

Matching

Academic Year 2009-2010, Second Semester

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Reading List 4: The College Admissions Problem

- J. Alcalde. “Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 69, 240-254 (1996).
- L. Dubins and D. Freedman. “Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm,” *American Mathematical Monthly* 88, 485-494 (1981).
- L. Ehlers. “In search of advice for physicians in entry-level medical markets,” Université de Montréal, mimeo (2002).
- L. Ehlers. “In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 48, 249-270 (2004).
- L. Ehlers. “Truncation strategies in matching markets,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 33, 327-335 (2008).
- L. Ehlers and J. Massó. “Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 136, 587-600 (2007).
- L. Ehlers and J. Massó. “Matching markets under (in)complete information,” Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona mimeo (2008).
- D. Gale and L. Shapley. “College admissions and the stability of marriage,” *American Mathematical Monthly* 69, 9-15 (1962).
- D. Gale and M. Sotomayor. “Some remarks on the stable matching problem,” *Discrete Applied Mathematics* 11, 223-232 (1985).
- J. Pais. “Giving advice and perfect equilibria in matching markets,” ISEG mimeo (2006).
- J. Pais. “Random matching in the college admissions problem,” *Economic Theory* 35, 99-116 (2008).
- A. Roth. “The economics of matching: stability and incentives,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 7, 617-628 (1982).

- A. Roth. “Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 34, 383-387 (1984).
- A. Roth. “The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory,” *Journal of Political Economy* 92, 991-1016 (1984).
- A. Roth. “Common and conflicting interests in two-sided matching markets,” *European Economic Review* 27, 75-96 (1985).
- A. Roth. “The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 36, 277-288 (1985).
- A. Roth and U. Rothblum. “Truncation strategies in matching markets—in search of advice for participants,” *Econometrica* 67, 21-43 (1999).
- A. Roth and M. Sotomayor. *Two-sided Matching: A Study in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis*. Cambridge University Press and Econometric Society Monographs (1990). Chapter 4.
- S. Shi. “A direct search model of inequality with heterogeneous skills and skill-biased technology,” *Review of Economic Studies* 69, 467-491 (2002).