

# Matching

Academic Year 2009-2010, Second Semester

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## Reading List 5: Many-to-one matching

- H. Adachi. “On a characterization of stable matchings,” *Economics Letters* 68, 43-49 (2000).
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- F. Echenique and J. Oviedo. “Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 115, 358-376 (2004).
- F. Echenique and J. Oviedo. “A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets,” *Theoretical Economics* 1, 233-273 (2006).
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- J. Hatfield and F. Kojima. “Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 67, 745-749 (2009).
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- J. Hatfield and P. Milgrom. “Matching with contracts,” *American Economic Review* 95, 913-935 (2005)
- A. Kelso and V. Crawford. “Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes,” *Econometrica* 50, 1483-1504 (1982).
- H. Konishi and U. Ünver. “Credible group-stability in many-to-many matching problems,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 129, 57-80 (2006).

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- R. Martínez, J. Massó, A. Neme, and J. Oviedo. “An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings,” *Mathematical Social Sciences* 47, 187-210 (2004).
- R. Martínez, J. Massó, A. Neme, and J. Oviedo. “The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model,” forthcoming in *Journal of Mathematical Economics*.
- A. Roth. “Stability and polarization of interests in job matching,” *Econometrica* 52, 47-57 (1984).
- A. Roth and M. Sotomayor. *Two-sided Matching: A Study in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis*. Cambridge University Press and Econometric Society Monographs (1990). Chapter 6.
- T. Sönmez. “Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems,” *Economic Design* 1, 365-380 (1996).
- M. Sotomayor, “Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem,” *Mathematical Social Sciences* 38, 55-70 (1999).