## Preferences and Choice. Part 1

1. Consider the usual notation for indifference and strict preference. Show that if  $\succeq$  is complete and transitive, then

1.  $x \succ x$  is impossible (irreflexive)

2.  $x \succeq x$  for all  $x \in X$  (reflexive)

3.  $x \succ y \succeq z \implies x \succ z$ .

2. (Difficult) Kreps (1990) introduces another formal de notion for preferences. His primitive is a binary relation P interpreted as "strictly preferred". He requires P to satisfy

Asymmetry: For no x and y do we have both xPy and yPx.

Negative Transitivity: For all x; y, and  $z \in X$ , if xPy, then, for any z, either xPz or zPy (or both).

Explain the sense in which Kreps formalization of preferences is equivalent to the traditional definition, i.e., a complete and transitive relation. (Taken from Rubinstein PS1, 2.)

3. Let  $B = \{b_1, b_2, b_3\}$  be a set of boys and  $G = \{g_1, g_2\}$  a set of girls. A couple is a pair of one boy and one girl, e.g.,  $(b_3, g_2)$ . A decision maker is facing the problem of choosing a couple from a feasible set of alternatives  $\mathcal{A}$ . The family  $\mathcal{A}$  of feasible alternatives A (budgets in MWG) has two properties: (1) every  $A \subset \mathcal{A}$  contains exactly two couples and, (2) for every  $A \in \mathcal{A}$  each boy or girl appears in at most 1 couple.

(a) Describe formally the set of alternatives X for this problem.

(b) Provide the list of all the elements in  $\mathcal{A}$ .

(c) If you know that -if given the option- the decision maker chooses always the couple containing  $g_2$ , can you determine the choice rule C?

(d) Is the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) satisfied in this case?

4. Consider a choice structure with  $X = \{a, b, c, d, e\}$ ,  $\mathcal{A} = \{\{a, b, c\}, \{a, b, d\}, \{a, c, d\}, \{b, c, d\}\}$ and the choice correspondence given by

 $C(\{a, b, c\}) = \{a, c\}$   $C(\{a, b, d\}) = \{a\}$   $C(\{a, c, d\}) = \{a\}$   $C(\{b, c, d\}) = \{c\}$ Is WARP satisfied?

5. Think about this problem and discuss at the end of the TA session. No need to hand in your answers

The following are descriptions of decision-making procedures. Discuss whether the procedures can be described in the framework of the choice model and whether they are compatible with the rational man paradigm. (a) The decision maker chooses an alternative in order to maximize another persons suffering.

(b) The decision maker asks his two children to rank the alternatives and then chooses the alternative that is the best on average.

(c) The decision maker has an ideal point in mind and chooses the alternative that is closest to it.

(d) The decision maker looks for the alternative that appears most often in the choice set.

(e) The decision maker has an ordering in mind and always chooses the median element.

(Rubinstein, PS3 1.)