Gender Gap in Spain: Policies and Outcomes over the Last Three Decades, with Ezgi Kaya and Virginia Sanchez-Marcos, September 2012
We document recent trends in gender equality in employment and wages in Spain. Despite an impressive decline in gender gap in employment, females are still less likely to work, and if they work they are more likely to be employed part time and with temporary contracts. The gender gap (after controlling for worker and job characteristics) is about 20% and did not change between 1995 and 2006. Furthermore, the gender gap in wages is driven mainly by differences in returns to individual characteristic. While women are more qualified than men in observable labor market characteristics, they end up earning less. Public policy seems to affect female employment. In particular, there was a significant acceleration of female employment in 2000s. This was a period in which many policies that were implemented after early 1990s started to have their longer term effects. It was also a period during which Spain received a large number of immigrants, which had a positive impact on female labor force participation.
Income Taxation of U.S. Households: Facts and Parametric Estimates, with Remzi Kaygusuz and Gustavo Ventura, August 2012.
We use micro data from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service to document how Federal Income tax liabilities vary with income, marital status and the number of dependents. We report facts on the distributions of average taxes, properties of the joint distributions of taxes paid and income, and discuss how taxes are affected by marital status and the number of children. We also provide multiple parametric estimates of tax functions for use in applied work in macroeconomics and public finance.
Technology and the Changing Family, Jeremy Greenwood, Georgi Kocharkov and Cezar Santos, June 2012.
Marriage has declined since 1960, with the drop being bigger for non-college educated individuals versus college educated ones. Divorce has increased, more so for the non-college educated vis-ŕ-vis the college educated. Additionally, assortative mating has risen; i.e., people are more likely to marry someone of the same educational level today than in the past. A unified model of marriage, divorce, educational attainment and married female labor-force participation is developed and estimated to fit the postwar U.S. data. The role of technological progress in the household sector and shifts in the wage structure for explaining these facts is gauged.
Firm Dynamics, Job Turnover, and Wage Distributions in an Open Economy, with Kerem Cosar and James Tybout, May 2011.
This paper explores the effects of tariffs, trade costs, and firing costs on firm dynamics and labor markets outcomes. The analysis is based on a general equilibrium model with labor market search frictions, wage bargaining, firing costs, firm-specific productivity shocks, and endogenous entry/exit decisions. Firing costs reduce firms’ profits and discourage them from quickly adjusting their employment levels in response to idiosyncratic shocks. Tariffs and other trade costs reduce rents for efficient firms and increase rents for inefficient firms, as in Melitz (2003). These well-known effects interact with idiosyncratic productivity shocks and with scale economies in hiring costs to determine the equilibrium size distribution of firms, entry/exit rates, job turnover rates, rate of informality, and cross-firm wage distributions.
Marital Instability and the Distribution of Wealth, with John Knowles, manuscript, July 2007.
The levels of wealth differ significantly among people who are approaching their retirement both by current marital status as well as by marital histories. We develop an equilibrium model of marriage and divorce and household savings, in which the interplay between endogenous formation and dissolution of families and savings decisions plays a key role. We show that a calibrated version of the model can reproduce observed patterns of wealth inequality by marital status and marital history, and highlight the role of endogenous marriage formation in wealth accumulation.
An Economic Analysis of Family Structure: Inheritance Rules and Marriage Systems, manuscript (first version November 1998). Updated version coming soon.
Traditional societies had norms governing the choice of mates and rules for determining inheritances. The goal here is to analyze how different inheritance rules and marriage systems are determined. To do this, an overlapping generations model of an agrarian economy is constructed. On the one hand, a young adult’s prospects on the marriage market depend upon the inheritance he or she will receive from their parents. The size of the inheritance is a function of who the children marry. On the other hand, parents depend upon their children to support them in old age. In the analysis, the size of inheritance and the level of old age support are determined as a result of a multilateral bargaining process between parents and their children. Assortative mating, patrilineal inheritance rules and polygamy emerge naturally out of the model.