

Matching

Academic Year 2009-2010, Second Semester

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Reading List 3: Incentives

- J. Alcalde. “Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 69 240-254 (1996).
- J. Alcalde and S. Barberà. “Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems,” *Economic Theory* 4, 417-435 (1994).
- L. Dubins and D. Freedman. “Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm,” *American Mathematical Monthly* 88, 485-494 (1981).
- D. Gale and M. Sotomayor. “Ms Machiavelli and the stable matching problem,” *American Mathematical Monthly* 92, 261-268 (1985).
- A. Roth. “The economics of matching: stability and incentives,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 7, 617-628 (1982).
- A. Roth. “Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 34, 383-387 (1984).
- A. Roth and M. Sotomayor. *Two-sided Matching: A Study in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis*. Cambridge University Press and Econometric Society Monographs (1990). Chapter 4.