

# Matching

Academic Year 2009-2010, Second Semester

Jordi Massó

## Reading List 6: Assignment Games and Housing Problems

- E. Camiña. “A generalized assignment game,” *Mathematical Social Sciences* 52, 152-161 (2006).
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- J. Ma. “Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities,” *International Journal of Game Theory* 23, 75-83 (1994).
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- A. Roth and A. Postlewaite. “Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 4, 131-137 (1977).
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- Sotomayor, M. “Correlating new cooperative and competitive concepts in the time-sharing assignment game,” mimeo (2009).