number of individuals in our sample is nearly 44,000.

[15] ADD HERE A BRIEF SUMMARY ON HOW SAMPLING IS DONE -SEE AFROBAROMETER MANUAL. According to Eifert et al. (2010) "the enormous logistical task of selecting enumeration sites and setting up field teams requires that preparations be made many months or even years in advance."

words, we examine some crucial characteristics of the respondent that may confound with different levels of ethnic identification or interpersonal trust, and see whether these covariates appear to be similar between the treatment and control observations. We also test whether characteristics of the interviewer are unbalanced. For all interviews made in a 30-day time window around an official match of national football team (15 days before and 15 days after), we define two treatments: 1) whether the interviewed was conducted after any game independently of the final result (i.e. played), and 2) whether the interview was made after a victory. A statistically insignificant relationship between any of the treatments and the list of covariates would provide strong evidence consistent with our identification assumption that neither Afrobarometer's interviewer nor a particular type of respondent are selecting into the interview based on the occurrence or the final result of the game. For the case of respondents, the covariates we look at are the following: gender, education, age, unemployment status, religious membership, whether the respondent belongs to the ethnic majority of the country, whether the individual lives in a rural area or in a location where basic public goods are provided. All these confounders are arguably potential observable determinants of ethnic identity.[16] [17] For the case of the interviewer, we look at gender, education, age. Additionally, we focus on whether the interviewer speaks the same language as the respondent and whether she or he thinks that anyone influenced the respondent's answers during the interview. These are indeed important checks since an imbalance in any of these two dimensions could arguably make social desirability bias more likely. We thus regress each of these covariates on the treatment and country-match fixed effects to ensure that comparison between treatment and control is made between respondents (or interviewer) in the proximity of the same game and in the same country. All point estimates are shown in Table and are based on OLS regressions for which robust standard errors are clustered at the country-match level.

In Panel A of Table 2 we test whether being treated by a game is balanced across individual and enumerator characteristics. With the exception of education and gender, we find in columns 1 to 8 that characteristics of individuals interviewed after any official game are not statistically different than those whose were interviewed before the same game. These baseline differences in education and gender, however, could be attributed to chance and the implied imbalances are rather small. People interviewed after a game is, on average, only 0.5 percent more likely to be a man than those interviewed before the game whereas being treated by any official game is associated to a lessening in education equivalent to 12% of

[16] For instance, Robinson (forthcoming) shows that urban status, education, male and formal employment all positively predict national identification (relative to ethnic). Meanwhile, Eifert et al. (2010) find no evidence that young people are more likely to self-identify in ethnic terms.

[17] Ideally, we would like to perform a balance test for a broader set of individual's characteristics. Unfortunately, our analysis is restricted to the small set of individual characteristics collected in the Afrobarometer.

its standard deviation (or 8% of its mean value). Additionally, note that the potential biases from these imbalances would operate in opposite directions since both education and gender would be negatively associated to ethnic identification.[18] Results in columns 9 to 10 suggests that when the interview took place after a game the enumerator is no more likely to speak the same language as the interviewed or think that the respondent was influenced. We also find in columns 11 to 13 that age, gender, and education are balanced across enumerators in the proximity of an official game.

Results in Panel B of Table 2 show that, again, all characteristics, but gender and education, are balanced on the victory treatment. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the implied imbalances are again remarkably small. Nonetheless, in the main empirical exercise that follows we include both gender and education as well as other individual characteristics as controls (included in the aforementioned vector X). None of our empirical results depend on the incorporation of this vector of controls. Finally, we find that all the variables related to the enumerator are balanced in the proximity of a victory of national team.

[18] According to Robinson (2014), more educated people and males tend to identified themselves as national over ethnic.

TABLE 2: BALANCE IN COVARIATES

		Panel A: Played		Panel B: Victory	
Covariate	N	Estimate	Std. Errors	Estimate	Std. Errors
Male	30,306	0.005*	0.003	0.006*	0.004
Education	30,239	-0.26*	0.133	-0.285*	0.146
Age	29,880	1.094	0.727	1.142	0.784
Unemployed	30,306	0.008	0.014	-0.007	0.013
Major Ethnicity	30,306	-0.021	0.053	-0.034	0.043
Rural	30,306	-0.000	0.010	-0.009	0.010
Religious Group Member	30,188	-0.022	0.019	-0.017	0.026
Public Goods	30,306	0.001	0.023	-0.020	0.018
Same Language	30,306	-0.045	0.037	-0.027	0.046
Influenced By Others	30,258	-0.004	0.005	-0.002	0.007
Male Interviewer	30,306	-0.006	0.014	-0.011	0.019
Interviewer's Education	30,272	-0.035	0.049	-0.072	0.061
Interviewer's Age	30,306	0.052	0.123	0.157	0.151

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country-match level. Each panel presents point estimates and standard errors for 13 regressions of a covariate (listed at the left) on Played (Panel A) and Victory (Panel B). Played takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a game (regardless of the result), 0 otherwise. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. All estimates are based on OLS regressions using 56 country-match dummies to ensure that the comparison in the covariates is made between respondents in the proximity of the same game and in the same country.

3.1. NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORIES AND ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

Table 3 provides a first statistical test for the empirical relationship between a national team's victory and ethnic identification. The sample under analysis includes individuals who were interviewed within 15 days before and after a game. In our baseline sample we include in the treatment group only individuals interviewed who were treated by only one game. Later, however, we do exploit information from individuals who were treated by multiple games.

TABLE 3: NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORY AND ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

	Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity			
	Dummy (0-1)			Ordinal (0-4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Victory	-0.014	-0.020	-0.036	-0.089
	(0.008)*	(0.008)**	(0.009)***	(0.028)***
			[0.010]***	[0.031]***
Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	30,306	29,814	29,814	26,332
R-squared	0.057	0.067	0.102	–

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust SEs (clustered by language group) in parentheses (brackets). Sample includes respondents interviewed within 15 days before and after an official game. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Specification in column 4 exploits the ordinal version of the dependent variable (waves 3, 4, and 5 of Afrobarometer) and is estimated by ordered probit.

In column 1 we only control for country-year dummies. Therefore, we compare respondents interviewed within 15 days after any victory happening in a given year with their countrymen interviewed either within 15 days before any game or within 15 days after a non victory (i.e. defeat or a draw). In doing so, we account for any country-level confounder that may vary between years such as political (i.e. national election, ethnic conflicts, etc) or economic (i.e. nation-wide economic policies, external shocks, such as variation in commodity prices, etc.) events. The point estimate in column 1 suggests that a national team's victory significantly negatively correlates with the probability that a respondent will report a strong sense of ethnic identification.

Adding individual-level controls in column 2 substantially improves the precision of the estimate. Interestingly, when we add language group fixed effects, in column 3, we find an even stronger statistical result regardless of the way we compute the standard errors.[19] The estimated effect of victory is economically large: individuals interviewed in the days following a victory of their country's national team are almost 4% less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity than other countrymen, of the same language group, in our

[19] Starting from column 3 and below each coefficient in Table 3, we report two robust standard errors: heteroscedasticity-corrected -robust- (in parenthesis) and clustered at the language group level -proxing for ethnicity- (in brackets). Standard errors clustered at the language group level are always larger that for the robust case thus clustering at that level appears to be the most conservative approach. Therefore, for the rest of the paper we report only the standard errors clustered at the language group level.

sample composed by individuals in the proximity (i.e. +/- 15 days) of any official game. This effect implies a 20% decrease in the average probability of ethnic self-identification. Reassuringly, in column 4 we show that the previous results do not depend on the discrete nature of our ethnic identification measure by running the same specification as in column 3 using the original ordinal (i.e. five-point scale) ethnic identification measure reported in three of the four rounds of Afrobarometer exploited in this paper.[20] Indeed, the point estimate reported in column 4 suggests a statistically strong negative association between victory and ethnic identification.

In Table 4 we explore the impact of alternative treatments and provide other additional checks for the previously documented results. In column 1 we show that a national team's defeat does not exert the opposite effect to that of a victory. Indeed, when comparing individuals within the same language group in a given country and year, those interviewed in the days following a defeat of their country's national team are not statistically more or less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity. If we add, in column 2, the victory indicator to the previous specification, we still find that only national team's victories affect ethnic identification. In column 3 we focus on a particular sample: only the individuals interviewed within +/- 15 days a victory. Despite the fact that our sample size substantially shrinks, we find qualitatively similar results; namely a national team's victory is strongly statistically associated with a reduction in self-reported ethnic identification. In column 4 we now focus on individuals within +/- 15 days a defeat and, consistently with results in column 1, we find that a national team's defeat does not alter ethnic identification.

It could still be the case that what is mainly driving the previous results is just a related treatment: being exposed to a national team's match regardless of the final result. In this sense, the point estimate in column 5 suggests that, conditional on the full set of controls in column 3 of Table 3, individuals interviewed after a game are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identification. Nonetheless, the results in column 6, to which we add the victory indicator, confirm that what matters in fact is a victory of the national team since being exposed to a game is no longer statistically significant once we account for the victory indicator.

[20] Exploiting the ordinal version of our dependent variable leads to a reduction in sample size due to the fact that the relevant ethnic identification question is not reported in a five-point scale in the second wave of Afrobarometer.

TABLE 4: VICTORIES, DEFEATS, AND PLACEBOS

	Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Victory		-0.036***	-0.030**			-0.030*
		(0.010)	(0.013)			(0.017)
Defeat	-0.004	-0.006		-0.010		
	(0.013)	(0.012)		(0.011)		
Played					-0.027***	-0.007
					(0.009)	(0.016)
Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,814	29,814	15,630	14,184	29,814	29,814
R-squared	0.101	0.102	0.121	0.089	0.102	0.102

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Defeat takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a defeat, 0 otherwise. Played takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a game (regardless of the result), 0 otherwise. Sample in Column 3 (4) includes only respondents interviewed within 15 days before and 15 days after a victory (defeat).

We next examine how ethnic identification evolves during different moments before and after the occurrence of the victory. In Panel A of Figure 2 we plot the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for 9 dummies indicating 3-day blocks for respondents within +/- 15 days from a national team's victory. The coefficient for the block -3 (i.e. 1 to 3 days before a victory) was normalized to zero; thus, the dummy coefficients indicate how ethnic identification changes over time with respect to the 3 days before the football-driven patriotic shock. Confidence intervals were constructed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the language group level. In addition to the the collection of 3-day block dummies for the respondent in the proximity of a victory, the regression includes an indicator for respondents in the proximity of either a defeat or a draw, individual-level controls, country-year fixed effects, and language group fixed effects.[21] The coefficients to the right of the date of the shock are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that, after a national team's victory, individuals are significantly less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identification (relative to national identification). On the contrary, the estimated

[21] Unfortunately, we do not have enough statistical power to estimate the coefficients for the 9 dummies when we include country-match fixed effects.

coefficients to the left of the date of the victory are not statistically different from zero, suggesting that, prior to the occurrence of the victory, there is no differential reporting on ethnic identification. In Panel B of Figure 2 we repeat the exercise with 9 dummies indicating the moments before and after a national team's defeat. All the coefficients regardless whether we look at before or after the game are not statistically different from zero, suggesting that a negative result for the national team does not affect ethnic self-identification.

TABLE 5: MULTIPLE GAMES AND COMPARISONS WITHIN SAME MATCH

	Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Victory	-0.036***			-0.028**
	(0.010)			(0.013)
Share of Victories		-0.033***		
		(0.010)		
Share of Points Won			-0.033***	
			(0.010)	
Multiple Games	No	Yes	Yes	No
Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Match FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	29,814	36,125	36,125	29,814
R-squared	0.102	0.098	0.098	0.103

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Share of Victories accounts for the fraction of total games won. Share of points Won accounts for the fraction of total possible points obtained (a win, draw, and lose awards 3, 1, and 0 points, respectively).

In Table 5 we provide additional checks and extension to our previous results. For the sake of comparison, column 1 of Table 5 reports the results in column 3 of Table 3. First, we exploit variation from multiple games by considering in our analysis also individuals treated several times before the Afrobarometer's interview. We construct a measure accounting for the share of victories of the national team. Results in column 2 suggest that a higher share of victories within 15 days before an interview is strongly statistically associated with a

FIGURE 2: ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION IN THE PROXIMITY OF A VICTORY (FIGURE A) AND OF A DEFEAT (FIGURE B)

FIGURE A: VICTORY (3-DAY BANDWITHS)



FIGURE B: DEFEAT (3-DAY BANDWITHS)



Top (bottom) figure plots coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for 9 dummies indicating 3-day blocks for respondents within +/- 15 days a National Team's victory (defeat). The coefficient for the block -3 (i.e. 1 to 3 days before the game) was normalized to zero. Confidence intervals were constructed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the language group level. Beyond the nine 3-day blocks dummies for the respondent in the proximity of a victory (defeat), the regression includes an indicator for respondents in the proximity of either a defeat or a draw (a victory or a draw), individual level controls, country-year fixed effects, and language group fixed effects.

decrease in self-reported ethnic identity. Next, we use another alternative definition for our treatment variable by computing the share of possible points obtained in the relevant game. A victory, draw, and defeat awards 3, 1, and 0 points respectively; thus, our treatment variable can take the values of 0, 1/3, and 1. When we use this alternative measure for the treatment in column 3, we find identical results.

In column 4 of Table 5, we introduce our preferred, albeit stringent specification in which we include country-match fixed effects along with language group fixed effects and individual-level controls. That is, we compare individuals from the same language group (i.e. ethnic group) before and after the same match of their national team. Point estimate reported in column 4 confirms that national team victories translate into lower levels of ethnic identification (relative to national identification). In this sense, individuals interviewed in the days following a victory of their country's national team are 3% less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity than those interviewed in the days just before the match. This estimated effect is sizeable since it represents almost a 20% decrease in the average probability of ethnic self-identification. Table A.1 in the appendix shows that the results are qualitatively similar when we estimate probit models for the specifications in Table 5.

To evaluate whether our treatment coefficient is stable across different time windows, we report in Table 6 different results of our preferred specification (i.e., comparing individuals of the same language group within the same match) for day windows of different length. For the sake of comparison, column 1 of reports the result for our 15 days baseline case. We then focus on 5, 10, 20, 25, and 30 days before and after a game. Two features stand out: (1) when focus in a shorter window (i.e; 5 days before and after the victory), we find an effect that is 25 percent larger than for our baseline estimate, and (2) the point estimates are remarkably stable across specifications regardless of the window length.

TABLE 6: ALTERNATIVE TIME-WINDOWS

	Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity					
	(1) +/- 15 Days	(2) +/- 5 Days	(3) +/- 10 Days	(4) +/- 20 Days	(5) +/- 25 Days	(6) +/- 30 Days
Victory	-0.028**	-0.035**	-0.026*	-0.027**	-0.026*	-0.026*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Country-Match FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,814	11,300	20,257	33,841	39,077	43,959
R-squared	0.103	0.140	0.114	0.095	0.094	0.096

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within X days after a victory, 0 otherwise where X is the number of days as defined by the window listed at the top of each column in this table.

We next analyse whether the impact of a victory is heterogeneous across different characteristics of the respondent. We thus interact our treatment with gender, education, age, and rural status in Table 7 and find that none of these characteristics seem to differentially affect ethnic identification after a victory.[22].

[22] The point estimates in table 7 for the uninteracted individuals' characteristics are consistent with previous literature suggesting that being male, more educated and older negatively correlates with the likelihood of reporting a strong ethnic salience

TABLE 7: HETEROGENOUS EFFECTS

	Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Victory	-0.034**	-0.029	-0.027	-0.033**
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Interaction	0.011	0.000	0.000	0.029
	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.021)
Uninteracted Term	-0.022***	-0.017***	-0.003***	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.014)
Interaction Term	Male	Education	Age	Rural
Country-Match FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	29,814	29,814	29,814	29,814
R-squared	0.103	0.103	0.068	0.103

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise.

In Table 8 we investigate the role of expectations regarding the final outcome of the game by running our preferred empirical specification for two different sample of individuals: (i) those in the proximity of a game for which the national team had (ex-ante) low probability of winning (column 1) and (ii) those in the proximity of a game for which the national team had high probability of winning (column 2). We define low (high) probability of winning if the win expectancy based on the World Football Elo Ratings is less than 1/3 (more than 2/3). [23]. When comparing to the results of the unrestricted sample (see column

[23] The World Football Elo Ratings are based on the Elo rating system, developed by Arpad Elo. Win expectancy is computed based on the following formula:

$$W_E = \frac{1}{10^{(-dr/400)} + 1}$$

Where dr is the difference in ratings plus 100 points for a team playing at home. Since the World Football Elo ratings are not publicably available for the the entire period of our analysis (i.e., 2000- 2015), we construct them based on FIFA ranking data. See appendix for further details.

4 in Table 5), the impact of a victory on ethnic identification is tenfold when there was a low probability of winning (column 1 in Table 8). Interestingly, we also find that the victory effect is economically large and statistically significant when the probability of winning was high (column 2 in Table 8). In column (3) of Table 8 we show that main effect of a victory is not driven by games played at home those suggesting that respondents' direct participation in the event is not the key mechanism underlying our reduced form results. In fact, the victory' point estimate for the away games' sample is slightly larger than for the unrestricted sample; result that is consistent with our previous finding due to the fact that playing a game away substantially reduces the probability of winning.

TABLE 8: ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS AND AWAY GAMES

	Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Victory	-0.312***	-0.047***	-0.044**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Match FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	Low Winning Expectations	High Winning Expectations	Away Games
Observations	6,585	15,225	13,777
R-squared	0.073	0.120	0.135

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Share of Victories accounts for fraction of total games won. Based on win expectancies from the World Football Elo Ratings, less than 1/3 (more than 2/3) is defined as low (high) winning expectation.

To confirm that only important matches have the potential to prime national over ethnic identification, in Table 9 we estimate the effect of national team's victories in friendly matches, for which the stakes are generally lower. The results confirm that, unlike official matches, victories in friendly contests have no significant impact on respondents' propensity to report to identify with their own ethnic group as opposed to the nation as a whole.

TABLE 9: PLACEBO WITH FRIENDLY GAMES

	Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Victory	0.014		0.011
	(0.012)		(0.013)
Share of Victories		0.017	
		(0.012)	
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes	No
Multiple Games	No	Yes	No
Country-Match FE	No	No	Yes
Observations	28,767	34,353	28,767
R-squared	0.083	0.083	0.083

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Share of Victories accounts for fraction of total games won.

3.2. NATIONAL TEAM'S VICTORIES AND INTER-ETHNIC TRUST

In this section we ask whether the football-driven shocks previously documented also translate into higher levels of interpersonal trust towards countrymen. In particular, we are interested in trust toward people from other ethnic groups. However, we start documenting that national team's victories positively impact generalized trust. As discussed above, we define generalized trust as the average level of trust in relatives, other acquaintances, other countrymen, and neighbors. Results in Table 10 suggest that, regardless of the econometric specification or the definition of the treatment, generalized trust substantially increases after a football-driven shock.

TABLE 10: IMPACT ON GENERALIZED TRUST

	Dependent Variable: Generalized Trust		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Victory	0.089**	0.124***	
	(0.034)	(0.033)	
Share of Victories			0.073*
			(0.040)
Multiple Games	No	No	Yes
Country-Year FE	Yes	No	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Match FE	No	Yes	No
Observations	28,636	28,636	34,983
R-squared	0.223	0.224	0.230

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Share of Victories accounts for fraction of total games won. Generalized Trust is the average level of trust in relatives, other acquaintances, other countrymen, and neighbors.

Having established that national team's victories increase generalized trust, we next examine, in Table 11, the impact of our treatment on a particular dimension of trust: inter-ethnic trust. In the first specification we include both country-year and language group fixed effects along with individual-level controls. We focus in the sample with individuals having exclusively one match within 15 days before the interview and find that inter-ethnic trust increases after a victory. The point estimate is substantially much larger than in the case in which our dependent variable was generalized trust. In column 2 we estimate our preferred specification which includes country-match fixed effects and find virtually identical results. We find similar results when our main treatment variable is the share of victories (column 3). It may still be the case that this documented statistical relationship is just picking up a generalized trust effect having nothing to do with an increasing trust toward people from other ethnic groups. Nonetheless, in column 4 to 6 we show that, for different econometric specifications, including generalized trust as a control, does not wash away the significantly strong relationship between football-driven national pride and unity shocks and inter-ethnic trust. These results are in line with previous work for Kenya (Miguel, 2004) and Malawi (Robinson, forthcoming), suggesting that a strong national identity may help to explain higher levels of inter-ethnic trust and cooperation.

TABLE 11: IMPACT ON INTER-ETHNIC TRUST

	Dependent Variable: Inter-Ethnic Trust					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Victory	0.253**	0.254**		0.145***	0.145***	
	(0.106)	(0.106)		(0.038)	(0.038)	
Share of Victories			0.257**			0.147***
			(0.103)			(0.037)
Generalized Trust				0.587***	0.586***	0.589***
				(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Multiple Games	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Country-Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Match FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	8,091	8,091	8,202	8,089	8,089	8,200
R-squared	0.193	0.193	0.191	0.390	0.390	0.389

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Share of Victories accounts for fraction of total games won. Generalized Trust is the average level of trust in relatives, other acquaintances, other countrymen, and neighbors. Inter-ethnic trust is based on the response to the question "How much do you trust in people from other ethnic groups?". Answers follow a 4-point scale where 0 is "not at all" and 3 is "a lot".

We now define a new dependent variable to which we refer as pro-inter-ethnic trust and which accounts for the distance between inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic trust. We examine whether an increasing salience of a common national identity implicit from a national team victory differentially induces more trust toward people from other groups than toward coethnics. Results in Table 12 suggest that the positive effect on interpersonal trust of a football-driven patriotic shock is particularly more pronounced towards people of different ethnicities. This effect does not wash away, but becomes even stronger when we account for the levels of generalized trust (column 4 to 6 in Table 12).

TABLE 12: IMPACT ON PRO-INTER-ETHNIC TRUST

	Dependent Variable: Pro-Inter-Ethnic Trust					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Victory	0.047*	0.047*		0.076**	0.076**	
	(0.028)	(0.028)		(0.033)	(0.033)	
Share of Victories			0.048*			0.077**
			(0.027)			(0.032)
Generalized Trust				-0.156***	-0.156***	-0.154***
				(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Multiple Games	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Country-Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Match FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	8,077	8,077	8,188	8,075	8,075	8,186
R-squared	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.079	0.079	0.079

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Share of Victories accounts for the fraction of total games won. Generalized Trust is the average level of trust in relatives, other acquaintances, other countrymen, and neighbors. Pro-Inter-Ethnic Trust represents the difference between levels of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic trust. Therefore, it takes values from -3 to 3.

We next ask whether ruling politicians somehow capitalize this particular patriotic shock into higher popular support.[24] In Table 13 we find that national team's victories have no impact on trust in the government or support for the incumbent. Therefore, we find no evidence of a "rally 'round the flag" effect.

[24] According to Darby (2013b), pictures of Ghanaian president, John Atta Mills, holding the World Cup trophy below the slogan, "Let us rally around the flag and support the Black Stars" were widespread in Ghana in 2010.

TABLE 13: RALLY 'ROUND THE FLAG EFFECT?

Dependent Variable:	Trust in Ruling Party			Approve President		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Victory	0.014	0.007		-0.006	-0.019	
	(0.029)	(0.034)		(0.038)	(0.044)	
Share of Victories			0.015			0.034
			(0.031)			(0.035)
Multiple Games	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Match FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	32,759	32,759	38,791	32,455	32,455	38,592
R-squared	0.170	0.171	0.168	0.230	0.231	0.218

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Trust in Ruling Party is based on the response to the question "How much do you trust in the ruling party?". The answer follow a 4-point scale, with 0 being "not at all" and 3 being "a lot". Approve President is based on the question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way the president has performed over the past 12 months?" The answer follows a 4-point scale, with 1 being "strongly disapprove" and 4 being "strongly approve". Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Share of Victories accounts for the fraction of total games won.

These high-stake victories of the national football teams might just be improving the mood of the respondents. If that is the case, the respondents would be just providing positive answer due to an increase in their general optimism. We investigate that potential channel by looking at different individuals' opinions regarding present and future economic conditions of both the country and their own. In Table 14 we show that individuals interviewed after a victory are not statistically more likely to have a positive rating of the economic conditions of the country neither of their own living condition. These results hold regardless the individuals were asked about present or future conditions.

TABLE 14: ASSESSMENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Dependent Variable:	Country's Economic Conditions		Own Living Conditions	
	Present	Future	Present	Future
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Victory	-0.020	-0.008	-0.021	-0.036
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Match FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	34,540	34,530	34,510	34,511
R-squared	0.115	0.171	0.115	0.184

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. The 4 different dependent variables listed in each column are based on how respondents assess the economic conditions of the country as well as their own living conditions. Respondents rate present conditions based on a 5-point scale: very bad (1), fairly bad (2), neither good nor bad (3), fairly good (4), and very good (5). Respondents also rate future conditions based on a 5-point scale: much worse (1), worse (2), same (3), better (4), and much better (5). A dependent variable thus takes the value 1 if a respondent rates conditions either as (4) or (5), 0 otherwise. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise.

4. COUNTRY-LEVEL ANALYSIS: EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Having established that football-driven positive shocks contribute to a reduction in ethnic identification and inter-ethnic mistrust, we go a step further and ask whether those shocks can also contribute to a reduction in violent conflict. Hence, we examine the impact of football-driven national pride and unity on actual conflict using quasi-experimental evidence. To do so, we examine the weekly evolution of conflict events in the proximity (+/- 25 weeks) of the last game of the qualification process to the CAN tournament by comparing countries whose teams (barely) qualified to the tournament with countries whose teams (barely) did not. We estimate the following equation:

$$Conf_{c,q,t} = \alpha + \beta Qual_{c,q,t} + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \delta^k Conf_{c,q,t-k} + \sum_{t=-25}^{25} \Gamma_t + \Delta_{c,q} + \varepsilon_{c,q} \qquad (2)$$

where c, q, and t denote country, qualification, and week from qualification. The outcome variable $Conf$ is a conflict indicator in week t. We focus on 3 conflict indicators:

a conflict prevalence measure indicating whether there is at least one active conflict, and two intensity measures accounting for the number of conflict events, and the number conflict fatalities. For countries whose teams barely qualified to the CAN, our treatment variable *Qual* takes value 1 starting the week following the end of the qualification process. The term $\sum_{t=-25}^{25} \Gamma_t$ is a collection of 50 dummies indicating weeks from qualification whereas Δ are country-qualification fixed effects. We also include up to 4 lags of dependent variable. The error term $\varepsilon_{c,q}$ is allowed to be correlated within country-qualifier observations so we adjust standard errors accordingly.

4.1. Qualification to CAN and Social Conflict

We now exploit a different quasi-experiment while focusing our attention on large-scale conflict measures: violent conflict from ACLED. The football-driven shock to national pride and unity will be manifested in the qualification to the most important regional football tournament in Africa: the African Cup of Nations (CAN). We focus on +/- 25 weeks around the end of the CAN qualification process and look at how weekly conflict evolves before and after the qualification during the period 1997-2013. We define a group of treatment and control countries for which the qualification to the CAN (i.e. our treatment) was as-if random. Our treatment group is composed of countries whose national teams barely qualified to the CAN whereas the countries whose national teams barely missed qualification is our control group. We define "barely" qualifying and missing in the next paragraph.

To construct the sample of countries in our analysis, we consider all the sub-Saharan African national teams reaching the last matchday with chances of qualifying to the CAN. Sub-Saharan African national teams qualifying and not qualifying that last matchday are part of the treatment and control group, respectively. Take for instance the qualification to the 2012 CAN. The national teams of 45 countries were drawn into 10 groups, each containing 4 teams, and 1 group of 5 teams. Group winners, the 5-team group's runner-up, and top two runners-up in all other groups qualify for the CAN finals. Senegal qualified to the CAN when two games were left and ended up winning Group E with a 5-point difference over the runner-up. Therefore, neither Senegal nor its runner-up (i.e. Cameroon) belong to the group of countries exploited in our analysis. Things were different in Group A. As shown at the top of Figure 3, Mali, Zimbabwe, and Cape Verde -highlighted in yellow- reached the last matchday with qualification chances (Liberia was already without chances). Cape Verde defeated Zimbabwe whereas Mali could not defeat Liberia; nonetheless, Mali qualified to the finals due to a goal difference in matches against Cape Verde. Therefore, Mali is part of our treatment group whereas Cape Verde and Zimbabwe are both part of our control group.

FIGURE 3: EXAMPLE OF CLOSE QUALIFICATION: GROUP A, CAN 2012

Team	Pld	W	D	L	GF	GA	GD	Pts
Mali	5	3	0	2	7	4	3	9
Zimbabwe	5	2	2	1	6	3	3	8
Cape Verde	5	2	1	2	5	6	-1	7
Liberia	5	1	1	3	5	10	−5	4

08/10/2011	Liberia	2 – 2	Mali
	Cape Verde	2 – 1	Zimbabwe

Team	Pld	W	D	L	GF	GA	GD	Pts
Mali	6	3	1	2	9	6	3	10
Cape Verde	6	3	1	2	7	7	0	10
Zimbabwe	6	2	2	2	7	5	2	8
Liberia	6	1	2	3	7	12	−5	5

Table 15 lists the countries in the control (46 countries) and treatment (55 countries) groups by qualifying process. Before starting our empirical analysis, we present evidence that the control and treatment observations are highly balanced across different characteristics that may matter for conflict. We look at 10 different country-level covariates in the year before the qualification, namely GDP per capita, poverty rates, income inequality, life expectancy, population density, share of urban population, an index of political corruption, autocracy index, and two conflict history measures: the number of active conflicts, and an indicator of whether the country had a civil war during the '90s.[25]

Column (3) of Table 16 reports the p-value associated with the mean difference test between treatment and control (that is, countries that qualified in column 1 and did not qualified in column 2). Only in the measures of autocracy and political corruption the two groups are slightly unbalanced (both p-values are slightly below 0.1) although these differences are economically small. In this sense, treatment countries present lower levels of political corruption and autocracy; equating these differences, respectively, to 1/3 and 1/4 of the standard deviations of each covariate in Sub-Saharan Africa during the period under analysis. To ensure that the comparison in the covariates is made between treatment and control countries during the same year, in column (4) we also present point estimates from separate OLS

[25] Country-level data comes from different sources. GDP per capita, poverty rates, income inequality, life expectancy, population density, and share of urban population come from the World Development Indicators version 03-Jan-2017. The measure of political corruption comes from Variaties of Democracy (v6.2). Autocracy index comes from the Polity IV Project. The indicator of civil war in the 1990's comes from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Finally, the active conflict indicator is constructed based on the UCDP PRIO Conflict dataset.

regressions of each covariate on our treatment status and 9 qualification process dummies. We find that our treatment variable is statically insignificant in all, but three, specifications: when explaining political corruption and autocracy as well as poverty rates (treatment countries are slightly poorer than countries in the control group). Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note that in the empirical exercise that follows we include country-qualifier fixed effect to rule out any potential bias from the omission of any country-year-level determinant of conflict. Moreover, we also show below that treatment and control groups did not experience different evolution in conflict during the pre-treatment period (i.e., we find no evidence of the violation of the parallel trend assumption in our DiD exercise).

TABLE 15: TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS BY QUALIFYING PROCESS

Tournament Year	Treatment Group	Control Group
1998	Angola, ***Namibia***, *DRC*, and Mozambique	***Zimbabwe***, *Mali*, *Senegal*, Gabon, Liberia, and *Malawi*
2000	Togo, Ivory Coast, and *Congo*	Guinea, *Mali*, *Liberia*, and *Uganda*
2002	Zambia, Burkina Faso, and DRC	*Angola*, ***Zimbabwe***, ***Madagascar*** ***Lesotho***, and Gabon
2004	***Benin***, *Kenya*, ***Rwanda***, Mali, DRC, South Africa, and ***Zimbabwe***	Zambia, Togo, *Sierra Leone*, Ivory Coast, ***Madagascar***, and *Uganda*
2006	DRC and South Africa	Burkina Faso
2008	Ivory Coast, *Sudan*, Senegal, Guinea, *Namibia*, *Benin*, and South Africa	Gabon, ***Gambia***, Uganda, ***Eritrea*** ***Equatorial Guinea***, Mozambique, and DRC
2010	Zambia and *Malawi*	*Rwanda* and Guinea
2012	Mali, *Guinea*, ***Niger***, Angola, and *Sudan*	*Zimbabwe*, *Sierra Leone*, Nigeria, Malawi, *South Africa*, Cameroon, ***Cape Verde***, *Uganda*, *Kenya*, ***CAR***, and ***Gambia***
2013	Ivory Coast,*Ethiopia*, ***Cape Verde***, Niger, Angola, Togo, *DRC*, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Zambia	Malawi, Botswana, *Uganda*, *Sierra Leone*, Senegal, *Liberia*, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Guinea, Mozambique, *Zimbabwe*, Gabon, and ***CAR***

NOTE: Italic is used to denote that an overdue qualification was at stake (defined as at least 3 years without qualifying to the CAN finals). Italic bold is used to denote that a first-time qualification to the CAN finals was at stake. Due to the lack of conflict data, Mauritius is not included in the analysis despite of the fact that it did not qualified to the 2000 CAN the last matchday.

TABLE 16: BALANCE CHECK

Variable	Qualified	Not Qualified	*P*-Value of Difference	Within Qualification Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GDP per Capita	1689.92	2252.11	0.396	-515.812
				(568.896)
Poverty Rate	0.49	0.44	0.246	0.048*
				(0.025)
Gini Index	44.18	44.49	0.826	-0.119
				(2.282)
Life Expectancy	53.82	54.17	0.785	-0.447
				(0.930)
Population Density	45.10	65.66	0.131	-21.190
				(18.468)
Urban Population Rate	37.88	38.25	0.909	-0.175
				(2.775)
Autocracy	1.64	2.31	0.081	-0.674*
				(0.313)
Political Corruption	0.66	0.72	0.084	-0.065*
				(0.029)
Fraction Civil War 90's	0.29	0.33	0.603	-0.037
				(0.059)
Number of Conflicts	0.30	0.26	0.696	0.039
				(0.083)

For a set of covariates (listed on the left) in the year before the end of each qualification process to the CAN, columns (1) and (2) report the uncondicional means for (barely) qualified countries (46 observations) and (barely) not qualified countries (55 observations). Column (3) reports the p-value associated with the mean difference test between (1) and (2). A second test is presented in column (4) which presents the OLS coefficients from separate regressions of each covariate on a treatment status (i.e, qualified) conditional on 9 qualification process dummies to ensure that comparison in the covariates is made between countries in the same year. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses (in column 4). Each test includes 101 observations, except in poverty rate and Gini index with 100 observations.

From the proposed quasi-experiment, we identify the causal impact of qualifying to the CAN on social conflict by estimating equation (2) for 3 different conflict outcomes. In Table 17 we focus on conflict prevalence which indicates whether there was at least one active conflict in a given week. The point estimate for our treatment in column 1 shows that the qualification shock reduces conflict prevalence by almost 8%. If we account for different lags of the dependent variable (up to 4, from column 2 to 5) to account for the dynamic of conflict, we find both qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. Interestingly, the

implied steady state impact of the qualification suggests 8 percent reduction in the long run.[26]

TABLE 17: IMPACT OF CAN QUALIFICATION ON CONFLICT PREVALENCE

Dependent Variable: Conflict Prevalence (1 if at least one conflict in week, 0 otherwise)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Qualification	-0.078**	-0.063**	-0.062**	-0.062**	-0.068**
	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Conflict Prevalence$_{t-1}$		0.121***	0.113***	0.113***	0.112***
		(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Conflict Prevalence$_{t-2}$			0.024	0.018	0.012
			(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Conflict Prevalence$_{t-3}$				0.026	0.023
				(0.016)	(0.017)
Conflict Prevalence$_{t-4}$					0.009
					(0.018)
Long-Run Impact	-0.078	-0.0717	-0.0718	-0.0735	-0.0805
Country-Qualifier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,050	4,949	4,848	4,747	4,646
R-squared	0.010	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process for 101 country-qualifier pairs. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

In Table 18 we focus on our first conflict intensity measure: the number of active conflicts in a given week. Results in Table 18 suggest that qualifying to the CAN also reduces conflict intensity. Note that we are estimating a semi-log specification, which simplifies the interpretation of the results. [27] In this sense, the size of the impact is economically large: the countries whose teams barely qualified experience a reduction in conflict intensity of 18 percent, relative to countries whose teams barely did not qualify to the same tournament. Again, we include different lags of the dependent variable (up to 4, from column 2 to 5) to account for the dynamics of conflict. Two facts are worth noting: (i) conflict intensity ex-

[26] Table A.2 in appendix shows that the results are qualitatively similar when estimating probit regression models.

[27] Table A.4 in appendix shows that the results does not depend on the log transformation. That is, the results are qualitatively similar if an inverse hyperbolic since transformation is used instead.

hibits a strong persistence since the coefficients of all lags are strongly statistically significant and positive, (ii) the implied steady state impact of the qualification suggests a permanent reduction in conflict events of almost 20 percent.[28]

TABLE 18: IMPACT OF CAN QUALIFICATION ON CONFLICT INTENSITY

Dependent Variable: Conflict Intensity (Log of 1+number of conflict events in week)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Qualification	-0.180**	-0.122**	-0.107**	-0.106**	-0.105***
	(0.072)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Conflict Intensity$_{t-1}$		0.308***	0.274***	0.263***	0.261***
		(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Conflict Intensity$_{t-2}$			0.098***	0.080***	0.069***
			(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Conflict Intensity$_{t-3}$				0.068***	0.041*
				(0.021)	(0.021)
Conflict Intensity$_{t-4}$					0.076***
					(0.020)
Long Run Impact	-0.1810	-0.1763	-0.1704	-0.1799	-0.1899
Country-Qualifier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,050	4,949	4,848	4,747	4,646
R-squared	0.013	0.107	0.113	0.114	0.118

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process for 101 country-qualifier pairs. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

Consistently, we also find that conflict fatalities experience a large reduction in the 6 months following the qualification to the CAN. [29] Table 19 presents 5 different specifications with the same message: countries whose teams barely qualified experience a reduction in conflict-related fatalities of the order of 20-23 percent. [30]

[28] Table A.3 in appendix shows that the results are qualitatively similar when we use the dependent variable in levels (i.e, without the log transformation) and estimate negative binomial regression models.

[29] Table A.4 in appendix shows that the results does not depend on the log transformation. That is, the results are qualitatively similar if an inverse hyperbolic since transformation is used instead.

[30] Table A.3 in appendix shows that the results are qualitatively similar when we use the dependent variable in levels (i.e, without the log transformation) and estimate negative binomial regression models.

TABLE 19: IMPACT OF CAN QUALIFICATION ON CONFLICT FATALITIES

Dependent Variable: Conflict Intensity (Log of 1+number of conflict fatalities in week)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Qualification	-0.226**	-0.187**	-0.148**	-0.145**	-0.147**
	(0.092)	(0.072)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Conflict Intensity$_{t-1}$		0.196***	0.174***	0.167***	0.163***
		(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Conflict Intensity$_{t-2}$			0.133***	0.129***	0.129***
			(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Conflict Intensity$_{t-3}$				0.051**	0.051**
				(0.022)	(0.021)
Conflict Intensity$_{t-4}$					-0.018
					(0.032)
Long Run Impact	-0.226	-0.233	-0.213	-0.221	-0.218
Country-Qualifier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,050	4,949	4,848	4,747	4,646
R-squared	0.011	0.050	0.068	0.073	0.070

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

A key identifying assumption in our difference-in-difference approach is that the the change in any of our conflict measures in the countries that did not barely qualify to the CAN (i.e. our control groups) is an unbiased estimate of the contrafactual. Although we cannot directly test this assumption, we can leverage on the fact that we have multiple pre-treatment periods and test whether treatment and control groups had indeed different trends before the end of the qualification process. We formally test this by estimating a slightly different version of equation (2). That is, we only use the observations for the treatment and control group in the pre-treatment period and assign a "fake" treatment to the countries that will eventually qualify to the CAN. This "fake" treatment takes the value of 1 during the 12 weeks immediately before the end of the qualification process, 0 otherwise. If treatment and control group had different pre-trends, we would expect the "fake" treatment to be statistically significantly different from zero. Results in Table 20 suggest, however, that regardless of the outcome variable we look at or the econometric specification we run, treatment and control groups did not experience different evolution in conflict in the 12 weeks immediately

before the end of the qualification process (relative to the previous 12 weeks).

TABLE 20: PARALLEL TRENDS TEST

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable:	Conflict Prevalence		Num. Events (log+1)		Num. Fatalities (log+1)	
12 Weeks Before Qualification	0.036	0.040	0.048	0.040	-0.107	-0.103
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.104)	(0.081)
Country-Qualifier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 Lags of Conflict	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2,525	2,121	2,525	2,121	2,525	2,121
R-squared	0.010	0.023	0.008	0.040	0.008	0.033

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers 25 weeks before the end of qualification process (i.e. pretreatment period). The variable 12 Weeks Before Qualification takes value 1 during the 12 weeks immediately before the end of the qualification process for the countries that will eventually qualify to the CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

We next ask whether the reduction in conflict in the countries that qualified to the CAN was short-lived. To do so, we examine the evolution of conflict after the close qualification to the CAN by splitting the post-treatment period in two. Results in Table 21 shows that the reduction in conflict persisted even 13 to 25 weeks after the qualification to the CAN. Moreover, the size of the point estimates suggest that the effects are not fading away after 3 months.

TABLE 21: EVOLUTION CONFLICT AFTER QUALIFICATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable:	Conflict Prevalence		Num. Events (log+1)		Num. Fatalities (log+1)	
1-12 Weeks After Qualification	-0.061*	-0.056**	-0.149**	-0.107***	-0.238**	-0.169**
	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.069)	(0.038)	(0.100)	(0.069)
13-25 Weeks After Qualification	-0.090**	-0.078**	-0.214**	-0.116**	-0.229*	-0.144*
	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.098)	(0.054)	(0.121)	(0.080)
Country-Qualifier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 Lags of Conflict	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	5,050	4,646	5,050	4,646	5,050	4,646
R-squared	0.010	0.024	0.014	0.119	0.012	0.070

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process for 101 country-qualifier pairs. The variable 1-12 Weeks After Qualification takes value 1 during the 12 weeks immediately after the end of the qualification process for the countries that barely qualify to the CAN, 0 otherwise. The variable 13-25 Weeks After Qualification takes value 1 starting the 13th week after the end of the qualification process for the countries that barely qualify to the CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

Another way to examine both the existence of pre-trends and the evolution of conflict after the end of qualification process is to fit a model in the spirit of Figure 2. That is, we interact time dummies with the treatment indicator to explain our measures of conflict prevalence and intensity. In Figure 4 we plot the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for eleven dummies accounting for the interaction between the treatment indicator and eleven 4-week blocks. The coefficient for interaction of the (eventual) treatment status and the 4-week block immediately before the end of the qualification process was normalized to zero. Thus, the plotted coefficients indicate how conflict (conflict prevalence in Panel A and conflict intensity in Panel B) of changes over time with respect to month immediately before the end of the qualification process. In addition to the aforementioned interaction indicators the regression also include 50 week dummies and 101 country-qualifier dummies. Regardless of the outcome variable we look at, most of the coefficients to the right of the dashed vertical lines (which separates pre- and post-treatment periods) are negative and statistically different from zero at the 5% (all of them at the 10%). On the contrary, none of the coefficients for the pre-treatment period are statistically different from zero. In sum, both panels in Figure 4 are consistent with our interpretation of the results in Table 20 and Table 21: the trends for treatment and control were the same in the pre-treatment period, and the negative impact of qualifying to the CAN tournament on conflict does no wash away

immediately after this event that could prime sentiments of national unity and pride.

In Table 22 we reestimate equation (2) two particular samples: those countries reaching the last matchday with chances of qualifying to the CAN finals after 3 or more years (i.e. overdue qualification sample) and those countries with chances of qualifying for their very first time (first qualification sample). This classification is clearly based on the emotional importance of the qualification. Specifically, one could expect a first-time qualification to represent a larger shock to national pride and unity. The same would apply, albeit to a lesser extent, for an overdue qualification. The results in Table 22 are in line with this hypothesis. Indeed, the reduction in conflict tend to be much larger after high-stake qualifications.

FIGURE 4: CONFLICT PREVALENCE (FIGURE A) AND INTENSITY (FIGURE B) IN THE PROXIMITY OF A QUALIFICATION TO CAN

FIGURE A: PREVALENCE (4-WEEK BANDWITHS)



FIGURE B: INTENSITY (4-WEEK BANDWITHS)



Figures plot coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for interactions between an indicator for the countries that barely qualified to the CAN and 11 dummies indicating 4-week blocks within +/- 25 weeks the qualification game. The coefficient for the interaction of the qualification indicator and the dummy indicating the 4 weeks immediately before the qualification game was normalized to zero. The dependent variable in Figure A (B) is an indicator taking value of 1 if at least one conflict was active that week, 0 otherwise (the log of 1 + number of active conflict events that week). Confidence intervals were constructed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the country-qualifier level. Beyond the aforementioned interaction terms, both regressions include 50 week dummies and 101 country-qualifier dummies (5,050 observations).

TABLE 22: OVERDUE AND FIRST QUALIFICATION EFFECTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Dependent Variable:	Conflict Prevalence			Num. Events (log+1)			Num. Fatalities (log+1)		
Sample	Full	Overdue qualif.	1st qualif.	Full	Overdue qualif.	1st qualif.	Full	Overdue qualif.	1st qualif.
Qualification	-0.068**	-0.114**	-0.158**	-0.105***	-0.168***	-0.218***	-0.147**	-0.224***	-0.082
	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.072)	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.102)	(0.058)	(0.082)	(0.047)
Country-Qualifier FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 lags of conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,646	2,346	828	4,646	2,346	828	4,646	2,346	828
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.024	0.031	0.090	0.118	0.161	0.221	0.070	0.077	0.092

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset. An overdue (first-time) qualification is defined as reaching the last matchday with chances of qualifying to the CAN finals after 3 or more years (for the very first time). See Table 15

While our underlying hypothesis suggests that the collective experiences that prime sentiments of national and pride should be playing a particularly relevant role in appeasing ethnic-related tensions and violence the conflict measures from ACLED dataset we exploit above do not distinguish ethnic conflict events from non-ethnic ones. To the best of our knowledge there is no daily event conflict dataset coding ethnic conflict in a systematic way. The ACLED dataset does provide however some information that allowed us to code events as ethnic-related. For instance, ACLED classifies conflict actors in 8 different categories: government force, rebel force, political militia, ethnic militia, rioters, protesters, civilians, and external force (e.g. UN). Thus, if one of the conflict actors involved in a particular conflict event is identified as "ethnic militia" by ACLED, we coded that particular conflict event as "ethnic". Nonetheless, it may be the case that a conflict event involving others than a ethnic militia, say civilians, could be also ethnically driven. To tackle this issue we exploit the fact that ACLED also codes the name of the actor allied or identifying in one of the 8 aforementioned categories. In several cases, the actor's name provides useful information. For instance, on March 3th, 2004 ACLED recorded a violent event in which one of the actors (in this case the victims) were civilians while the perpetrator was an "unidentified armed actor". Thus, none of them was an "ethnic militia". However, we coded the event as ethnic because ACLED identified one of the actors as "Bete Ethnic Group".[31] We are assuming then that if a particular ethnic group was targeted then the attack was ethnically motivated. Finally, we also coded an event as ethnic if ACLED included any note making a reference to ethnicity as a key driver of the violent event. For instance, ACLED documented an attack against civilians by an "unidentified armed actor" in Kenya (on January 22th, 1998) including the following note: "Raiders kill two in ongoing political and ethnic attacks". We thus also coded that event as ethnic. We acknowledge that a substantial amount to measurement error may be present in our ethnic conflict measure. Nonetheless, this measurement error pertains to the dependent variable thus it is only likely affecting the precision of the estimates rather than their consistency. The prevalence of ethnic conflict in our sample under analysis is 0.062 (Std. Dev 0.242). That is, roughly 6% of the 5050 week-country observations present at least one ethnically-related conflict event (compared to 41% for the case of the broader measure of conflict used in previous analysis - Std. Dev 0.49).

In Table 23 we report the estimated impact of a close qualification to the CAN on 3 ethnic conflict measures . Point estimates provides strong empirical evidence for our main hypothesis: regardless of the ethnic measure we employed (either prevalence or intensity), we find that indeed countries whose national teams achieved an important goal strongly

[31] Additionally, ACLED included a note to this event stating that unidentified gunmen kill 8 civilians of the Bete tribe in south central village

experience a reduction in conflict in the 25 weeks following the realization of that successful moment. Although the point estimates are smaller than in the case of a broader measures of conflict, the magnitudes of the effect are economically large. For instance, the reduction in conflict prevalence due to the qualification (column 1 in Table 23) represents more than one third of the mean prevalence of ethnic conflict in our sample.[32]

TABLE 23: IMPACT ON ETHNIC CONFLICT

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent Variable:	Conflict Prevalence	Num. Events (log+1)	Num. Fatalities (log+1)
Qualification	-0.024**	-0.022*	-0.066**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.031)
Long-Run Impact	0.029	0.034	0.086
Country-Qualifier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
4 Lags of Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,646	4,646	4,646
R-squared	0.029	0.083	0.055

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Ethic conflict is coded using conflict data from the ACLED dataset.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This research examines how successful collective experiences that prime national pride and sentiments of unity can contribute to alleviate inter-ethnic tensions and reduce violence. We investigate this issue in the context of sub-Saharan Africa by looking at the impact of national football teams' victories on both individual attitudes and acts of violence.

We first combine information on over 70 official games by Sub-Saharan African national teams over the period 2000-2015 with survey data for over 35,000 individuals interviewed in 24 countries in four rounds of the Afrobarometer. Comparing the responses of individuals interviewed in the days immediately before and after a match, we find that a victory of the national team is associated with a significant decrease in the probability that individuals report a strong sense of ethnic (as opposed to national) identity. The estimated

[32] Table A.4 in appendix shows that the results does not depend on the log transformation. That is, the results are qualitatively similar if an inverse hyperbolic since transformation is used instead.

effect is sizable - accounting for a 20% decrease in the average probability of ethnic self-identification - and robust to different specifications and controls. In particular, our results still hold when restricting the comparisons to individuals within the same ethnic group interviewed before and after the same match. Our findings also show that football-driven shocks are also associated to an increase in trust in other people, in general, and individuals of other ethnicities, in particular. In contrast, they have no significant impact on respondents' trust and support for the incumbent, suggesting the absence of a "rally 'round the flag" effect, or optimism regarding present and future economic conditions.

To test whether the effect of football-driven sentiments of national pride and unity extends beyond attitudes to more tangible behavioral outcomes, we then look at the evolution of conflict around the time of important national teams' achievement. We find that countries whose national teams (barely) qualified to the CAN tournament experience significantly less conflict events in the six months following the qualification than countries whose teams (barely) did not.

In sum, the empirical evidence that we presented in this paper suggests that priming "national pride" can have a sizeable and robust impact on self-reported ethnic identification, inter-ethnic trust, and conflict. Our findings suggest that, even in regions where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, transitory shocks can reinforce national identity, reduce inter-ethnic mistrust and, by this means, have a tangible impact on conflict intensity.

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APPENDIX

CONSTRUCTION OF FOOTBALL RATINGS TO COMPUTE WINNING EXPECTATIONS

In order to compute winning expectations we use the formula proposed by the World Football Elo Ratings which is based on the Elo rating system, developed by Arpad Elo. A win expectancy is computed based on the following formula:

$$W_E = \frac{1}{10^{(-dr/400)} + 1}$$

Where dr is the difference in ratings plus 100 points for a team playing at home. Since the World Football Elo ratings are not publicly available for the entire period of our analysis (i.e., 2000- 2015), we construct them based on monthly FIFA ranking data with the following procedure:

1. Using the last available World Football Elo rating (see Table A.5), [33] we estimate the coefficients of a simple linear relationship between ranking and rating. That is, we run a OLS regression of ELO ratings on ELO rankings (sample size is 234 countries)
2. We then apply the estimated coefficients in 1. (intercept = -5.26 and slope = 1943.27) to each monthly FIFA ranking to compute a weekly ELO rating.

[33] The rating corresponds to February 17th, 2017 and was downloaded from http://www.eloratings.net/world.html

ADDITIONAL TABLES

TABLE A.1: MULTIPLE GAMES AND COMPARISONS WITHIN SAME MATCH (PROBIT)

	Dependent Variable: Ethnic Identity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Victory	-0.177***			-0.132**
	(0.048)			(0.059)
Share of Victories		-0.166***		
		(0.048)		
Share of Points Won			-0.165***	
			(0.046)	
Multiple Games	No	Yes	Yes	No
Country-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Language FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Match FE	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	28,485	34,691	34,691	28,485

Estimates from Probit regression models. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors clustered at the language group level in parentheses. Victory takes value 1 if the respondent was interviewed within 15 days after a victory, 0 otherwise. Share of Victories accounts for the fraction of total games won. Share of points Won accounts for the fraction of total possible points obtained (a win, draw, and lose awards 3, 1, and 0 points, respectively).

TABLE A.2: IMPACT OF CAN QUALIFICATION ON CONFLICT PREVALENCE (PROBIT)

Dependent Variable: Conflict Prevalence (1 if at least one conflict in week, 0 otherwise)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Qualification	-0.336**	-0.301***	-0.200**	-0.308**
	(0.133)	(0.117)	(0.079)	(0.128)
Country-Qualifier FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Random Effect Model	No	No	No	Yes
Qualifying Country Indicator	No	No	Yes	No
4 lags of Conflict	No	Yes	No	No
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,650	4,278	5,050	5,050

Estimates from Probit regression models. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

TABLE A.3: IMPACT OF CAN QUALIFICATION ON CONFLICT INTENSITY (NB-ML)

Dependent Variable:	Num. Events		Num. Fatalities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Qualification	-0.440**	-0.332**	-0.803**	-0.797**
	(0.194)	(0.146)	(0.327)	(0.335)
4 lags of Conflict	No	Yes	No	Yes
Country-Qualifier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,050	4,646	5,050	4,646

Estimates from negative binomial regression models. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

TABLE A.4: CONFLICT INTENSITY (IHS TRANSFORMATION)

Conflict Measure	Dependent Variable: Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation of							
	All Conflicts				Ethnic Conflicts			
	Num. Events		Num. Fatalities		Num. Events		Num. Fatalities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Qualification	-0.225**	-0.136***	-0.265**	-0.174***	-0.041	-0.028*	-0.088*	-0.068**
	(0.090)	(0.048)	(0.106)	(0.066)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.046)	(0.031)
4 lags of Conflict	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Country-Qualifier FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,050	4,646	5,050	4,646	5,050	4,646	5,050	4,646
R-squared	0.013	0.111	0.012	0.068	0.010	0.080	0.011	0.061

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country-qualifier level. Sample covers +/- 25 weeks around the end of qualification process. Qualification takes value 1 during the 25 weeks following the qualification to CAN, 0 otherwise. Conflict data comes from the ACLED dataset.

TABLE A.5: ELO RATING AND RANKING

Rank	Team	Rating	Rank	Team	Rating	Rank	Team	Rating
1	Brazil	2073	78	Jamaica	1510	157	Suriname	1221
2	Argentina	2028	80	Jordan	1504	158	Curacao	1208
3	Germany	2018	81	Haiti	1499	158	Dominican Republic	1208
4	France	1989	82	Martinique	1495	160	Yemen	1205
5	Chile	1968	82	Guatemala	1495	161	Hong Kong	1201
6	Spain	1961	84	Guinea	1491	162	Antigua and Barbuda	1193
7	Italy	1924	85	Armenia	1482	162	Malta	1193
8	England	1909	86	Kuwait	1471	164	Bermuda	1190
8	Portugal	1909	87	Iraq	1467	164	Papua New Guinea	1190
10	Colombia	1908	88	Oman	1462	166	Guyana	1181
11	Mexico	1902	89	Libya	1458	167	Solomon Islands	1179
12	Uruguay	1898	89	Uganda	1458	168	South Sudan	1177
13	Belgium	1886	91	Georgia	1447	169	Lesotho	1175
14	Netherlands	1870	92	Gabon	1443	170	Liechtenstein	1158
15	Croatia	1861	93	Lithuania	1442	171	Afghanistan	1155
16	Switzerland	1836	94	Zambia	1438	172	Belize	1136
17	Ecuador	1832	95	Cape Verde	1428	173	Barbados	1122
18	Poland	1830	96	Congo	1427	174	Grenada	1116
19	Peru	1816	97	Bahrain	1424	174	Singapore	1116
20	South Korea	1782	98	Estonia	1419	176	India	1115
21	Ireland	1781	99	Northern Cyprus	1418	177	Malaysia	1111
22	Costa Rica	1768	100	Trinidad and Tobago	1417	178	Saint Lucia	1092
23	Iran	1766	100	Thailand	1417	178	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1092
24	Turkey	1765	102	El Salvador	1412	180	Sao Tome e Principe	1084
25	Ukraine	1747	103	Azerbaijan	1406	181	Eritrea	1077
25	Iceland	1747	104	Zimbabwe	1404	182	Gibraltar	1066
27	Japan	1745	105	Benin	1399	183	Myanmar	1060
28	Wales	1739	106	Latvia	1395	184	Mauritius	1053
29	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1738	107	Kenya	1390	185	Puerto Rico	1016
30	Sweden	1736	108	Togo	1388	186	Comoros	987
31	Slovakia	1733	108	Reunion	1388	187	Sint Maarten	973
32	United States	1719	110	Kazakhstan	1386	188	Seychelles	961
33	Serbia	1709	111	Kosovo	1383	189	Pakistan	960
33	Senegal	1709	111	Cyprus	1383	190	Maldives	959
35	Australia	1701	113	Macedonia	1382	191	Dominica	950
36	Denmark	1695	114	Namibia	1371	192	Cayman Islands	948
37	Paraguay	1685	115	Lebanon	1370	193	Andorra	938
37	Cameroon	1685	116	Sierra Leone	1368	194	Nepal	918
39	Egypt	1678	117	New Caledonia	1363	195	Aruba	906
40	Czechia	1676	118	Equatorial Guinea	1350	196	Bahamas	898
41	Ivory Coast	1672	119	Angola	1345	197	Bonaire	896
42	Russia	1671	120	French Guiana	1341	198	Greenland	885
43	Hungary	1668	121	Palestine	1338	199	Saint Martin	880
44	Venezuela	1666	122	Swaziland	1330	200	Taiwan	871
45	Austria	1665	123	Moldova	1327	201	San Marino	861
46	Romania	1662	124	Tanzania	1315	202	Guam	855
46	Nigeria	1662	125	Liberia	1313	203	Somalia	843
48	Uzbekistan	1657	125	Mozambique	1313	204	Wallis and Futuna	838
49	Panama	1654	127	Mauritania	1311	205	Tuvalu	822
50	Scotland	1649	128	Burundi	1309	206	Cambodia	821
51	Greece	1635	129	Rwanda	1305	207	Cook Islands	820
52	Slovenia	1632	130	Ethiopia	1303	208	Laos	819
53	Northern Ireland	1626	130	Malawi	1303	209	Bangladesh	815
54	Burkina Faso	1618	132	Botswana	1295	210	Samoa	814
55	Bolivia	1614	133	Cuba	1292	211	Saint Barthelemy	791
56	Israel	1607	133	Central African Republic	1292	212	Saint Pierre and Miquelon	762
57	South Africa	1604	135	Zanzibar	1291	213	Djibouti	754
58	Algeria	1600	136	Sudan	1290	214	US Virgin Islands	748
59	Morocco	1597	136	Niger	1290	215	Monaco	732
60	Honduras	1596	138	Fiji	1285	216	Turks and Caicos	718
61	Democratic Republic of Congo	1592	139	Vietnam	1284	217	Montserrat	715
62	Saudi Arabia	1581	140	Gambia	1278	218	Macao	707
63	United Arab Emirates	1577	141	Guinea-Bissau	1275	219	Sri Lanka	705
64	Montenegro	1571	142	Faroe Islands	1273	219	Tonga	705

Data downloaded on February 17th, 2017 at http://www.eloratings.net/world.html

TABLE A.5: ELO RATING AND RANKING (CONTINUATION)

Rank	Team	Rating	Rank	Team	Rating	Rank	Team	Rating
65	Ghana	1567	143	Guadeloupe	1271	221	Mongolia	672
65	Tunisia	1567	144	Nicaragua	1265	222	Federated States of Micronesia	664
65	New Zealand	1567	145	Tahiti	1262	223	Brunei	645
65	Belarus	1567	146	Turkmenistan	1258	224	East Timor	642
69	Bulgaria	1566	147	Indonesia	1257	225	British Virgin Islands	626
70	Albania	1560	148	Chad	1253	225	Bhutan	626
71	Norway	1554	149	Saint Kitts and Nevis	1250	227	Anguilla	620
72	Qatar	1553	150	Madagascar	1245	228	Eastern Samoa	602
73	Syria	1537	151	Tajikistan	1244	229	Niue	595
74	Finland	1532	152	Vanuatu	1241	230	Vatican	577
75	Mali	1523	153	Mayotte	1225	231	Kiribati	566
76	North Korea	1522	154	Philippines	1224	232	Tibet	553
77	China	1511	155	Kyrgyzstan	1223	233	Palau	491
78	Canada	1510	156	Luxembourg	1222	234	Northern Mariana Islands	454

Data downloaded on February 17th, 2017 at http://www.eloratings.net/world.html