Game Theory

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Program

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- 1.3.3.- Imperfect Information

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2 Nash Equilibrium and Related Issues

2.1.- Dominant Strategies

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2.3.- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

2.4.- Perfect Equilibrium

2.5.- Proper Equilibrium

2.6.- Stable Sets of Equilibria

2.7.- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior

2.8.- Correlated Equilibrium

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3 Repeated Games

3.1.- Strategies

3.2.- Payoffs

3.3.- "Folk" Theorems

3.4.- Bounded Rationality, Evolution and Learning

3.5.- Stochastic Games

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4 Games of Incomplete Information

4.1.- The Harsanyi Solution

4.2.- Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium

4.3.- Sequential Equilibrium

4.4.- Using Bayesian-Nash Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria

4.5.- Signalling Games and Forward Induction

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5 Bargaining Theory

5.1.- The Bargaining Problem

5.2.- The Nash Bargaining Solution

5.3.- The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution

5.4.- Strategic Bargaining

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6 Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility

6.1.- Stable Sets, Core, Bargaining Sets, and Kernel

6.2.- Shapley Value, Nucleolus, and other Values

6.3.- Division Rules and Solutions for the Bankruptcy Problem

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7 Cooperative Games with Non-Transferable Utility

7.1.- The Core

7.2.- The $\lambda-$transfer Extensions

7.3.- Bargaining and Value

7.4.- Market Games

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8 Miscellaneous

8.1.- Games with Infinitely Many Players

8.2.- Matching Models: Stability and Incentives

8.3.- Experiments on Game Theory

8.4.- Implementation

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