We study collective decision making and mechanism design in contexts where groups, networks, and coalitions play an important role in shaping the individual incentives, and in general, in determining the outcome of the social choice. Our main contribution to the collective decision making is that we want to put emphasis on the structures of relationships that connect agents (exogenous or endogenous) as well as on the individual incentives that such structures generate.

We use decision theory, social choice theory and game theory together with network theory, coalition formation, and genetic algorithms to analyse different allocation problems (matching markets, public goods, etc.) as well as to study the design of institutions and organizations.

The concrete objectives consist of developing six lines of research where group formation, networks, and incentives determine the nature and stability of public decisions.

Researchers:

• Salvador Barberà Sández.
• Carmen Bevià Baeza.
• Jordi Massó Carreras.