

# Matching

Academic Year 2009-2010, Second Semester

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## Reading List 2: Structure and Paths to Stability

- Y. Blume, A. Roth, and U. Rothblume. “Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 76, 362-411 (1997).
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- B. Klaus and F. Klijn. “Corrigendum to ‘On randomized matching mechanisms’ [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381],” *Economic Theory* 32, 411-416 (2007).
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- A. Roth and J. Vande Vate. “Random paths to stability in two-sided matching,” *Econometrica* 58, 1475-1480 (1990).
- H. Sasaki and M. Toda. “Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 56, 218-227 (1992).
- M. Toda. “Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets,” *International Journal of Game Theory* 34, 13-31 (2006).