

Matching

Academic Year 2009-2010, Second Semester

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Reading List 1: Introduction and Stability

- A. Alkan. “Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings,” *Mathematical Social Sciences* 16, 207-209 (1988).
- D. Gale and L. Shapley. “College admissions and the stability of marriage,” *American Mathematical Monthly* 69, 9-15 (1962).
- D. Gusfield and R. Irving. *The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms*. The MIT Press (1989).
- H. Halaburda. “Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences,” forthcoming in *Games and Economic Behavior*.
- M. Niederle and A. Roth. “Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: gastroenterology with and without a centralized match,” *Journal of Political Economy* 111, 1342-1352 (2003).
- A. Roth. “The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory,” *Journal of Political Economy* 92, 991-1016 (1984).
- A. Roth. “A natural experiment in the organization of entry level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the U.K.,” *American Economic Review* 81, 415-440 (1991).
- A. Roth. “New physicians: a natural experiment in market organization,” *Science* 250, 1524-1528 (1990).
- A. Roth. “The economist as engineer: game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics,” *Econometrica* 70, 1341-1378 (2002).
- A. Roth. “The origins, history, and design of the resident match,” *Journal of the American Medical Association* 289, 909-912 (2003).
- A. Roth and E. Peranson. “The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design,” *American Economic Review* 89, 748-780 (1999).

- A. Roth and M. Sotomayor. *Two-sided Matching: A Study in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis*. Cambridge University Press and Econometric Society Monographs (1990).
- A. Roth and X. Xing. “Jumping the gun: imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions,” *American Economic Review* 84, 992-1044 (1994).
- M. Sotomayor. “A non-constructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 13, 135-137 (1996).
- U. Ünver. “On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms,” *International Journal of Game Theory* 33, 239-254 (2005).