Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley, Nobel Prizes in Economics 2012 for the Theory of Stable Allocations and the Practice of Market Design

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Abstract The Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 was awarded jointly to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley for their contributions to the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. The theory of stable allocations consists of a family of models that study assignment problems in which two disjoint sets of agents (or a set of agents and a set of objects) have to be matched. For example, men to women, workers to firms, students to schools, or patients to live donor kidneys. A matching is stable if no subset of agents can improved upon their proposed matches by rematching only among themselves. Stability is an essential property if matching is voluntary. The practice of market design consists of applying those two-sided matching models to specific assignment problems with the aim of proposing improvements on how they are solved. In this paper I give a brief description of the academic career of the laureates and describe their contributions by presenting the most basic two-sided matching model and some of its market design applications like the organization of a centralized system to propose kidney transplantations to use kidneys of live donors that are incompatible with their respective patients, the yearly assignment of north-american medical students to hospital internship programs, and children to schools in cities like Boston and New York.

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Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley

Resum  El Premi Nobel en Economia 2012 fou otorgat conjuntament a Alvin E. Roth i Lloyd S. Shapley per les seves contribucions a la teoria de les assignacions estables i la pràctica del disseny de mercats. La teoria de les assignacions estables consisteix en una família de models que estudien problemes d’assignació en els que dos conjunts disjunts d’agents (o un conjunt d’agents i un conjunt d’objectes) han de ser assignats bilateralment. Per exemple, homes a dones, treballadors a empreses, estudiants a escoles, o pacients a ronyons de donants vius. Una assignació bilateral és estable si cap subconjunt d’agents pot millorar en relació a la seva assignació proposada, reassignant-se només entre ells. La estabilitat és una propietat imprescindible si l’assignació bilateral és voluntària. La pràctica del disseny de mercats consisteix en aplicar aquests models d’assignació bilaterals a problemes específics d’assignació amb l’objectiu de proposar millores en la manera en què aquests es resolen. En aquest article primer dono una breu descripció de la trajectòria acadèmica dels guardonats i descripc les seves contribucions tot presentant el model més bàsic d’assignació bilateral i alguna de les seves aplicacions de disseny de mercats com la organització d’un sistema centralitzat per proposar transplantaments de ronyons de donants vius incompatibles amb els seus respectius pacients, l’assignació anual d’estudiants de medicina nord-americans a programes hospitalaris d’interns i nens a escoles en ciutats com Boston i Nova York.
1 Introduction

1.1 The Laureates

The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2012 was awarded jointly to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley. The main purpose of this article is to describe Roth and Shapley’s research on “the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design” that justifies the concession of such honor.

Al Roth was born in New York on December 18, 1951. He graduated from Columbia University in 1971 (when he was 19 years old!) with a degree in Operations Research. He obtained his Ph.D. in Operations Research from Stanford University in 1974 under the supervision of Robert B. Wilson. His first two jobs were at the Departments of Economics at the University of Illinois (from 1974 to 1982) and at the University of Pittsburgh (from 1982 to 1998). In 1998 he moved to Harvard University with a joint appointment from the Economics Department and the Harvard Business School. He has stayed there until the beginning of 2013 when he moved to the Economics Department at Stanford University. During this period at Harvard University he has been supervising a large group of Ph.D. students, most of whom are now working at the best universities in the USA and Europe.

Al Roth thesis was on von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets. His research interests have been wide and moved very consistently to include axiomatic bargaining, experimental economics, learning in non-cooperative games, the theory of stable allocations in matching markets, and market design. According to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences the prize has been awarded to him for his research on the last two areas, although he has fundamental contributions in the other ones. See for instance, Roth (1979), Roth and Ockenfels (2002), and Erev and Roth (1998).¹

Lloyd Shapley was born in Cambridge (New England) on June 2, 1923. After serving in the Army Air Corps in Chengdu, China, during the second world war, he went to Harvard University where he graduated in 1948 with a degree in Mathematics. He obtained his Ph.D. in Mathematics from Princeton University in 1953 under the supervision of Albert W. Tucker. He has had only two affiliations: at RAND Corporation (from 1954 to 1981) and at the Departments of Mathematics and Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles, since 1981.

Lloyd Shapley thesis was on additive and non-additive set functions. He has made fundamental contributions in all areas of Game Theory; for instance to the theory of the Core, the Shapley value, repeated and stochastic games, the potential of a game and the theory of stable allocations in matching markets. Many game theorists thought that the fact that Lloyd Shapley had not been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics yet was a sad omission. We are now pleased that this has been corrected in 2012.

The concession of the 2012 Nobel Prize to both Al Roth and Lloyd Shapley may be seen as recognizing two complementary sides of a research: Lloyd Shapley for the theoretical contributions to the theory of stable allocations in two-sided matching problems and Al Roth for the applications of this theory to improve the functioning of institutions solving two-sided assignment real-life problems. The main references of these complementary contributions

¹The last paper is still his most cited paper in Scopus.


for the theory, and


for two applications of the theory to the assignment of medical interns to hospital internship programs and kidney exchanges of incompatible patient-donor pairs.\(^2\)

Al Roth and Lloyd Shapley did not write jointly, but Al Roth has been closely following Lloyd Shapley’s research as his fourth paper and his fourth book show. They are:


The late David Gale had also fundamental contributions to the theory of stable allocations and it is reasonable to think that he would have also been awarded with the prize had he been alive in 2012. He was born in New York on December 13, 1921 and died in Berkeley (California) on March 7, 2008. He obtained his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1949 under the supervision of Albert W. Tucker. He had two main affiliations: at Brown University (from 1954 to 1981) and at the University of California, Berkeley, (from 1965 to 2008). He had also relevant contributions to Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. Gale (1960) is still a very useful reference on the applications of Linear Programming to Economics.

\(^2\)Roth and Sotomayor (1990) contains a masterful review of all matching literature from 1962 to 1990 and it is still the best gateway to the theory and applications of two-sided matching problems.
1.2 The Theory of Stable Allocations and the Practice of Market Design

Participants in some markets cannot be divided \textit{a priori} between buyers and sellers. If the price of a good changes sufficiently a participant can be a seller and a buyer in a few minutes of difference. Stocks are clear examples of goods exchanged in such markets. However, there are many other markets without this property: participants are either buyers or sellers, independently of the price of the good. Physical or legal characteristics of the participants make them to be in one, and only one side of the market. For instance, a university professor cannot become a university, even after a dramatic decline of the professors wage, nor the university can become a university professor after its increase.

There are many two-sided assignment problems, not necessarily solved through markets, in which participants are divided \textit{a priori} between two disjoint sets. For instance, men and women, workers and firms, and students and colleges. The assignment problem is precisely to match each participant in one of the two sets with a participant in the other set (or to remain unmatched) taking into account the preferences that each participant in one set has on the participants on the other set (plus the prospect of remaining unmatched). But the matching has to be bilateral: if \( a \) is matched with \( b \), \( b \) is matched with \( a \). Moreover, those problems have often two additional properties that distinguish them from conventional markets. First, the matching between two participants requires mutual agreement: if \( a \) chooses to be matched with \( b \), \( a \) has to be chosen by \( b \). Second, prices do not play any role to facilitate the matching and to resolve the potential disequilibrium of the mutual wills.

Two-sided matching models formalize the main characteristics of these assignment problems. Lloyd Shapley contributed to the development of the earlier stages of this theory; specifically, Gale and Shapley (1962) propose the notion of stability of an allocation as the relevant property whenever the assignment has to be voluntary. An assignment (or a matching) between the two sets of participants is stable at a preference profile if: (a) all participants are either unmatched or matched with a participant that is strictly preferred to remaining unmatched and (b) there is no pair of participants that are not matched with each other but they would prefer to be so rather than staying with the partner proposed by the assignment.

Although Al Roth also has fundamental theoretical contributions to two-sided matching models he has been the founder and main contributor to market design. This area uses two sided matching models and other tools to analyse practical assignment problems. It restricts the attention to specific situations by modifying the general and abstract model to incorporate the specific details of the particular problem under consideration. Hence, it obtains conclusions that do not have general validity (of course) but that by taking into account the institutional details of the problem at hand allows the researcher to perform a deeper analysis and recommend possible changes to improve the way that specific assignment problems are solved in practice. For instance, Al Roth and his collaborators have proposed substantial modifications on the solutions of problems like the yearly assignment of north-american medical interns to hospital internship programs, children to schools in cities like Boston and New York, or the organization of a centralized system to propose kidney transplantsations of live donors that are incompatible with their respective and loved patients.
In the remaining of the paper, instead of presenting different models of two-sided assignment problems and their applications as practices of market design, I will restrict myself to present some examples. I will start with an application. In Section 2, I will describe (in my view) one of the most interesting practices of market design: the kidney exchange problem. To do so, I will present Roth, Sönmez and Ünver (2004) adaptation of the Gale’s Top Trading Cycle Algorithm as the best solution to solve kidney exchange problems, with some references to the Spanish case. In Section 3, I will present the notion of stable allocations in the basic marriage model presented by Gale and Shapley (1962) and the main results in terms of the strategic incentives faced by participants in centralized two-sided matching markets. At the end of the section, I will briefly mention two other applications of this theory: the yearly assignment of medical students to hospital internship programs in north-america and the yearly assignment of students to schools in Boston and New York city.

2 Kidney Exchange

There are two treatments for patients with renal disease: dialysis and transplantation. Since dialysis requires a strong dependence and has many side effects (physical as well as psychological), transplantation is considered the best treatment. Kidneys for transplantation come from either deceased or living donors. The first successful kidney transplantation took place on December 23, 1954 in Boston. It was done between two identical twins (to eliminate the immune reaction) and performed, among others, by Joseph E. Murray, J. Hartwell Harrison, and John P. Merrill. The patient survived eight years after the transplantation. At the end of the last century, and after the improvement in immunosuppressive therapies, the majority of transplanted kidneys in many countries were from deceased donors; for instance, in 1999 in Spain less than 1% of all kidney transplants were from living donors (only 17 among 2023). However, there is a unanimous agreement that the quality and success-rate of kidney transplants from living donors are greater than those from deceased ones. In particular, the likelihood that the transplanted kidney survives 5 years is 0.87 if it comes from live donors and 0.80 if it comes from deceased donors, and the likelihood that the recipient will survive 5 years is 0.93 and 0.86, respectively. Furthermore, promoting the donation of kidneys from living donors may help solve the shortage of kidneys for transplantation. Indeed, all countries with active transplantation programs suffer from shortage of kidneys. Almost everywhere the average time that a patient has to stay in the waiting list for a kidney transplant is well above two years. In addition, increasing life expectancy as well as the decrease in mortality due to car and motorcycle accidents has made the shortage even more severe. For all these reasons, in the last ten years, many countries are promoting living donation; for instance, in 2011 in Spain already more than 12% of all kidney transplants were from living donors (312 among 2498).

In the direct donation, the patient receives, if compatible, one of the two kidneys from a relative or friend (usually, the spouse and siblings of the patient). The most basic incom-

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3Joseph E. Murray received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1990, jointly with E. Donnall Thomas, “for their discoveries concerning organ and cell transplantation in the treatment of human disease.”
compatibilities are blood and tissue type (the later is related to genetics that produce immune reaction), although the age of the kidney is also relevant for the graft kidney survival. But if the kidney is not compatible, the transplant is not possible and the donor’s kidney is removed from the system. It is estimated that approximately one third of patients with a friend or family donor are excluded from the system due to different incompatibilities. Until very recently this was the only live donation that was taking place, and there was no system to take advantage of rejected donors, which were simply sent home. In 1986, the doctor F.T. Rapaport was the first to propose kidney exchanges from living donors. The idea is simple: suppose that one day a nephrologist receives a patient accompanied by a relative who is willing to donate a kidney. Unfortunately, the analysis shows that they are incompatible. The next day, the same doctor receives another patient-donor pair who are also incompatible. But each patient is compatible with the donor of the other pair, and hence, a kidney exchange is possible (in this case, by satisfying a cycle of length two). Or even longer cycles involving three or more incompatible patient-donor pairs could be undertaken.

A kidney exchange problem consists of a set of incompatible patient-donor pairs together with a profile of ordered lists of all donors’ kidneys, one list for each patient. Formally, let $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ be the set of patients and let $K = \{k_1, \ldots, k_n\}$ be the set of live donors kidneys. Each patient $i \in N$ has a donor whose kidney $k_i$ is not compatible with $i$. Thus, $\{(1, k_1), \ldots, (n, k_n)\}$ is the set of $n$ incompatible patient-donor pairs. Each patient $i \in N$ has a preference order (a strict) ranking $P_i$ of all donors kidneys. For instance, with $n = 4$,

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& k_3 & k_2 & k_1 \\
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P_3 & k_2 & k_4 & k_3 \\
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indicates that, for patient 3, $k_2$ and $k_4$ are two compatible kidneys, $k_2$ is better than $k_4$, and $k_1$ is not compatible (the ordering between incompatible kidneys is irrelevant). A patient’s ordered list of all kidneys (from the best to the worst) reflects, according to the patient’s nephrologist, the $ex-ante$ ordinal quality of the match between each kidney and the patient. The market design question in this case is to determine a systematic way of selecting, for each kidney exchange problem, a set of compatible transplants with some desirable properties. A set of compatible transplants can be represented by a matching $\alpha : N \rightarrow K$, where $\alpha(i) = k_j$ means that if $i \neq j$, $i$ receives kidney $k_j$ and if $i = j$, $i$ does not receive any kidney (and stays under dialysis waiting for a new run of the match). Note that the set of incompatible patient-donor pairs can be represented by the matching $\mu$, where $\mu(i) = k_i$ for all $i \in N$. An instance of a kidney exchange problem is thus a tuple $(N, K, \mu, P)$, where $N$ is the set of patients, $K$ is the set of kidneys, $\mu$ represents the set of incompatible patient-donor pairs and $P = (P_1, \ldots, P_n)$ is the profile of agents preferences on $K$.

Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004) study the kidney exchange problem and propose an adaptation of the general model presented by Shapley and Scarf (1974) as well as of an already known algorithm in matching theory to solve all kidney exchange problems. The algorithm is known as the $Gale’s Top Trading Cycle Algorithm$, and I will refer to it as the TTC algorithm.

\footnote{Given $i, j, t \in N$ and $P_i$, I will write $k_jR_i k_t$ to denote that either $k_j = k_t$ or else $k_j P_i k_t$.}
Given a kidney exchange problem (remember, a set of incompatible patient-donor pairs and a profile of patients’ lists, each list ordering all donors’ kidneys) the TTC algorithm solves the problem (i.e., proposes a set of compatible transplants) in stages. At each stage, the TTC algorithm roughly works as follows. (1) It constructs a graph whose nodes are the patient-donor pairs that have not yet been matched in the previous stages; (2) it directs the graph (a single arrow leaves from each node pointing to a node) by making that each patient points to the best kidney (according to his ordered list of kidneys) among those still present in the stage; (3) it identifies the nodes on the cycles of the directed graph; and (4) it satisfies the cycles, matching each patient of the nodes of the cycles to his pointed kidney. The TTC algorithm keeps identifying and satisfying successively the cycles along the stages. Note that in each stage, there is always at least one cycle, if there are several cycles they do not intersect each other and a cycle may have a single node whose patient points to the kidney of his donor (obviously, since they are not compatible, the patient in this case will not be transplanted and the patient will remain under dialysis). Thus, the input of the TTC algorithm is an instance of a kidney exchange problem and its output is a solution of the problem (i.e., a matching) that consists of a proposal of transplants based on the cycles identified along its stages. I denote by \( \eta \) the matching representing the transplants proposed by the output of the TTC algorithm applied to the kidney exchange problem at hand. Example 1 below illustrates how the TTC algorithm works.\(^5\)

**Example 1** Let \((N,K,\mu,P)\) be a kidney exchange problem with eight incompatible patient-donor pairs, \(\mu(i) = k_i\) for each \(i = 1,\ldots,8\), and the profile \(P\) represented in Table 1 below, where the kidneys inside an square in each agent’s preference list indicates the initial assignment \(\mu\) of agents to kidneys.

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Table 1

Figure 1 below represents the three steps of the TTC algorithm applied to profile \(P\) to obtain the assignment \(\eta\).

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\(^5\)Example 1, as well as Example 2 of Section 3, can be found in Massó (2012).
The TTC algorithm has many desirable properties. First, it is *individually rational*: every patient that receives a kidney from another donor at the outcome of the TTC algorithm prefers this situation rather than not receiving a kidney and remaining under dialysis. Second, it is *efficient*: all patients can not improve simultaneously; that is, if there is another set of transplants where one patient receives a strictly better kidney then, there must exist another patient that receives a strictly worse kidney. Third, the output of the TTC algorithm is an stable assignment (in game-theoretic terms, it belongs to the *Core* of the kidney exchange problem): there is no subset of patient-donor pairs that, by reassigning only the kidneys of the donors of the patients in the subset, can obtain better kidneys; *i.e.*, no subgroup of the patient-donor pairs (for example those from a hospital, a city or a region) can object unanimously to the output of the TTC algorithm (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). Moreover, the *Core* of each kidney exchange problem is unique and coincides with the output of the TTC algorithm (Roth and Postelwaite, 1977). Fourth, the mechanism associated to the TTC algorithm is strategy-proof: no patient could obtain a strictly better kidney by reporting (in fact, his nephrologist) a false ordered list of kidneys (Roth, 1982b). Furthermore, the mechanism that, for each kidney exchange problem, selects the output of the TTC algorithm is the unique individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof mechanism (Ma, 1994). Finally, the quality of the kidney received by each patient in the output of the TTC algorithm depends positively on the quality of his kidney’s donor (Roth and Postelwaite, 1977).

Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004) also reports some simulations suggesting that the TTC algorithm performs well and that it can be applied to real kidney exchange problems, and indeed it is now used in most countries with kidney exchange programs. But in addition,
the paper has also triggered an already long list of papers studying different issues related to the specific nature of the kidney exchange problem that may require to adapt the TTC algorithm. For instance, (1) to deal with the increasing number of altruistic donors (called “good samaritans”), whose kidney can be used to initiate chains (instead of cycles) of transplants; The New York Times, on February 18, 2012 contained an article entitled 60 Lives, 30 Kidneys, All Linked describing a chain of 30 transplants initiated one year earlier by a good samaritan. (2) The consequences of requiring alternative incentive properties (weaker than strategy-proofness) when patients (their nephrologists) submit the ranked list of all donors’ kidneys. (3) The presence of patients with several potential donors. (4) Ethical issues related with the ex-ante worse situation faced by O blood type patients since they can only receive kidneys from O blood type donors. (5) The effects of considering explicitly the dynamic feature of the problem, where the database of pairs keeps changing by the entrance and exit of patient-donor pairs.

In any case, kidney exchange has become a natural and successful market design application of the theory of stable allocations to help human beings to live longer and better. Al Roth and Lloyd Shapley’s contributions have made it possible.

3 The Theory of Stable Allocations

Following Gale and Shapley (1962)’s metaphor we will use the marriages between men and women as the reference example to describe a basic matching problem. Let $M = \{m_1, \ldots, m_n\}$ be the set of men and let $W = \{w_1, \ldots, w_m\}$ be the set of women. The set of agents is $N = M \cup W$. We assume that each man $m \in M$ has a strict preference (a ranking) $P_m$ on the set of women and the prospect of remaining unmatched, that for convenience we identify as being matched to himself. That is, $P_m$ is a complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation on the set $W \cup \{m\}$. Given $m \in M$ and $w, w' \in W$, we will write $wP_mw'$ and $mP_mw$ to denote that $m$ prefers to be matched to $w$ rather than to $w'$ and to be unmatched instead of being matched to $w$, respectively. Similarly, each woman $w \in W$ has a strict preference $P_w$ on the set $M \cup \{w\}$, where $w$ in the ranking represents the prospect, for $w$, of remaining unmatched. Given $w \in W$ and $m, m' \in M$, we will write $mP_wm'$ and $wP_wm$ to denote that $w$ prefers to be matched to $m$ rather than to $m'$ and to be unmatched instead of being matched to $m$, respectively. A (preference) profile is a list of preferences $P = (P_{m_1}, \ldots, P_{m_n}; P_{w_1}, \ldots, P_{w_m})$, one for each agent. A market (or matching problem) is a triple $(M, W, P)$, where $M$ is the set of men, $W$ is the set of women and $P$ is a profile.

Example 2 Let $(M, W, P)$ be the market where $M = \{m_1, m_2, m_3, m_4, m_5\}, W = \{w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4\}$,

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and $P$ is

\begin{align*}
| & P_{m_1} & P_{m_2} & P_{m_3} & P_{m_4} & P_{m_5} & | & P_{w_1} & P_{w_2} & P_{w_3} & P_{w_4} \\
& w_1 & w_4 & w_4 & w_1 & w_1 & | & m_2 & m_3 & m_4 & m_1 \\
& w_2 & w_2 & w_3 & w_4 & w_2 & | & m_3 & m_1 & m_5 & m_4 \\
& w_3 & w_3 & w_1 & w_3 & w_4 & | & m_1 & m_2 & m_1 & m_5 \\
& w_4 & w_1 & w_2 & w_2 & m_5 & | & m_4 & m_4 & m_2 & m_2 \\
& m_1 & m_2 & m_3 & m_4 & w_3 & | & m_5 & m_5 & m_3 & m_3 \\
& m_2 & & & & & | & w_1 & w_2 & w_3 & w_4
\end{align*}

where agents’ preferences are columns and each column indicates the corresponding agent’s preference in decreasing order, for instance, $w_1 P_{m_5} w_2$ and $m_5 P_{m_5} w_3$.

The assignment problem consists of matching each men with at most a woman and each women with at most a man with the properties that the matching is bilateral and agents may remain unmatched. Formally,

**Definition 1** A matching (for market $(M, W, P)$) is a mapping $\mu : M \cup W \to M \cup W$ such that:

(a) for each $m \in M$, $\mu(m) \in W \cup \{m\}$,
(b) for each $w \in W$, $\mu(w) \in M \cup \{w\}$, and
(c) for each pair $(m, w) \in M \times W$, $\mu(m) = w$ if and only if $\mu(w) = m$.

The figure below illustrates a matching for the market of Example 2.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{matching.png}
\caption{Matching Example 2}
\end{figure}

A matching is stable if it is individually rational and no pair of agents prefer each other rather than the partners proposed to each of them by the matching. Formally,

**Definition 2** A matching $\mu$ is stable at $P$ if

(a) for each $m \in M$, $\mu(m) R_m m$,
(b) for each $w \in W$, $\mu(w) R_w w$, and
(c) there is no pair $(m, w) \in M \times W$ such that $w P_m \mu(m)$ and $m P_w \mu(w)$.

The matching $\mu$ in Figure 2 is not stable at profile $P$ of Example 2 since $w_2 P_{m_1} w_3 = \mu(m_1)$ and $m_1 P_{w_2} m_5 = \mu(w_2)$. Fix $M$ and $W$. Given $P$, let $S(P)$ be the set of stable

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\textsuperscript{9}Given agents $x, y, z \in N$, we write $x R_y z$ to denote that either $x = z$ or else $x P_y z$; namely, either $x$ and $z$ are the same agent or else $y$ strictly prefers to be matched to $x$ rather than to $z$. 

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matchings at $P$. Gale and Shapley (1962) state and prove that the set of stable matchings is always non-empty.\textsuperscript{10} Formally,

**Theorem 1** Let $P$ be a profile. Then, $S(P)$ is non-empty.

Gale and Shapley (1962) prove that, for any $P$, the set $S(P)$ is non-empty by showing that it contains two stable matchings, the men-optimal stable matching (denoted by $\mu_M$) and the women-optimal stable matching (denoted by $\mu_W$). The two matchings have the properties that for any stable matching $\mu \in S(P)$ the following two conditions hold: (a) for all $m \in M$, $\mu_M(m)R_m\mu(m)R_m\mu_W(m)$ and (b) for all $w \in W$, $\mu_W(w)R_w\mu(w)R_w\mu_M(w)$; namely, all men agree that the partner that they receive at $\mu_M$ ($\mu_W$) is the best (worst) among all partners that they receive at any stable matching and simultaneously all women agree that the partner that they receive at $\mu_W$ ($\mu_M$) is the best (worst) among all partners that they receive at any stable matching.\textsuperscript{11} Gale and Shapley (1962) propose two versions of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) to compute the two optimal stable matchings $\mu_M$ and $\mu_W$. I describe the version of the algorithm in which men make offers to women, denoted by $DAA_M$ (the other is symmetric, replacing the role of men and women and it is denoted by $DAA_W$). At any step of the $DAA_M$, each man offers himself to his most-preferred woman amongst the set of women who have not already rejected him, while each woman accepts the most-preferred men amongst all men whose proposals along the algorithm she has not rejected yet. The algorithm terminates when no woman rejects a man. It turns out that the outcome of the $DAA_M$ is $\mu_M$ and the outcome of the $DAA_W$ is $\mu_W$.

Table 2 summarizes the 4 steps of the $DAA_M$ applied to the market $(M, W, P)$ of Example 2, where $m \rightarrow w$ represents an offer of $m$ to $w$, Yes means that $w$ accepts it, and No that $w$ rejects it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>Step 3</th>
<th>Step 4</th>
<th>Final</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$m_1 \rightarrow w_1$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_1 \rightarrow w_1$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_1 \rightarrow w_1$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_1 \rightarrow w_1$ Yes</td>
<td>$\mu_M(m_1) = w_1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m_2 \rightarrow w_4$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_2 \rightarrow w_4$ No</td>
<td>$m_2 \rightarrow w_2$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_2 \rightarrow w_2$ Yes</td>
<td>$\mu_M(m_2) = w_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m_3 \rightarrow w_4$ No</td>
<td>$m_3 \rightarrow w_3$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_3 \rightarrow w_3$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_3 \rightarrow w_3$ Yes</td>
<td>$\mu_M(m_3) = w_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m_4 \rightarrow w_1$ No</td>
<td>$m_4 \rightarrow w_4$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_4 \rightarrow w_4$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_4 \rightarrow w_4$ Yes</td>
<td>$\mu_M(m_4) = w_4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m_5 \rightarrow w_1$ No</td>
<td>$m_5 \rightarrow w_2$ Yes</td>
<td>$m_5 \rightarrow w_2$ No</td>
<td>$m_5 \rightarrow w_4$ No</td>
<td>$\mu_M(m_5) = w_5$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

Table 3 describes the unique step of the $DAA_W$ applied to the market $(M, W, P)$ of Example 2.

\textsuperscript{10}Moreover, it coincides with the Core of the one-to-one matching problem; namely, intermediate coalitions of agents have no additional blocking power.

\textsuperscript{11}Knuth (1976) shows that $S(P)$ is a (dual) complete lattice with the unanimous partial ordering of men (women) $\succeq_M$ ($\succeq_W$), where for any $\mu, \mu' \in S(P)$, $\mu \succeq_M \mu'$ if and only if $\mu(m)R_m\mu'(m)$ ($\mu \succeq_W \mu'$ if and only if $\mu(w)R_w\mu'(w)$). Moreover, $\mu \succeq_M \mu'$ if and only if $\mu' \succeq_W \mu$. Then, $\mu_M$ is the supremum and $\mu_W$ is the infimum of the set $S(P)$ according to $\succeq_M$, and $\mu_W$ is the supremum and $\mu_M$ is the infimum of the set $S(P)$ according to $\succeq_W$. 

10
Observe that $\mu_M \neq \mu_W$ and that $\mu_M(w_5) = \mu_W(w_5) = w_5$.\(^{12}\)

Al Roth has made relevant contributions to the study of the strategic incentives induced by the DAAs when they are understood as direct revelation mechanisms.\(^{13}\) Moreover, he has proposed modifications of some mechanisms used to solve real-life assignment problems. Some of the modifications are partially driven by the aim of fixing mechanisms that induce wrong strategic incentives to agents. At the end of this section I will be a bit more specific about two of these modifications. But first, to consider the strategic incentives faced by participants in these markets, observe that whether or not a matching is stable depends on the agents’ preferences. But each agent’s preferences are private information and hence, they have to be elicited by a mechanism. Fix the sets $M$ and $W$. Let $\mathcal{M}$ be the set of all matchings among $M$ and $W$ and let $\mathcal{P}$ be the set of all preference profiles. A social choice function $f : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ selecting, for each preference profile $P \in \mathcal{P}$, a matching $f(P) \in \mathcal{M}$. Given a social choice function $f : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$, a profile $P \in \mathcal{P}$ and an agent $x \in M \cup W$ we denote by $f_x(P)$ the partner assigned to $x$ by the social choice function $f$ at profile $P$ (i.e., $f_x(P) \equiv f(P)(x)$, because $f(P)$ is the matching selected by $f$ at $P$). Given agent $x \in M \cup W$, a profile $P \in \mathcal{P}$ and a preference $P'_x$, denote by $(P'_x, P_{-x})$ the new profile obtained from $P$ after substituting $P_x$ by $P'_x$ in $P$. Agent $x \in M \cup W$ manipulates the social choice function $f : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ if there exist $P \in \mathcal{P}$ and $P'_x$ such that $f_x(P'_x, P_{-x})P_x f_x(P_x, P_{-x})$; namely, agent $x$ (with preference $P_x$) obtains a strictly preferred partner by reporting to $f$ a false preference $P'_x$. A social choice function $f : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ is strategy-proof if no agent can manipulate it.\(^{14}\) A social choice function $f : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ is stable if it always selects stable matchings; namely, for all $P \in \mathcal{P}$, $f(P) \in S(P)$. Roth (1982a) shows that strategy-proofness and stability are incompatible.

**Proposition 1** (Roth, 1982a) There are no social choice function $f : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ that is simultaneously strategy-proof and stable.

However, the two DAAs understood as social choice functions induce good incentive properties to the side of the market that makes the offers. To state that, let $f^M : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$

\(^{12}\)The following property of the set of stable matchings $S(P)$ always holds. For any agent $x \in M \cup W$ if $\mu \in S(P)$ and $\mu(x) = x$ then, for all $\mu' \in S(P)$, $\mu'(x) = x$. Namely, to be unmatched is a global property of the set of stable matchings.

\(^{13}\)A direct revelation mechanism asks each agent to report his preferences and proposes a matching depending on the declared profile of preferences.

\(^{14}\)That is, truth-telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy in the game induced by the social choice function $f$. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Final</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$w_1 \rightarrow m_2$</td>
<td>$\mu_W(w_1) = m_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_2 \rightarrow m_3$</td>
<td>$\mu_W(w_2) = m_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_3 \rightarrow m_4$</td>
<td>$\mu_W(w_3) = m_4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w_4 \rightarrow m_1$</td>
<td>$\mu_W(w_4) = m_1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\mu_W(w_5) = m_5$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
be the social choice function that selects for each preference profile the men-optimal stable matching and let \( f^W : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M} \) be the social choice function that selects for each preference profile the women-optimal stable matching; namely, for each \( P \in \mathcal{P} \), \( f^M(P) = \mu_M \) and \( f^W(P) = \mu_W \). A social choice function \( f : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M} \) is strategy-proof for the men if it can not be manipulated by any men and \( f : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M} \) is strategy-proof for the women if it can not be manipulated by any women. The following result may explain why these two social choice functions are used so widely to solve many real-life centralized two-sided matching problems.

**Theorem 2** (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982a) The social choice function \( f^M : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M} \) is strategy-proof for the men and the social choice function \( f^W : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{M} \) is strategy-proof for the women.

Before finishing, I mention two successful market design applications of the theory of stable allocations.

First, Roth (1984) reports that, since the academic year 1951-1952 (ten years earlier than Gale and Shapley (1962)'s paper), the problem of matching each year medical students with hospital internship programs in north-america was solved by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) by asking to medical students and hospital to report their ranked preferences lists and by applying to the declared preference profile the DAA in which hospitals make offers. Before 1951, and as earlier as the beginning of the 20th Century, the matching process exhibited lots of problems. In particular, the market unravelled in the sense that hospitals were looking (and making offers in a decentralized setting) to medical students earlier and earlier while they were still at college, and needed almost two additional years of college before finishing. The AAMC tried to stop these practices without much success until 1953-1954 when the centralized ADD mechanism was adopted under voluntary basis. The procedure was working well with high participation rates until the mid 1990’s (around 20,000 medical students were assigned yearly) when more couples where looking coordinately for hospitals located in the same city, some links had to be done between different subspecialities to fulfill the internship requirements, and students were arguing that the system was favoring hospitals and that they could “game the system” by reporting false preference lists. The AAMC asked Al Roth to modify the mechanism to fix those problems and he redesigned the algorithm to be able to accommodate them satisfactorily. In 1998 the match was completed using (with small modifications) the DAA in which students make offers (see Roth and Peranson (1999) for a full description of the redesign). This intervention may be seen as the first (conscious) practice of market design.

Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) used a two-sided matching model to study the yearly problem of assigning students to public schools in a city. The main issue of the assignment problem is to let parents to choose the school of their children. Boston and New York city were using a centralized mechanism (known as the Boston mechanism) that is similar to the DAA but with the very important difference that provisional matches along the application of the algorithm are made definitive, and hence, it was highly manipulable.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\)For instance, in the application of the \( DAA_M \) to the profile \( P \) of Example 2, \( m_3 \) is assigned to \( w_3 \), his second choice, while in the outcome of the Boston mechanism he is unassigned (his worse choice). However, under the Boston mechanism \( m_3 \) could be assigned to \( w_2 \) by declaring, instead of \( P_{m_3} \), any preference \( P'_{m_3} \) with \( w_2 \) as his top choice.
Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak and Roth (2005) and Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth and Sönmez (2005) report that, following their advice, the two cities changed the assignment procedure and replaced the Boston mechanism by the DAA in which students make offers. Recently, many other cities are adopting the DAA to organize the assignment of their students to public schools.

References


